章节 1：速度与质量的迷思：打破权衡

📝 本节摘要：

主持人 Lenny 以一份调查开场，指出 Linear 是用户最渴望迁移到的工具。Nan Yu 分享了 Linear 的创立初衷——消除现有工具带来的痛苦。随后，对话深入探讨了 Linear 的核心哲学：速度与质量并非对立。Nan 认为，真正的专家因胜任而快速，而非草率。他提出一个具体的战术指标：在时间预算的前 10% 阶段就拿出一个可工作的版本，通过快速迭代来保证最终质量，而非追求首版即完美。

[原文] [Lenny]: Nan, thank you so much for being here and welcome to the podcast.

[译文] [Lenny]: Nan，非常感谢你的到来，欢迎来到这个播客。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Thanks for having me. I'm a long-time listener and reader, so it's really a treat to be here.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 谢谢邀请。我是（你栏目）长期的听众和读者，所以能来这里真的是一种享受。

[原文] [Lenny]: I want to share something with you to kick off that I haven't shared with you yet, that I haven't shared with anyone. These results might have come out by the time this podcast comes out, but I'm running a survey right now that I'm calling, "What's in your stack?" Where all my subscribers are asked, "What tools do you use most day to day? What tools do you love most? What tools do you hate?" And one of the questions asked was, what tool do you wish you could switch to if your IT department allowed you to? The number one answer by far is people want to switch from Jira to Linear.

[译文] [Lenny]: 开场我想和你分享一些我还没和你、甚至还没和任何人分享过的数据。这期播客发布时结果可能已经出来了，但我正在进行一项名为“你的技术栈里有什么？”的调查。我问所有的订阅者：“你日常最常使用的工具是什么？你最喜欢的工具是什么？你最讨厌的工具是什么？”其中有一个问题是，如果你们的 IT 部门允许，你最希望能切换到哪个工具？目前的头号答案遥遥领先：人们想从 Jira 切换到 Linear。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Wow. I mean, hopefully, that means we're doing a good job.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 哇。我是说，希望这意味着我们做得还不错。

[原文] [Lenny]: I think that's exactly what that means. I'll read a couple quotes to give you a sense of what people are saying about Linear. I doubt these are surprising to you, but this gives people a sense of why you're here and why I'm excited to extract as much wisdom as I can from you. So, a couple quotes here. "Linear is a joy to use as I interact with my engineering teams, and I find inspiration in its design." "Linear is simple to use, yet powerful." "Linear's design is obviously an industry benchmark, but moreover, the performance and speed is a massive productivity boost."

[译文] [Lenny]: 我觉得这正是这个意思。我会读几条引用，让你感受一下人们是如何评价 Linear 的。我想这些对你来说并不意外，但这能让大家明白为什么你今天会坐在这里，以及为什么我如此兴奋想从你身上挖掘尽可能多的智慧。这里有几句评价：“在与工程团队互动时，使用 Linear 是一种乐趣，我从它的设计中找到了灵感。”“Linear 使用简单，但功能强大。”“Linear 的设计显然是行业标杆，但更重要的是，其性能和速度极大地提升了生产力。”,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I mean, it's really good to hear that because in a lot of ways, that's what we're trying to do. If you think about the entire impetus behind why Linear was started, it's because Karri was sitting at Coinbase and Airbnb and these places and just watching everyone around him struggle using the tools that they had available and always incumbent tools and just seeing that it made people hate their day-to-day a little bit, and we all got into technology and design and engineering, all this kind of stuff because it was fun. All of us started off building stupid MySpace pages and all of these side projects when we were young, and it started off as this fun thing that we do, and we're like, "Wow, we get to do this for a career," and then to have all of this kind of stuff put these big speed bumps into our day-to-day workflow, it just was really sad. So, that's why we started Linear. This really bust through all of that.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 听到这些真的很好，因为在很多方面，这正是我们要做的。如果你回想 Linear 创立背后的全部动力，那是因为 Karri（Linear 创始人）当时在 Coinbase 和 Airbnb 这些地方，看着周围的人在使用现有工具和那些老牌工具时苦苦挣扎，眼看着这些工具让人们有点讨厌他们的日常工作了。我们当初投身科技、设计和工程这些领域，是因为它们很有趣。我们年轻时都是从制作愚蠢的 MySpace 页面和各种业余项目开始的，最初这是一种乐趣，我们会感叹：“哇，我们可以以此为职业。”然而，当这些东西给我们的日常工作流设置了巨大的减速带时，这真的很令人悲哀。所以，这就是我们创立 Linear 的原因。这真的是为了打破这一切。,

[原文] [Lenny]: What I love about Linear, I feel like it's an inspirational business because many people want to, "I'm going to build just a much better version of something," and often that doesn't actually work out. Often nobody cares enough. There's all these barriers and reasons. People don't switch to something that's better, and Linear is an amazing example of building an excellent product and actually succeeding, and there's a lot more to it maybe than just building an awesome product. So, that's what I'm excited to dig into and understand how you all operate, and I guess just based on these results, to me, this is the ultimate sign of product market fit. People being sad they can't use a product in B2B enterprise software especially, so let's get into it.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我喜欢 Linear 的一点在于，我觉得它是一个令人深受鼓舞的企业，因为很多人都想说，“我要打造一个比现有产品好得多的版本”，但通常这行不通。通常没人在乎。有各种各样的障碍和理由。人们不会仅仅因为某个东西更好就切换过去，而 Linear 是一个打造卓越产品并真正获得成功的惊人案例，这其中可能不仅仅是制造一个很棒的产品那么简单。所以，这正是我兴奋地想要深入挖掘并了解你们如何运作的原因。仅仅基于这些调查结果，对我来说，这就是产品市场契合度（PMF）的终极标志——人们因为无法使用某款产品而感到难过，特别是在 B2B 企业软件领域。所以，让我们开始吧。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: First question I want to get into is something that I think you see and the team at Linear sees that a lot of people don't see, which is that there's not actually a trade-off between speed and quality. I think a lot of people think this is just an innate fact and something I've heard you talk about is that's not actually true. I actually saw Patrick Collison tweet this exact point that I'll read after you... I want to hear your thoughts, but talk about what you've learned about how there's maybe not actually this trade-off between speed and quality.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我想探讨的第一个问题是，我认为你和 Linear 团队看到了一些很多人没看到的东西，那就是速度和质量之间其实并不存在权衡。我认为很多人认为这种权衡是一个天生的事实，但我听你谈到过这其实不是真的。我实际上看到 Patrick Collison 也发推文表达了完全相同的观点，稍后我会读出来……我想听听你的想法，谈谈关于速度和质量之间可能并不存在这种权衡，你学到了什么。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: People talk about this as if there were a trade-off almost in a naive way because when they think about speed, the thing they over index on is rushing or being sloppy, and what they should be indexing on is being really competent or being like an expert. So, if you look at people who are at the pinnacle of their craft, it could be anything. It could be like a chef or a programmer or someone building houses or something. You can basically tell how good the output is going to be of their work product by how fast they're going. If they're going really fast, and they're obviously not being sloppy and then leaving a mess all over the place, it's like, "Yeah. Well, they got there because this is just second nature to them," and they're able to go at a really rapid pace and try stuff. And when we're building software, that's such a big component of how good the product is on the other side of it, which is like, "How many iterations were you able to do?" So, the only way you're going to get a bunch of iterations done and try different things and really feel out these different variations is by just going very fast.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 人们谈论这个就像真的存在权衡一样，这种想法几乎有点天真，因为当他们想到“速度”时，他们过分关注的是仓促或草率；而他们应该关注的是真正的“胜任”或像专家一样。如果你看看那些处于行业巅峰的人，无论哪个行业，可能是厨师、程序员，或者是盖房子的人。你基本上可以通过他们的速度来判断他们的工作产出会有多好。如果他们动作非常快，而且显然没有草率行事或留下一堆烂摊子，你会觉得，“是的。嗯，他们能做到这一点是因为这对他们来说已经是第二天性了，”他们能够以非常快的节奏去尝试新事物。而在我们构建软件时，这是决定最终产品好坏的一个重要组成部分，即：“你能进行多少次迭代？”所以，要完成大量迭代、尝试不同事物并真正感知这些不同变体的唯一方法，就是行动非常快。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: In terms of speed, is the speed there moving quickly on each of iterations? Like what does speed look like when you say, "It can be done quickly and high quality"? What does speed look like?

[译文] [Lenny]: 就速度而言，这里的速度是指在每次迭代中快速移动吗？比如当你说“可以做得既快又高质量”时，这个速度看起来是什么样子的？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Speed... What it really looks like is you have some rough time budget for how long you think something's going to take, and by the time 10% of it has passed, you have a workable solution. It's not like, "Oh, at the halfway point, we have something that is maybe a candidate that we can play around with." It's like, no, no, no. After week one you have something that works that tests some kind of key hypothesis internally so that you can feel like is this thing actually panning out the way we expect it to or did we have some crazy incorrect assumption? And you don't want to wait until you're 80% done to be able to make that kind of judgment because then it's just too late. Then you're pushing deadlines out, and you're making your marketing team very sad.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 速度……它真正的样子是，你对某件事需要多长时间有一个粗略的时间预算，而在时间过去 10% 的时候，你就已经有了一个可行的解决方案。这不像说，“哦，等到一半的时候，我们要有一个也许可以玩一下的候选版本。”不是的，不不不。是在第一周之后，你就得有一个能工作的东西，用来在内部测试某种关键假设，这样你就能感觉到这东西是否真的如我们预期的那样发展，还是说我们要么有一些疯狂的错误假设？你不想等到完成了 80% 才做这种判断，因为那样就太晚了。那样你会推迟截止日期，你会让你的市场团队非常难过。,

[原文] [Lenny]: Amazing. Okay, so the way you think is, "We're going to spend a month on this feature. Let's get something workable. We can start testing with potential users even internally in the first few days, essentially in the first week"?

[译文] [Lenny]: 太棒了。好的，所以你的思路是，“我们要在这个功能上花一个月。让我们先弄出一个可用的东西。我们甚至可以在最初几天，基本上在第一周内，就开始在这个东西上测试潜在用户，即使是内部测试”？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yes. Yeah.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，没错。

[原文] [Lenny]: Yeah. I guess how can you do that? Because most teams can't do that. Most teams need to research, design, build. "Okay, cool. We have something," and once a month later, what allows you to do that?

[译文] [Lenny]: 是啊。我想问你们是怎么做到的？因为大多数团队做不到这一点。大多数团队需要研究、设计、构建。“好了，酷。我们有东西了，”那都是一个月后的事了。是什么让你们能做到这一点？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I mean, there's a lot of components of it. I think having really good talent really helps. Having engineers who don't get blocked by every single little design choice, they're happy to just make something workable. Even if they don't feel comfortable with that particular solution, they'll just bust through it and make something happen there. Part of it is intent. We don't have any expectation that the first version of it is going to be great. That is not in the cards. Look, the first version of it is our best guess in the general direction of what we want to actually ship in the end, and sometimes it works out. Sometimes, it's like, "Wow, this first version was pretty good. Let's make some minor adjustments, and we're good to go," but there's no expectation there. So, no one feels like they have to be a perfectionist and get everything, like all sanded down and really in tip-top shape. It just has to work and get the job done and validate or invalidate our major assumptions.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 嗯，这包含很多因素。我认为拥有真正优秀的人才确实很有帮助。拥有那些不会被每一个微小的设计选择卡住的工程师，他们乐于先做出一些可用的东西。即使他们对那个特定的解决方案不完全满意，他们也会冲破障碍，让东西先跑起来。部分原因在于意图（Intent）。我们不期望第一个版本会很棒。这不在计划之内。听着，第一个版本只是我们在最终想要交付的大方向上的最佳猜测。有时它成功了。有时你会觉得，“哇，这第一版还不错。我们做些小调整就可以发布了，”但我们并没有那种期望。所以，没人觉得必须成为完美主义者，把所有东西都打磨得平平整整、处于巅峰状态。它只需要能工作，能完成任务，并验证或推翻我们的主要假设。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: I'll read this quote from Patrick Collison. He tweeted this today as I was preparing for this interview, and he's the CEO and founder of Stripe, if you're not familiar. His tweet is, "I increasingly believe that 'good, cheap, fast -- choose two' maxim is devious misinformation spread by the slow. In my experience, slow and expensive usually go together."

[译文] [Lenny]: 我读一下 Patrick Collison 的这句名言。他正好在我准备这次采访的今天发了这条推文，如果你不熟悉的话，他是 Stripe 的 CEO 兼创始人。他的推文是：“我越来越相信‘好、便宜、快——三者只能选其二’这句格言是慢吞吞的人散布的狡猾的错误信息。根据我的经验，慢和贵通常是并存的。”,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly. I mean, use the contractor kind of example. Like If someone's making modifications to their house, and it's taking forever, one, you're in a hotel and also the bills are adding up.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，确实如此。就像用承包商的例子。如果有人在装修房子，而且花了很长时间，首先，你得住酒店，其次账单也在不断累积。

[原文] [Lenny]: The other example you used when we were chatting about this earlier is chess players. I'm thinking of Magnus Carlsen, watching him. I think he was number one in speed chess in addition to just regular chess and what a microcosm of this point.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我们之前聊天时你用的另一个例子是国际象棋选手。我想到了 Magnus Carlsen，看他下棋。我觉得他不仅是常规国际象棋第一，也是快棋第一，这正是这一点的缩影。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I think that's the case and Magnus and Hikaru and all those guys who are at the top of their game, they can go unbelievably fast. In fact, that's the usual... I mean, I don't want to get too out of my depth with chess, but the usual way you try to make the game fair is you give them much, much less time than someone who's not quite as strong of a player, and they'll still win a lot of time, too.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我觉得情况就是这样，Magnus 和 Hikaru 以及所有那些处于巅峰状态的人，他们的速度快得令人难以置信。事实上，通常……我不想在国际象棋上谈论太多我不懂的，但通常让比赛公平的方法是给他们比不那么强的选手少得多、少得多的时间，而他们通常还是会赢。

[原文] [Lenny]: So, maybe just to close out this point and give someone something concrete they can do with this information, say they want to start moving faster while not cutting quality, what do you think they can do? What's one thing they can start trying to work on and improving in the way they operate?

[译文] [Lenny]: 那么，也许为了结束这一点的讨论，给人们一些利用这些信息可以做的具体事情，假设他们想要开始跑得更快而不降低质量，你觉得他们能做什么？有什么事情是他们可以开始尝试并在运作方式上改进的？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I think it's really that sort of attitude and point of view question to understand and take the almost controlled risk that the first version of this is not going to be perfect. So, it actually makes it a lot cheaper in many ways. It means you don't need a pixel perfect design. It means you don't need to make sure that all of the little UI bugs and stuff like that are solved because none of that really matters. What matters is you have working software that you can interact with, and you can see if it feels good. Does it actually solve the core problem that is facing our users? You can take it back to users. You can even let them into an early beta or something like that and get real validation there and to really focus on getting the smallest, shippable element, like not shippable in the sense of, "I can actually put on the production," but in the sense of like, "I can start learning from here."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我认为这实际上是一种态度和观点的问题，要理解并承担一种近乎受控的风险，即第一个版本不会是完美的。所以在很多方面这实际上让成本低了很多。这意味着你不需要像素级完美的设计。这意味着你不需要确保所有的小 UI 错误之类的东西都被解决，因为这些都不重要。重要的是你有一个可以交互的工作软件，你可以看看它的感觉是否良好。它真的解决了我们要面对的用户的核心问题吗？你可以把它带回给用户。你甚至可以让他们进入早期测试版之类的地方，从中获得真正的验证，真正专注于获得最小的、可发布（shippable）的元素——这里的“可发布”不是指“我可以把它放到生产环境上”，而是指“我可以开始从中学习了”。,

[原文] [Lenny]: Just a question I imagine is in everyone's mind is what do you do with this first very ugly V1... not ugly, not fully ready, first version. Is this something you're using internally to see if it's something? Is it something you have beta design partners with?

[译文] [Lenny]: 这是一个我想每个人心里都有的问题，你怎么处理这个最初非常丑陋的 V1 版本……不是丑陋，是不完全准备好的第一版。这是你们内部用来看看是否可行东西吗？还是你们有与之合作的 Beta 设计伙伴？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: We have a gradually increasing sort of circle of users that use every single feature. So, by the time it hits GA, by the time it gets released, it's been used by a lot of different users up to that point. So, the first circle is just internal users. We use Linear every single day to write software and do our own work, so we have that kind of advantage and then once we feel like it's good enough, we'll put it into some beta customer group, and again, as early as we can in the process. We have to make sure that we don't end up corrupting people's data, and it doesn't look hideous and that kind of stuff, but as long as it reaches that level of quality, we can release it to early access customers who can give us good feedback and also just try to solve their problems with it. If no one engages with it, if no one's using it, then that's a good signal that we didn't really hit the mark, and then we have a couple of different beta audiences that we grow and then the ultimate release obviously is for GA where everyone gets it.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我们有一个逐渐扩大的用户圈子来使用每一个功能。所以，等到它正式发布（GA），等到它被放出来的时候，在那之前已经被很多不同的用户使用过了。所以，第一个圈子只是内部用户。我们每天都用 Linear 编写软件和做我们自己的工作，所以我们有这种优势。然后一旦我们觉得它足够好了，我们会把它放入一些 Beta 客户群，同样的，在流程中尽早进行。我们必须确保我们不会最终破坏人们的数据，而且它看起来不那么难看之类的，但只要达到那个质量水平，我们就可以发布给那些能给我们提供良好反馈并尝试用它解决问题的早期访问客户。如果没人参与，如果没人在用它，那就是一个很好的信号，说明我们并没有真正切中要害。然后我们有几个不同的 Beta 受众群体逐步扩大，最后的发布显然就是 GA，每个人都能用到。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: That's an amazing answer. Okay, so secret number one to Linear success, I'm going to take some notes here, is get new feature, product ideas out to people as early as possible, say, in the first 10% of the amount of time you've allotted, and then release it increasingly to more and more people to get feedback. I think the implication here is just most wasted time is on building things nobody actually ends up wanting or using. So, the sooner you at least get directional sense of are you heading in a good direction, the faster it all go?

[译文] [Lenny]: 这是一个很棒的回答。好的，所以 Linear 成功的第一个秘密——我要做点笔记了——是尽可能早地把新功能、产品创意展示给人们，比如在你分配的时间的前 10% 阶段，然后逐渐发布给越来越多的人以获得反馈。我认为这里的含义是，大多数浪费的时间都花在构建那些最终没人真正想要或使用的东西上。所以，你越早获得至少是方向性的感知，知道你是否朝着好的方向发展，一切就会进行得越快？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, totally.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，完全正确。

章节 2：对抗软件臃肿：优先考虑独立贡献者（IC）

📝 本节摘要：

本章直面了企业级软件最常见的痛点——臃肿。Nan Yu 揭示了 Linear 保持产品简洁的核心策略：坚决拒绝为了满足中层管理者的汇报需求而牺牲独立贡献者（IC）体验的功能。他指出这不仅关乎用户体验，更关乎数据质量：如果工具让工程师感到痛苦，他们就会随意填写数据，导致汇报失效。此外，Nan 分享了在销售谈判中对抗“功能愿望清单”的技巧——专注于解决客户最重要的前三个问题，而非盲目堆砌功能。

[原文] [Lenny]: I imagine a criticism you all get. People are like, "Yes, Linear is so great, so beautiful, so much better than what's been out there for decades," but over time you'll probably become a bloated piece of software as well. That's just the fate of enterprise software. You have to check all these checkboxes. IT teams need all these features. So, there's always this like, "Oh, yeah, sure, you guys can operate this way for now. You have an amazing product for now, but it'll get ugly and bloated." How do you think about avoiding that? I know it's something you spent a lot of time thinking about. Maybe give us a glimpse into some of the conversations you have internally when there's these feature requests like, "Oh, I need single sign-on with this thing and this button here." How do you think about what to add, what not to add, and how to add these features to not make it bloated?,,

[译文] [Lenny]: 我能想象你们会收到一种批评。人们会说，“是的，Linear 很棒，很漂亮，比这几十年来的产品都要好得多，”但也觉得随着时间的推移，你们可能也会变成一个臃肿的软件。这似乎就是企业级软件的宿命。你必须勾选所有的功能框。IT 团队需要所有这些特性。所以总会有这种声音：“噢，是的，当然，你们现在可以这样运作。你们现在的产品很棒，但它最终会变得丑陋和臃肿。”你是怎么考虑避免这种情况的？我知道这是你花了很多时间思考的问题。也许可以让我们看一眼你们内部在面对这些功能请求时的讨论，比如“噢，我们需要这个东西的单点登录（SSO），还有这里的这个按钮。”你们是如何考虑加什么、不加什么，以及如何在添加这些功能时不让软件变臃肿的？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: This question actually comes to us a lot from candidates that are interviewing with us. When you go like, "Hey, do you have any questions for us?" This is the question that we're going to get. So, we hear it quite a lot, and it's very sensible for them to ask it because they see history being littered with the corpses of startups trying to compete in this space and not making it, and I think when we examine this problem, we look at, "Well, what kind of feature requests can we debate and what kind of feature requests do we absolutely have to say no to?" And the stuff that we absolutely have to say no to is also the exact kind of thing that leads to this bloatedness that makes ICs hate their lives, and it's very specific. It's customization features requested by middle managers in order to make reporting a little bit easier at the cost of making IC workflows worse.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 这个问题其实很多来面试的候选人也会问我们。当你问，“嘿，你有什么问题要问我们吗？”我们要面对的就是这个问题。所以我们经常听到这个，他们问这个也很合情合理，因为他们看到历史上到处都是试图在这个领域竞争却失败了的初创公司的尸体。我认为当我们审视这个问题时，我们会看，“好吧，哪些功能请求我们可以讨论，而哪些功能请求我们必须绝对说不？”那些我们必须绝对说不的东西，正是导致这种让独立贡献者（ICs）痛恨生活的臃肿感的罪魁祸首，而且它非常具体。那就是中层管理者为了让汇报稍微容易一点，不惜以牺牲 IC 工作流体验为代价而要求的定制化功能。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: It's like if it fits that description, we're just saying, "No." There's no debate because we've already thought about it and this is the thing that we can't take a single step down this path. So, I think that's honestly one of the core promises of Linear is that we will not make this particular trade-off. So, when you see people saying like, "Wow, Linear is so much faster. It's so much easier to use and it makes my work so much more enjoyable." This is the reason because we have not taken a single step in this direction. It's very easy for a PM to say yes to this kind of request because often they're talking with buyers. Any kind of B2B type of space, they're talking with whoever the gatekeeper is and sales is putting pressure on them, and they're saying like, "Hey, we really want this one feature. It's going to make our reporting nicer." So, the director's going to be really excited by this, and we'll definitely make a buying decision based off of this, and we have to convince them that this is a false trade-off. The whole premise is wrong because the moment you start going down this path, and you make the IC user experience worse, they're just going to disengage.,,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 只要符合这个描述，我们就直接说“不”。没有辩论的余地，因为我们已经思考过了，这是我们在这一路径上一步都不能退让的事情。所以，我认为这实际上是 Linear 的核心承诺之一，即我们不会做这种特定的权衡。所以，当你看到人们说，“哇，Linear 快多了。它更容易使用，让我的工作更有趣了。”这就是原因，因为我们在那个方向上一步都没走。对于产品经理（PM）来说，答应这类请求是很容易的，因为他们通常是在和买家谈。在任何 B2B 领域，他们都在和把关人谈，销售人员也会给他们施压，说：“嘿，我们真的想要这个功能。它会让我们的汇报更漂亮。”所以总监会对此很兴奋，我们肯定会基于这个做购买决定。但我们必须说服他们这是一个错误的权衡（false trade-off）。整个前提都是错的，因为一旦你开始走这条路，让 IC 的用户体验变差，他们就会直接停止参与。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: No one has to do this. If I'm an engineer, I get paid to write code. My performance review is based on my code contribution. It's not based on like, "Did I fill in all the tickets right?" So, I'm just not going to do that part, or I'm going to do it very sporadically, and then I'm just going to focus on my actual job. And then all your reporting is wrong because all the data is wrong, and it's sparse, and you get situations where people will... They'll say like, "Well, here's a dropdown field that someone put in here that's required." There's nine choices. I don't know what any of them meet, so I'm just going to pick one at random. I'm still going to pick the first one. Also, I'm going to pray that my boss is not actually using this data to do any kind of reporting and that has consequence because the data can't possibly be correct. So, I think for us, it's a very easy decision when it comes to that particular category of feature request.,,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 没人必须做这个。如果我是个工程师，我是拿工资写代码的。我的绩效评估是基于我的代码贡献。而不是基于“我是否正确填写了所有的工单？”所以，我就不会做那部分，或者我会做得非常零星，然后我就专注于我的本职工作。接着你所有的汇报都是错的，因为所有的数据都是错的，而且很稀疏。你会遇到这样的情况……人们会说，“好吧，这里有个下拉菜单是必填项。”有九个选项。我不知道它们都是什么意思，所以我随手选一个。我就选第一个。同时，我在祈祷我的老板实际上没用这些数据做任何汇报，也没产生什么后果，因为这数据根本不可能是对的。所以，对我们来说，当涉及到那一类特定的功能请求时，这是一个非常容易做的决定。

[原文] [Lenny]: I love how simple and clear that is. Basically, you all have a policy. We'll prioritize ICs over middle managers. Especially, like I love that it's around reporting. Almost always it sounds like, "I want to track what's happening."

[译文] [Lenny]: 我喜欢这种简单明了的方式。基本上，你们有一项政策：我们将优先考虑 IC（独立贡献者）而不是中层管理者。特别是，我喜欢这是围绕着“汇报”这一点。几乎总是听起来像，“我想追踪正在发生什么。”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly. It's always, "I want to track what's happening." Well, what do you want to track? Well, I want to track which version of the product this thing's tied to based on some field information. It's like, okay, how is the person working on this supposed to even know that information? Well, it takes like a five-minute scavenger hunt every single time. It's like, "I don't think they're going to do that, man.",

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，没错。总是“我想追踪正在发生什么。”好吧，你想追踪什么？嗯，我想根据某些字段信息追踪这个东西是和哪个版本的产品绑定的。这就好像，好吧，在这个任务上工作的人怎么可能知道那个信息呢？嗯，这每次都需要像做五分钟的寻宝游戏一样。那就好像在说，“伙计，我觉得他们根本不会去做的。”

[原文] [Lenny]: What I imagine happens, and I think why this is hard for most companies is there's an implication that you're turning down deals. You're not adding that one feature that will close a massive million-dollar sale, very difficult to do. I imagine it helps a lot that... I imagine the COO is very bought into this and there's this, "We will win long-term holding the line on this." Is that right?,

[译文] [Lenny]: 我能想象会发生什么，这也是我认为大多数公司很难做到这一点的原因，因为这意味着你在拒绝交易。你不添加那个能促成百万美元大单的功能，这很难做到。我想这很有帮助的是……我猜 COO 对此非常认同，并且有一种观念是，“只要我们坚持这条底线，我们将在长期赢得胜利。”是这样吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, it is, but I also think that there's not as much pressure as you would expect to do these kinds of things. There are basic scaling things, like we had to make SAML and SCIM and that kind of stuff. It's like, "Yeah, sure, we're going to do those sorts of, like keep the lights on type of work," but when it comes to work that's related to the actual business logic of the app's value proposition, what buyers care about is, is this going to make their team more effective? That's the reason that they're making this buying decision in the first place is that they're like, "Well, the current situation we're in... " And especially with large companies, right? The current situation we're in is a mess, and if we can convince them that these types of things are actually the reason that it's a mess, then we can really navigate them out of wanting them in the first place.,,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 确实如此，但我也认为做这类事情的压力并没有你想象的那么大。有一些基本的扩展性功能，比如我们必须做 SAML 和 SCIM 之类的东西。这就好像，“是的，当然，我们会做那些维持基本运转的工作，”但在涉及到与应用价值主张的实际业务逻辑相关的工作时，买家关心的是，这会让他们的团队更高效吗？ 这才是他们最初做购买决定的原因，因为他们觉得，“嗯，我们目前的处境……”特别是大公司，对吧？我们目前的处境是一团糟，如果我们能说服他们，正是这些（想要追踪的）东西导致了一团糟，那么我们就能真正引导他们从一开始就不想要这些东西。

[原文] [Lenny]: Got it. So, there's an element of you think you need this, but it turns out you'll be more successful and get everything you want, not getting this?

[译文] [Lenny]: 明白了。所以有一种成分是，你以为你需要这个，但事实证明，如果不那样做，你会更成功并得到你想要的一切？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, and the thing is, it's not everything you want, right? Because people come with a laundry list, and it's like laundry list. Here's 10 things I want. You're like, "Do you want all of those 10 things equally?" They're like, "No, actually I don't." The first three are the things that really matter to us. If we solve the first three, then the other stuff, we can negotiate on. So, our job is to solve the first three-way better than anybody else that if they got through the first three through some kind of visual programming, customization type of thing, that it's never going to get to the quality level and the depth that we're able to offer by offering those as native features.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，而且问题在于，这并不是你想要的一切，对吧？因为人们会带着一份冗长的清单（Laundry List）来，就像是一份愿望清单。我要这 10 样东西。你会问，“这 10 样东西你都同样想要吗？”他们会说，“不，其实不是。”前三样才是对我们真正重要的。如果我们解决了前三样，那么其他东西我们可以商量。所以，我们的工作是把前三样解决得比其他任何人都好，以至于如果他们通过某种可视化编程或定制化的方式来解决前三样，永远无法达到我们通过提供原生功能所能提供的质量水平和深度。

章节 3：深度挖掘：寻找具体的用户与真实场景

📝 本节摘要：

本章首先触及了 Linear 在企业市场的扩张策略，Nan 指出企业软件的购买决策往往源于品牌认同感（"这是为我们这类公司准备的"）。随后，对话进入核心议题：如何处理复杂的功能辩论？Nan 提出了一条黄金法则：不要通过假设性的“用户画像（Persona）”来构建产品，而要找到“具体的某个人（Bob from Company X）”。他介绍了“退火（Annealing）”过程——即将不完美的产品推向现实世界进行锤炼。最后，他以“客户请求（Customer Requests）”功能为例（源于沃尔玛的需求），展示了如何通过连接销售与工程数据，既满足了管理层的追踪需求，又保护了工程师免受繁琐流程的打扰。

[原文] [Lenny]: It's interesting thinking back to that survey I shared where the tool people want to switch to if IT allowed them was Linear, and on the one hand you could argue, "Well, okay, IT is not letting them use Linear for all these reasons. On the other hand, you guys are growing really quickly within enterprise, like you're a new business. You started, I think, mid-market startups, and now you're working way up. So, I think it's not fair to say it's not going to work in enterprise. It's clearly working really well. I don't know if there's any stats you can share anything of that, but it seems to be going well, expanding up market.

[译文] [Lenny]: 回想我分享的那份调查很有趣，人们在 IT 部门允许的情况下最想切换的工具是 Linear。一方面你可以争辩说，“好吧，IT 部门不让他们用 Linear 是有各种原因的。”但另一方面，你们在企业级市场增长得非常快，你们还是个新业务。我想你们是从中端市场的初创公司起步的，现在正在向高端市场进军。所以我认为说它在企业级市场行不通是不公平的。显然它运作得很好。我不知道你是否可以分享一些相关的数据，但这看起来进展顺利，正在向高端市场扩展。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I mean, growth has been good. Growth in enterprise has been leading the other segments because I think this year, especially we reached a tipping point where I think with software, so much of the buying decision is based on almost like a brand thing, like is this for us? A lot of times people pick "enterprise software." It's like, "Why? You know everyone doesn't want this," and they're like, "Yeah, but it's for us."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，增长确实不错。企业级市场的增长一直领先于其他细分市场，因为我认为今年，特别是我们到达了一个引爆点。我认为对于软件来说，很多购买决定几乎是基于一种品牌因素，比如“这是为我们准备的吗？”很多时候人们选择“企业级软件”。你会问，“为什么？你知道大家都不想要这个，”他们会说，“是的，但这是为我们这种公司准备的。”

[原文] [Lenny]: You won't get fired for buying Microsoft or whatever.

[译文] [Lenny]: 就像“没人会因为购买微软而被解雇”之类的。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly, and I think that we're starting to have enough brand penetration amongst enterprises where people can have that feeling, right? They're like, "Hey, Linear is for us. Who are we? Well, we are a large company that wants to act like a startup." It's like, "Who doesn't want that? Who doesn't want to go fast?"

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，没错。我认为我们开始在企业中拥有足够的品牌渗透率，让人们产生这种感觉，对吧？他们会觉得，“嘿，Linear 是为我们准备的。我们是谁？嗯，我们是一家想要像初创公司一样行动的大公司。”这就像是说，“谁不想要那样呢？谁不想走得快呢？”

[原文] [Lenny]: Yeah. I had Jeffrey Moore on the podcast, and this is exactly what crossing the chasm looks like. He talked about basically you need someone that's across the chasm like a later adopter that isn't the person that's, "I love new stuff, and I'm an early adopter kind of evangelist." You need someone that's like traditional old school, takes their time to start to adopt it for you to be like, "Oh, okay. Now, maybe I should really take it seriously."

[译文] [Lenny]: 是的。我曾经邀请 Jeffrey Moore（《跨越鸿沟》作者）上过播客，这正是“跨越鸿沟”的样子。他谈到，基本上你需要一些处于鸿沟另一边的、更晚期的采用者，而不是那些说“我喜欢新东西，我是个早期采用者布道师”的人。你需要那些传统的、老派的、花时间慢慢接受的人开始采用它，你才会觉得，“噢，好的。现在，也许我真的应该认真对待它了。”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I also think that with this particular category of tool, and with a lot of other B2B software, not... Like no means not now, right? Not right now because it doesn't fit our budget. It doesn't fit our change management situation. "Oh, we have this exec that's really wedded to this other tool," but those things change, right? So, we keep in contact with them. They're in our CRM where we make sure we follow up, and we've had a lot of these where we've been said no to, like two years ago, and now we have some new features, and then go like, "Oh, yeah, it seems like you're ready for our scale," or whatever.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我也认为对于这类特定工具，以及很多其他 B2B 软件来说，“不”……“不”意味着“不是现在”，对吧？不是现在，因为它不符合我们的预算。它不符合我们的变更管理情况。“噢，我们有位高管非常执着于另一个工具，”但这些事情是会变的，对吧？所以，我们要与他们保持联系。他们在我们的 CRM（客户关系管理系统）里，我们要确保跟进。我们有很多这样的案例，两年前我们被拒绝了，而现在我们要么有了一些新功能，然后他们会说，“噢，是的，看起来你们已经准备好适应我们的规模了，”或者诸如此类。

[原文] [Lenny]: You mentioned that when you have these debates and questions that come out, you have features that a big company wants. There's this category of, "We know we will not build things for middle managers that want reporting and custom stuff just to track what's happening," versus something an IC wants to be more productive and successful, Linear. Give us a little sense of some of the more complicated debates that aren't necessarily in that bucket.

[译文] [Lenny]: 你提到当你们面临这些辩论和问题时，大公司会有功能需求。有一类是“我们知道我们不会为那些只想要汇报和定制东西来追踪进度的中层管理者开发功能”，与之相对的是 IC（独立贡献者）为了更高效和成功而想要的功能。能不能给我们举一些不一定属于这一类（非黑即白）的、更复杂的辩论例子？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I think the complicated debates are often when we do add a new native feature, do we extend an existing feature and make it more powerful or do we add a new sort of service? And a big part of that is trying to figure out exactly who's going to use it, what are the actual real life use cases that we know about? Like that I know that Bob from Company X has this workflow and this is how it would work for him. Here are the different variations where it would work. So, tying it all the way back to real people is-

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我认为复杂的辩论通常发生在我们确实要添加一个新的原生功能时：我们是扩展现有的功能让它更强大，还是添加一种新的服务？这其中很大一部分是试图弄清楚到底谁会使用它，我们所知道的真实生活中的用例是什么？比如，我知道 X 公司的 Bob 有这个工作流，这对他来说是如何运作的。以下是它起作用的几种不同变体。所以，把它一路关联回真实的人是——

[原文] [Lenny]: Like a specific person?

[译文] [Lenny]: 比如一个具体的人？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, specific person. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. Not a hypothetical person. Not one that you made up like Alice, Bob, or whatever. It's like, "No, here's the first name, last name. Here's their email. You can ask them," and I think that being able to tie it all the way back to reality in that way is a big part of how we really think about and discuss these things.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，具体的人。是的，没错。不是一个假设的人。不是你编出来的像 Alice 或 Bob 之类的那种（用户画像）。而是像，“不，这是名字，这是姓氏。这是他们的电子邮件。你可以去问他们，”我认为能够以这种方式将其一路关联回现实，是我们真正思考和讨论这些问题的重要部分。

[原文] [Lenny]: This connects the way I think about my newsletter is I always try to answer the question a very specific, like a person actually asked, not a general sense of something people may be interested in, and that very specific question, like it implies there's a need. Like not implies, it proves there's at least one person who needs this thing versus you have this idea of somebody that may want this thing.

[译文] [Lenny]: 这和我思考我的简报（Newsletter）的方式很像，我总是试图回答一个非常具体的问题，比如一个人实际问过的问题，而不是那种人们可能感兴趣的大概感觉。那个非常具体的问题，它暗示了一种需求。或者说不是暗示，它证明了至少有一个人需要这个东西，而不是你有一个“某人可能想要这个东西”的想法。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. I think a trap that a lot of times PMs will fall into is they'll make something, and they'll make some choices in it because maybe it's beautiful or it's elegant, but they don't go the step of like, "Is reality also beautiful and elegant?" Because reality is ugly sometimes, and if you have a beautiful and elegant solution that doesn't match with reality, it doesn't really matter. People can look at it, and they can ooh and ah, but if they don't use it to get their work done, it's never going to have long-term staying power.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。我认为很多时候产品经理（PM）会掉进一个陷阱，他们制造一些东西，并在其中做一些选择，可能因为这很美或者很优雅，但他们没有迈出那一步去问，“现实也是美丽和优雅的吗？”因为现实有时是丑陋的，如果你有一个美丽优雅的解决方案却与现实不匹配，那也没什么用。人们可以看着它，发出“噢”、“啊”的赞叹，但如果他们不用它来完成工作，它永远不会有长期的生命力。

[原文] [Lenny]: Do you have a heuristic of how often you need to hear something for you to... could be just convinced, this is worth investing in? People may hear this, "Oh, one Bob. Bob wants this featured." That doesn't make sense. It's just one guy. How do you know when it's like, "Okay, we should really invest in this"?

[译文] [Lenny]: 你有没有某种启发式方法（Heuristic），比如你需要听到某件事多少次才能……或者说被说服这值得投资？人们听到这里可能会说，“噢，只有一个 Bob。Bob 想要这个功能。”这说不通。这只是一个人。你怎么知道什么时候该说，“好了，我们真的应该投资这个了”？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Part of it is you hear something, and you're like, "Gosh, that actually is... " Not only is that true. It means that the way we thought about this was a little bit wrong, and I call this process... I don't know if it's the right way to describe it. I call it annealing where you have a thing, and it's not quite the right shape, and you put it out into the wild. So, this happens way in the first bit of the life of a particular feature. You release a thing, and then you start getting feedback about it, about hey, it doesn't quite fit reality, and then you ask yourself like, "Did we test that aspect of it? Did we actually match that part to reality?" And if you didn't, then it's like that's the part where you don't actually need that many pieces of feedback against it. It's not really a volume thing. It's like, "Did we think about this right or wrong?" That's one sort of category.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 部分原因是你听到某件事，你会觉得，“天哪，那确实是……”这不仅是真的。这意味着我们对此的思考方式有点错了。我把这个过程称为……我不知道这是否是正确的描述方式。我称之为退火（Annealing），就是你有一个东西，它的形状不太对，你把它放到野外去。所以，这通常发生在一个特定功能生命周期的最初阶段。你发布了一个东西，然后开始收到反馈，说嘿，这不太符合现实，然后你问自己，“我们测试过那个方面吗？我们真的把那部分与现实匹配了吗？”如果你没有，那么这就是那种你其实不需要太多反馈就能确认的部分。这真的不是数量的问题。而是，“我们想得对还是错？”这是一类情况。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Another category is just you're getting a request for maybe a very big feature or a feature set from a lot of different people, but then you dig in, and you try to say like, "Okay. Well, tell me about how you're trying to use this," and there's 100 different use cases. So, you have choices here. You can either build the big feature that covers all the long tail of use cases or you can try to see if there's really concentrated pools of use cases for this that really make a lot of sense to adopt as a first order type of feature. So, I think those are the two sort of strategies that we employ the most. It's like, "Did we think about this wrong? And now we're just learning something about how it matches reality or for this big general feature that people are asking for, are there actually more specific use cases that we should be solving, and we should be solving really, really well?"

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 另一类情况是，你可能从很多不同的人那里收到关于一个非常大的功能或功能集的请求，但当你深入挖掘，试着问，“好的。告诉我你想怎么使用这个，”结果有 100 种不同的用例。所以这里你有选择。你可以构建一个覆盖所有长尾用例的大功能，或者你可以试着看看是否有真正集中的用例池，将其作为一级功能来采纳是非常合理的。我认为这基本上是我们最常采用的两种策略。即：“我们是不是想错了？现在我们只是在学习它如何与现实匹配；或者对于人们要求的这个大的通用功能，实际上有没有我们应该解决的更具体的用例，而且是我们应该解决得非常非常好的？”

[原文] [Lenny]: A thread that's coming through so far across a lot of these examples is getting to the specific person using the thing and making them happy and making sure the ask is going to solve their actual problem. In the case of looking at the IC versus the middle manager, in this case, it's like, "Let's talk to the person actually asking for this thing," not, "There's like 100 people generally asking for this thing and let's build what we think is a general solution."

[译文] [Lenny]: 目前贯穿这些例子的一个线索是，要找到使用这个东西的具体的人，让他们开心，并确保这个请求能解决他们的实际问题。在审视 IC 与中层管理者的案例中，就像是说，“让我们和实际要求这个东西的人谈谈，”而不是，“大概有 100 个人在要求这个东西，让我们构建一个我们认为通用的解决方案。”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. I'll give you an example of all of these things, which we just launched a feature called Customer Requests, and basically what this does, it adds a new concept of Linear, which is a customer. For B2B companies, this is very relevant, and the reason we did this is because we kept getting this request for fully customized fields, and we would be like, "Well, what is it that you want with your custom fields?" Because the problem is you add 100 custom fields and all your ICs start hating it. So, we don't want to go down that path, but what is it actually you're trying to do?

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。我给你举一个包含所有这些要素的例子，我们刚刚发布了一个叫“客户请求（Customer Requests）”的功能，这基本上是在 Linear 中增加了一个新概念，即“客户”。对于 B2B 公司来说，这非常相关。我们之所以这么做，是因为我们要么一直收到关于完全自定义字段的请求，我们会问，“嗯，你想用自定义字段做什么？”因为问题是，如果你加了 100 个自定义字段，你所有的 IC（工程师）都会开始讨厌它。所以，我们不想走那条路，但你实际上想做什么呢？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: And 40% of them were because, "Well, I have a customer," like Walmart or whatever, right? Like, "Walmart asked for this feature, and it's really important. I need everyone to know that Walmart needs this. I need to track it. I need to see how have we report... " We can report on what have we done for Walmart over the past year so that when my CSM has a one-on-one conversation with a rep, they can have some kind of evidence that we've been doing stuff for them, like all this kind of stuff.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 结果 40% 的原因是因为，“嗯，我有一个客户，”比如沃尔玛（Walmart）或者其他什么，对吧？比如，“沃尔玛要求这个功能，这真的很重要。我需要每个人都知道沃尔玛需要这个。我需要追踪它。我需要看看我们如何汇报……”我们可以汇报过去一年我们为沃尔玛做了什么，这样当我的客户成功经理（CSM）与对方代表进行一对一对话时，他们能有一些证据表明我们一直在为他们做事，诸如此类的事情。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: We're like, "Okay. Cool." That sounds like a very useful and powerful thing you want to do. How do you expect people to tag these things? Well, manually, because that's how we did it in our spreadsheets. It's like, "Okay, instead of that, we're going to hook up with your customer support tools. We're going to hook up with your CRNs. We're going to automatically bring in feedback from these companies. We're going to analyze the emails where they're from, and then if someone requests a feature that gets escalated into engineering, it'll just be tagged with whoever asked for it. You don't have to do anything, but you will know, and you can still report on this stuff, but there's nothing about this that makes ICs lives harder.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我们就觉得，“好的。酷。”这听起来你想做一件非常有用且强大的事情。那你期望人们如何标记这些东西呢？嗯，手动标记，因为我们在电子表格里就是这么做的。我们就说，“好的，与其那样，我们要连接你们的客户支持工具。我们要连接你们的 CRM。我们要自动导入这些公司的反馈。我们要分析邮件的来源，然后如果有人请求了一个被升级到工程部门的功能，它就会自动标记上是谁请求的。你什么都不用做，但你会知道，你仍然可以汇报这些东西，但这其中没有任何东西会让 IC 的生活变得更艰难。”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: In fact, it makes them feel more confident because when they're building the thing, they actually understand who's asking for it and exactly what the email said. So, when they're doing the design or the details, they can actually see the real-life use cases that are present and solve for those directly.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 事实上，这让他们感觉更有信心，因为当他们在构建这个东西时，他们实际上了解是谁在要求它，以及邮件里具体说了什么。所以，当他们做设计或细节时，他们实际上可以看到摆在面前的现实生活用例，并直接解决这些问题。

[原文] [Lenny]: As I'm hearing this, it's like, "Okay, obviously, this seems like an obvious solution. Of course, 40% of people telling me they have customers." In reality, most of the time, if you hear from a bunch of your customers, "Hey, I need this custom field," and sometimes you hear one thing, sometimes you hear another. Most of the time you're going to build this custom field.

[译文] [Lenny]: 听你这么说，感觉就像，“好的，显然，这似乎是个显而易见的解决方案。当然，40% 的人告诉我他们有客户。”但在现实中，大多数时候，如果你听到一群客户说，“嘿，我需要这个自定义字段，”有时你听到这个，有时听到那个。大多数时候你会直接去构建这个自定义字段。

章节 4：情感化产品设计：解决“感觉糟糕”的时刻

📝 本节摘要：

本章深入探讨了同理心在产品设计中的实战应用。Nan 提出，产品经理的目标不应只是理解用户的功能需求，而是要“像用户一样感到难过”。他反对仅停留在逻辑层面的“五个为什么”，主张挖掘请求背后的焦虑（如害怕无法升职或部门冲突）。通过“模糊截止日期”和“Triage（分诊）”这两个具体案例，他展示了如何识别并消除用户习以为常的痛苦（Schlep Blindness），从而在竞争激烈的市场中建立情感连接。

[原文] [Lenny]: Something that your head of sales shared with me is how impressed he is with the way you ask questions on customer calls and just keep digging and digging until you get to something that is an insight for you, and then you start to try to solve the problem for them and think about what the product might be, and I think this is such an important and underappreciated skill for PMs. Is there any advice you could share of just how you approach this, how you ask questions, how you think about these customer calls to get to, "Okay, now, I see what we need to build versus let's just build what they're asking for"?

[译文] [Lenny]: 你们的销售主管和我分享过，他对你在客户电话中提问的方式印象深刻，你会不断地挖掘、挖掘，直到你获得某种洞察，然后你才开始尝试为他们解决问题，并思考产品应该是什么样的。我认为这是产品经理一项非常重要且被低估的技能。关于你是如何处理这个问题的，你是如何提问的，你是如何思考这些客户电话从而得出“好吧，现在我明白了我们需要构建什么，而不是仅仅构建他们所要求的东西”的，你有什么建议可以分享吗？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: It's funny because I think from the outside, I'm on these sales calls and then the AE or someone's watching me ask these questions, and I think often they're like, "What are you doing? You're just asking questions from angles that I don't even know what your goal is here," and my goal is to feel bad in the same way that customers feel bad. They come to us with a request, "Hey, we want X," and it's like there's something motivating it and you can do the normal analytical thing and be like, "Ask five whys," and try to figure out like, "Well, what are your goals?" "And as a persona X, I want to achieve this outcome."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 这很有趣，因为我觉得从旁观者角度看，我参加这些销售电话，然后客户经理（AE）或者其他人看着我问这些问题，我觉得他们经常会想，“你在干什么？你问问题的角度让我甚至不知道你的目的是什么。”而我的目标是像客户感到难过那样去感到难过。他们带着请求来找我们，“嘿，我们想要 X，”这背后一定有某种动力。你可以做常规的分析，比如“问五个为什么”，试图弄清楚“嗯，你的目标是什么？”“作为一个画像 X，我想要达成这个结果。”,,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: You can do it that way, but you might miss the reason that they actually feel bad for not having this thing like, "I can't accomplish this goal. So what?" "So, I'm not going to get promoted at work." Okay, great. I understand the severity of your problem at this point. What is the actual emotional valence that is motivating whatever you're telling me? And it takes a little while to get there. You can ask people directly like, "How do you feel?" And they're not necessarily going to tell you, but if you have a long enough and deep enough conversation with them, you start to level with them, and you're starting to see stuff from their perspective.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 你可以那样做，但你可能会错过他们因为没有这个东西而真正感到难过的原因，比如，“我无法完成这个目标。那又怎样？”“那样我就无法在工作中获得升职。”好的，太棒了。这下我明白你问题的严重性了。到底是什么样的情感效价（Emotional Valence）在驱动你告诉我这些？这需要一点时间才能挖掘出来。你可以直接问人们，“你感觉如何？”他们不一定会告诉你，但如果你和他们进行足够长、足够深入的对话，你开始与他们平视，你就会开始从他们的角度看问题。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: And the more you see it from their perspective and the more they know that, the more they're willing to open up to you and tell you like, "Okay, honestly, I had this thing happen where I marked the ship date of this project as December 30th because it's a Q4 project, and I wanted to put it at the very end, and then my marketing team lost their mind because they're like, 'We can't ship something on December 30th. Everyone's on vacation,'" and you're like... And then they're like, "Yeah, this has made me feel really bad." So, I don't ever want to put dates on things ever again. So, like, "Okay, cool. We can help you deal with that. If that's what you're feeling, then I can start building stuff to make sure that you never have to have that bad feeling again."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 你越是从他们的角度看问题，且他们越是知道这一点，他们就越愿意向你敞开心扉告诉你，比如：“好吧，老实说，我遇到过这么一件事，我把这个项目的发布日期标为 12 月 30 日，因为这是一个 Q4 的项目，我想把它放在最后。然后我的市场团队这就疯了，因为他们说，‘我们不能在 12 月 30 日发布东西。大家都在休假呢，’”你会觉得……然后他们说，“是的，这让我感觉真的很糟糕。”所以我再也不想给任何事情定日期了。所以，我会说，“好的，没问题。我们可以帮你解决这个问题。如果你是那种感觉，那么我可以开始构建一些东西，确保你永远不必再有那种糟糕的感觉。”,

[原文] [Lenny]: People talk about empathy like, "You need to have empathy as a PM. You need to build empathy the best product leaders, have empathy in this." I think it's such a succinct and powerful way of describing what empathy actually looks like as a product leader, which is I want to feel as bad as they feel in hearing the story they tell, and it sounds like the way you do that is you keep asking questions to understand the moment they felt bad about something. In this case, the deadline.

[译文] [Lenny]: 人们谈论同理心时会说，“作为产品经理你需要有同理心。最好的产品领导者需要建立同理心。”我认为这是一个如此简洁而有力的描述，说明了作为产品领导者，同理心到底是什么样子的，那就是：在听他们讲故事时，我要感受到和他们一样糟糕的感觉。听起来你做到这一点的方法就是不断提问，以了解他们对某事感到糟糕的那个瞬间。在这个案例中，就是截止日期。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: And if you ask somebody in that last story, like what kind of issue do you have? You're like, "Oh, marketing and I would just never align on anything." It's like that doesn't really tell you what's going on. What it tells you is you had this terrible moment of communication that it's all miscommunicated, and you're like, "It's just going to keep happening over and over again." So, the thing that we did specifically to solve this was on projects in Linear, you can just specify a target date at whatever level of granularity you want. You can say it's a December project. You can say it's a Q4 project. You can say it's a second half of 2024 project. Like whatever you're happy promising, you can just put it on there and that way you never feel like you have to give this sense of false precision so that it ends up with a whole bunch of miscommunication down the line.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 如果你在上一个故事中问某人，你有什么样的问题？你会得到这样的回答：“噢，市场部和我永远无法达成一致。”但这并没有真正告诉你发生了什么。它告诉你的是，你有过一次糟糕的沟通时刻，完全是沟通误解，你会觉得，“这只会一次又一次地发生。”所以，我们为了解决这个问题所做的具体事情是，在 Linear 的项目中，你可以以任何你想要的粒度指定目标日期。你可以说这是一个 12 月的项目。你可以说这是一个 Q4 的项目。你可以说这是一个 2024 年下半年的项目。只要是你乐意承诺的，你就可以放上去，这样你就永远不会觉得必须给出一个虚假的精确感（false precision），从而导致后续一堆的沟通误解。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: I could see why people love Linear is it just makes them feel less bad less often. There's a lot of connection here. I know this idea of emotions and feeling bad is a core part of how you think about building product, looking for moments. People feel bad. Is there anything more you could share there to share how you think about this idea of emotional hooks, emotional moments, and how you decide what to build?

[译文] [Lenny]: 我能明白为什么人们喜欢 Linear 了，因为它只是让他们感觉糟糕的频率降低了。这其中有很多联系。我知道这种关于情绪和感觉糟糕的想法是你思考产品构建的核心部分，即寻找那些时刻。人们感觉糟糕的时刻。关于这种“情感挂钩（Emotional Hooks）”、情感时刻的想法，以及你是如何决定构建什么的，你还有什么可以分享的吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, to set the background of this, I've worked in very, very competitive industries. I worked at Everlane, which was a direct-to-consumer clothing brand. I worked in Mode, which is like BI tools and there's so many BI tools out there, and then obviously, Linear. We're project management. There's a lot of project management tools, and I think the more competitive your industry is, the more the low-hanging goal-oriented stuff is already picked because every PM from every one of these companies has been asking like, "Well, what's your goal? What is your job to be done," and all this kind of stuff. So, you have to look at things from an angle that other people might not have seen and for me, and for us, it's the angle of where are the emotional hooks that you're experiencing as you go through your work day, as you use our product, as you use competitors' products?

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 为了说明背景，我曾在非常非常竞争激烈的行业工作过。我在 Everlane 工作过，那是一个直接面向消费者的服装品牌。我在 Mode 工作过，那是做 BI（商业智能）工具的，市面上有太多的 BI 工具了。然后显然是 Linear。我们做项目管理。也有很多项目管理工具。我认为你所在的行业竞争越激烈，那些低垂的、以目标为导向的果实就越早被摘光，因为来自这些公司的每一个产品经理都在问，“嗯，你的目标是什么？你要完成的工作（JTBD）是什么？”诸如此类。所以，你必须从其他人可能没看到的角度来看待事物，对我，对我们来说，这个角度就是：当你度过工作日，当你使用我们的产品，或者使用竞争对手的产品时，你体验到的情感挂钩在哪里？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I think it's probably underexplored because... I don't know. I feel like PMs and engineers, we're like very thinky people. We avoid the touchy-feely stuff. So, I think that's the opportunity. You can see where are you feeling bad throughout your day where you don't even know? You might think, "I hate Mondays." "Why do you hate Mondays?" "Well, on Mondays, I have to go out and gather a whole bunch of stuff to write this report that it's really annoying." "Oh, so if I gave you a button that made the report, would that help?" It's like, "Oh, yeah, then I might not hate Monday so much." So, I think Paul Graham has a word for this. He calls it schlep blindness, right? It's like I'm schlepping through life, and I'm just completely blind to it, and it's true.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我认为这可能是一个未被充分探索的领域，因为……我不知道。我觉得产品经理和工程师，我们都是很爱思考的人。我们会回避那些感性的东西。所以我认为这就是机会所在。你可以去看看你一天中哪里感觉糟糕，而你自己甚至都不知道？你可能会想，“我讨厌星期一。”“你为什么讨厌星期一？”“嗯，周一我必须到处收集一堆东西来写这份报告，这真的很烦人。”“噢，如果我给你一个按钮能生成报告，那会有帮助吗？”就像，“噢，是的，那样我就可能没那么讨厌星期一了。”所以我记得 Paul Graham 对此有个词。他称之为“盲目忍受（Schlep Blindness）”，对吧？就像我在生活中艰难前行，但我对此完全视而不见，这是真的。,

[原文] [Lenny]: Is there an example? I've shared a couple, but just where you've noticed this in someone using maybe a competitor or even Linear that you solved. I know you gave an example of the dates. I guess is there anything else?

[译文] [Lenny]: 有例子吗？我已经分享了几个，但就在那些使用竞争对手甚至 Linear 的人身上，你注意到了这一点并解决了它。我知道你举了日期的例子。我想还有别的吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: A big feature that people love about Linear is we have this thing called Triage Management, and what it does is it systemizes this thing where if I put an issue into a different team, if I'm asking them to do something or I'm reporting a bug to them, it sticks in a special zone where it'll notify the right people. They're on a rotation and people will be able to respond to it in an organized manner, and I think this kind of automation, this feature, it came out of two different fields people were having. One, people were trying to implement this stuff by hand, and it was just a lot of touches, and they were doing it, but they felt like, "Oh, I'm totally underwater." "Why are you under water?" "Well, I have to throw all these tickets around and route them correctly and stuff like that," and they didn't see this as an opportunity to have a tool specialize in managing their triage queue.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 人们非常喜欢 Linear 的一个大功能是我们有一个叫“分诊管理（Triage Management）”的东西。它的作用是将这种事情系统化：如果我给不同的团队提一个议题（Issue），如果我要求他们做某事或者给他们报一个 Bug，它会停留在一个特殊的区域，并通知正确的人。他们是轮班制的，人们能够以有组织的方式回复。我认为这种自动化、这个功能，源于人们当时面临的两种不同感受。第一种，人们试图手动实施这些东西，这涉及到大量的接触点，他们在做，但感觉像，“噢，我完全焦头烂额（underwater）了。”“为什么你会焦头烂额？”“嗯，我必须到处扔这些工单，把它们路由到正确的地方之类的，”而他们并没有把这看作是让工具专门管理分诊队列的机会。,,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Because they were managing by hand.... They were on top of it, but it just felt really bad because they just had to spend so much attention doing this and then there's the folks who didn't do that. The feeling was just like, "Well, it's totally out of control. People are just throwing tickets over the wall, and I don't know what to do with them. I don't know where they are. They end up in all these holes and then the people on the other side are like, "I throw tickets over the wall. I have no idea what happens to them. I have no expectation that people are ever going to respond to them." So, there's all of these bad feelings that people are having. They all have the same root cause, which is like there wasn't a very automated organized way to deal with your triage queue.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 因为他们在手动管理……他们虽然控制住了局面，但感觉真的很糟糕，因为他们必须花那么多注意力做这个。然后还有那些没这么做的人。那种感觉就像，“嗯，这完全失控（out of control）了。人们只是把工单扔过墙去，我不知道该怎么处理它们。我不知道它们在哪。它们最终掉进了各种黑洞。”然后墙另一边的人会觉得，“我把工单扔过墙去。我根本不知道它们发生了什么。我根本不指望人们会回复它们。”所以，人们会有所有这些糟糕的感觉。它们都有同一个根本原因，那就是没有一个非常自动化、有组织的方式来处理你的分诊队列。,

章节 5：中场总结与激励错位：核心原则复盘

📝 本节摘要：

在本章中，Lenny 首先通过一段插播（Wix Studio）为营销人员推荐了工具。随后，他精准回顾了 Linear 成功的四大秘诀：1. 极速发布（前10%时间）；2. 优先考虑 IC 而非管理者；3. 寻找具体的请求者；4. 关注用户“感觉糟糕”的时刻。Nan Yu 在此基础上增加了一个关键的细微差别（Nuance）：所谓“关注用户”，实则是要敏锐地捕捉中层管理者（需要汇报）与独立贡献者（讨厌繁琐）之间激励机制的错位，并在产品设计中寻找双赢的解法，而非单纯偏袒一方。

[原文] [Lenny]: Marketers, I know that you love TLDRs. So, let me get right to the point. Wix Studio gives you everything you need to cater to any client at any scale, all in one place. Here's how your workflow could look. Scale content with dynamic pages and reusable assets effortlessly. Fast-track projects with built-in marketing integrations like Meta, CAPI, Zapier, Google Ads, and more. A-B test landing pages in days, not weeks with intuitive design tools. Connect to tracking and analytics tools like Google Analytics and Semrush, and capture key business events without the hassle of manual setup. Manage all your client's social media and communications from a unified dashboard, then create schedule and post content across all their channels. If you're on content-rich sites, Wix Studio's no-code CMS lets you build and manage without touching the design. And when you're ready for more, Wix Studio grows with you. Add your own code, create custom integrations with Wix-made APIs, or leverage robust native business solutions. Drive real client growth with Wix Studio. Go to wixstudio.com.

[译文] [Lenny]: 营销人员们，我知道你们喜欢“长话短说（TLDR）”。所以，我就直奔主题了。Wix Studio 为你提供了一站式所需的一切，以满足任何规模的任何客户。你的工作流可能是这样的：通过动态页面和可复用资产轻松扩展内容；利用内置的营销集成（如 Meta、CAPI、Zapier、Google Ads 等）加速项目；使用直观的设计工具在几天而非几周内完成落地页的 A/B 测试。连接 Google Analytics 和 Semrush 等追踪分析工具，无需繁琐的手动设置即可捕捉关键业务事件。在一个统一的仪表盘上管理所有客户的社交媒体和沟通，然后创建日程并在所有渠道发布内容。如果你在做内容丰富的网站，Wix Studio 的无代码 CMS 让你无需触碰设计即可构建和管理。当你准备好更进一步时，Wix Studio 会随你成长。你可以添加自己的代码，使用 Wix 制作的 API 创建自定义集成，或利用强大的原生业务解决方案。用 Wix Studio 推动真正的客户增长。请访问 wixstudio.com。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: I'm going to try to summarize some of the secrets of Linear's success so far. So, the first is get something out as quickly as possible, say, in the first 10% of the time that you have to build this thing and get it out to internal users and then maybe a growing list of beta users and people that are aware of they're using early stuff. Two is prioritize the IC and the user, basically, versus the buyer or the middle manager that wants reporting and all these custom features. So, it's basically focused on the user, which I think you hear a lot, but I love this very specific example. Three is when you hear asks for features and requests, get to the specific person using the thing, not just general, "Okay, cool. I've heard it 100 times." Find the person that actually needs this thing and understand what's going on, and then four is look for people feeling bad in a moment working in the product. Is there anything else that I'm missing that's important or any nuance you want to add?

[译文] [Lenny]: 我试着总结一下目前为止 Linear 成功的一些秘诀。第一，尽可能快地把东西做出来，比如说在你构建这个东西原本计划时间的前 10% 阶段，就把它发布给内部用户，然后可能是一个不断增长的 Beta 用户名单以及那些知道自己在使用早期版本的人。第二，优先考虑 IC（独立贡献者）和用户，基本上是相对于那些想要汇报和各种定制功能的买家或中层管理者而言。所以基本上是专注于用户，我想这句话大家听得多了，但我很喜欢这个非常具体的例子。第三，当你听到功能需求和请求时，找到使用这个东西的具体的人，而不仅仅是笼统的，“好的，酷。我听过 100 遍了。”找到真正需要这个东西的那个人，了解到底发生了什么。第四，寻找人们在产品使用过程中感觉糟糕的时刻。还有什么重要的我漏掉的吗？或者有什么细微差别你想补充的？,,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: The part where you said, like focus on the user, I think it's maybe a little bit more subtle than that. There's a nuance which is find where the incentives are really misaligned amongst your user base. There's a middle manager that wants really detailed reporting and there's a IC who just really doesn't want to go through all those extra steps, and the incentives for what they want are just very... They're just very misaligned, and you have to find those situations and be pretty judicious about how you make those trade-offs and where you can really find win-win outcomes there.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 关于你说的那部分，比如“关注用户”，我认为这可能比那更微妙一点。这里有一个细微差别，那就是找到你的用户群中激励机制真正错位的地方。有一个想要非常详细汇报的中层管理者，还有一个真的不想经历所有那些额外步骤的 IC，他们想要的激励机制是非常……它们是非常错位的。你必须找到这些情况，并且在如何进行权衡以及在哪里真正找到双赢结果方面非常审慎。,

章节 6：产品 Backlog 管理：构建用户心智模型

📝 本节摘要：

这一章讨论了如何决定“什么时候该构建什么”。Lenny 引用了 Patrick Collison 关于“用户心智模型（Mental Model）”的概念。Nan Yu 解释说，Linear 的 Backlog 中并不是等待开发的功能清单，而是存放着 20-30 个“机会”或“问题域”（如容量规划）。团队会针对这些领域不断积累认知，直到对解决方案有足够的信念才开始动工。他强调了一个关键的细微差别：不要试图解决整个问题，而是要找到适合 Linear 去解决的那部分。此外，团队规模的限制实际上成为了一种保护机制，防止他们过早介入尚未想清楚的复杂领域。

[原文] [Lenny]: That's a really important nuance. Something else that's come through a couple of times as you've been talking is also something Patrick Collison tweeted once that has stuck with me, which is this idea of having a mental model in your head of the user. So, the way he described it and the way you've described it is oftentimes people are like, "Cool. We're going to figure out what to build. We're going to do a bunch of research, talk to users. That'll inform what we build, and we build it, versus what you've been saying and what he said is you do a bunch of research, look at data, talk to people. That informs your mental model of what the customer needs in their life, and then that informs what you build. So, that anytime you do more research, talk to customers, it's informing your view of the person, and then you're like, "Oh, this was different from what I imagined," or, "Oh wow. This is exactly what we've been thinking and let's build that." Anything along those lines that you might want to share?

[译文] [Lenny]: 这是一个非常重要的细微差别。在你刚才的谈话中，还有一点反复出现，这也是 Patrick Collison 曾经发推提到过并让我印象深刻的一点，那就是关于在你脑海中建立用户的心智模型（Mental Model）。他描述的方式，以及你描述的方式是，通常人们会觉得，“酷。我们要弄清楚该构建什么。我们要去做一堆研究，和用户交谈。那会告诉我们该构建什么，然后我们就去构建。”与之相对的是，你一直在说的，以及他所说的，是你做一堆研究，看数据，和人交谈。这其实是在告知你关于“客户在生活中需要什么”的心智模型，然后由这个心智模型来告知你该构建什么。所以，任何时候你做更多的研究，和客户交谈，都是在更新你对这个人的看法，然后你会觉得，“噢，这和我之前想象的不一样，”或者，“噢哇。这正是我们一直以来所想的，让我们把它做出来吧。”沿着这个思路，你有什么想分享的吗？,,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I mean, I can tell you a little bit about how we manage our backlog, which I think actually ties directly into this. At any given moment, we have probably 20 or 30 opportunities that we could possibly explore, just product opportunities, like problems to solve, areas to improve for our users, but they're not ready yet. We don't have enough conviction around how we might approach it. So, we just accumulate understanding of this stuff and periodically, we accumulate some more stuff, and then we reevaluate, "Okay, what is our current understanding of how we might best approach this thing?" And I think something that people struggle with is that they might have this model in their head. Like a PM might have this model in their head about how a user behaves, but it's just very hard to share that with someone else. You have to telepathically throw it into their brain, which is hard. So, what we try to do is identify areas that we might attack with a product, but also keep an up-to-date analysis of each of those areas so that everyone can engage with it and also contribute.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我可以跟你讲讲我们是如何管理 Backlog（待办事项）的，我认为这实际上与此直接相关。在任何特定时刻，我们可能有大概 20 或 30 个我们可能探索的机会（opportunities），只是产品机会，比如要解决的问题、为用户改进的领域，但它们还没准备好。对于如何着手处理它，我们还没有足够的信念（conviction）。所以，我们只是不断积累对这些东西的理解，周期性地，我们再积累一些东西，然后我们重新评估，“好了，对于如何最好地处理这件事，我们目前的理解是什么？”我认为人们挣扎的一点在于，他们脑子里可能有这个模型。比如一个产品经理脑子里可能有关于用户如何行为的模型，但这很难与其他人分享。你得通过心灵感应把它扔进别人的脑子里，这很难。所以，我们试图做的是确定我们可能通过产品去攻克的领域，但也对每个领域保持最新的分析，这样每个人都能参与其中并做出贡献。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: Is there an example of something that's sitting in your roadmap? I don't know if you could share these sort of things that's just sitting in the backlog of just like, "We're not quite ready to tackle this yet, but here's something we're inkling on."

[译文] [Lenny]: 有没有正躺在你们路线图里的例子？我不知道你是否可以分享这类正躺在 Backlog 里东西，就像那种“我们还没完全准备好解决这个，但这正是我们在琢磨的。”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, sure. Capacity planning is a thing that's been sitting in our backlog, and it's something that we see managers struggle with all the time, which is like I have a limited amount of personnel and resources, and I need to deploy them in such a way where we can theoretically accomplish our roadmap, but also we don't get blocked by some bottleneck that we don't end up blocking all of the projects because this one engineer is stuck on some info thing, and that's a thing people struggle with all the time. All the solutions out there are bad. The best solution is a very, very custom spreadsheet that someone would make, and it's a lot of upkeep. So, we have some ideas about how we might automate this, how we might use existing data within Linear to really help out with this problem, but I don't think we've quite cracked it yet. I think there's some nuances that we have to really explore a little bit further. So, we're continuously developing this, and as we hear from hear from users that are struggling with this problem, we will get on a call with them and sit down with them and talk through it.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，当然。容量规划（Capacity Planning）就是一个一直躺在我们 Backlog 里的东西，这是我们看到管理者一直在挣扎的事情，比如我有有限的人员和资源，我需要以某种方式部署它们，以便我们在理论上可以完成路线图，同时我们不会被某些瓶颈卡住，不会因为这一个工程师卡在某些信息问题上而导致所有项目受阻，这是人们一直在挣扎的事情。市面上所有的解决方案都很糟糕。最好的解决方案是某人制作的非常非常定制化的电子表格，但这需要大量的维护。所以，我们对于如何自动化这个过程、如何利用 Linear 内部现有的数据来真正帮助解决这个问题有一些想法，但我认为我们还没完全攻克它。我认为还有一些细微之处我们需要进一步探索。所以，我们在持续开发这个概念，当我们听到用户在这个问题上挣扎时，我们会给他们打电话，坐下来和他们一起通过谈话梳理它。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: And the idea there is keep informing this mental model, keep informing what this could be until you get to a place of like, "Okay. Cool. I think we figured out what will really solve this problem in an elegant way"?

[译文] [Lenny]: 那么这里的思路是，不断完善这个心智模型，不断完善这可能是什么样子的，直到你达到这样一个状态：“好了。酷。我想我们已经找出了能优雅地解决这个问题的真正方案”？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, and I want to really stress a nuance here, which is it's not that we want to solve the entire problem. The entire problem is quite big, but there's something that's really right for Linear to do that would help people have a good starting point for them to reason about it. So, I think a lot of building conviction around stuff is not even like do we have a workable solution? It's like how much of the problem should we actually take on? Because if we take on too much of the problem, then we'll end up overpromising and not being able to deliver on it.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我想特别强调这里的一个细微差别，那就是我们并不想解决整个问题。整个问题非常大，但 Linear 可以做一些非常合适的事情，帮助人们有一个很好的起点来思考这个问题。所以，我认为围绕事物建立信念的过程，甚至不仅仅是“我们有一个可行的解决方案吗？”而是“我们实际上应该承担多少问题？”因为如果我们承担了太多的问题，我们最终会过度承诺却无法兑现。,

[原文] [Lenny]: I think what's also useful here is you all keep your team very small intentionally and being constrained keeps you from taking on these things too early because you don't have the engineers to build their designers.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我觉得这里还有一点很有用，就是你们有意保持非常小的团队规模，这种约束（Constraint）防止了你们过早地承担这些事情，因为你们没有足够的工程师或设计师去构建它们。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, that's true. I actually hadn't really put that part together, but I think some of the reason we've done it this way is because we don't have the bandwidth to action everything. So, we have this backlog that we maintain to make sure that when we do take it on, we're pretty set up for success.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，确实如此。我其实之前没把这点联系起来，但我认为我们这样做的一部分原因是因为我们没有带宽去执行所有事情。所以，我们维护这个 Backlog 是为了确保当我们真的着手做时，我们已经为成功做好了充分准备。,

章节 7：系统化创意：测试极端方案

📝 本节摘要：

本章聚焦于如何系统化地进行创新。Nan Yu 提出，很多时候人们无法跳出框框是因为受限于潜意识里的“默认设置”。他主张通过测试极端版本（Testing Extremes）来扩大解决方案的搜索空间。类似于 Airbnb 的“11星体验”，Linear 会构建功能最疯狂的两个极端版本来寻找平衡点。Nan 现场演示了“草稿（Drafts）”功能的开发过程：他们分别构建了“极致快但感觉不安全”（无保存提示直接关闭）和“极致安全但制造混乱”（实时自动保存所有内容）的两个版本，最终通过亲身体验这两种极端，找到了“新的一律提示，修改时自动保存”的完美中间路线。

[原文] [Lenny]: Yeah, it's interesting. I think a lot of companies are starting to realize that they can build better products and move faster with fewer teams. I want to move in a different direction and talk a bit about how you actually think about building new products. Something that I've heard from you is that you have a systemized way of being creative, which I think is a dream for a lot of people's. It's like how do I be more creative? How do I think of new innovative concepts? You have a really interesting process for how you do this. Can you talk about it?,

[译文] [Lenny]: 是的，很有趣。我认为很多公司开始意识到，用更少的团队可以构建更好的产品并且行动更快。我想换个方向，谈谈你实际上是如何思考构建新产品的。我听你说过，你有一种系统化的创新方式，这对很多人来说是梦寐以求的。就像是“我怎样才能更有创造力？我怎样才能想出新的创新概念？”你有一个非常有趣的过程来做这件事。你能谈谈吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, totally. I think when people talk about being creative, a lot of times what they have a problem with is extrapolating. They can see the stuff that's right in front of them, but what about two or three steps down the line? And then it's just like, "Well, there's just so much possibility. I don't know what direction to go." So, the way that we try to do it is we ask a question which is like, "Okay, how extreme can you take it? You're designing a product. You're trying to come up with a solution. What's the most outrageous version of this along some trait?" I don't know if you guys did this at Airbnb, but I think Brian Chesky talks about like, "What's the 11-star experience?" Is that a thing you guys did?,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，完全可以。我认为当人们谈论创造力时，很多时候他们的问题在于外推（extrapolating）。他们能看到眼前的在东西，但往后推两三步呢？然后感觉就像，“嗯，有太多的可能性了。我不知道该往哪个方向走。”所以，我们尝试的方法是问一个问题，比如，“好吧，你能把它做到多极致？你在设计一个产品。你在试图想出一个解决方案。沿着某种特征，这个东西最离谱的版本是什么？”我不知道你们在 Airbnb 是否这样做过，但我记得 Brian Chesky 谈到过类似“什么是 11 星级的体验？”你们做过这个吗？

[原文] [Lenny]: It was a thing he talked about. Yeah, there's always a push of what's the 10X version of some idea.

[译文] [Lenny]: 这是他谈论过的事情。是的，总是有一种推动力去思考某个想法的 10 倍版本是什么。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: When you think in that way, when you're saying like, "Hey, what's the 11-star experience?" What you're really asking is like, "Hey, what's the most luxurious version of this hotel stay? Or what's the most unforgettable kind of experience we can give people?" And you throw away things, I don't know, like cost. You throw away things like practicality because that's not what's interesting. What's interesting is I want to actually explore the possibility space, and I think this is really important to do because the goal is to get you to see beyond your defaults. We have all of these constraints that we're operating under that we psychically have in the back of our heads that we just don't even realize we have them. So, just break past all of them, and then you can really see what your options are because we talk about product decisions. It's like, "Oh, yeah, you have these choices. What are you going to decide?" There's all this decision-making kind of theory. But the biggest risk is you didn't see the right choice to begin with. You have these three choices and none of them were right. It's this fourth one that was over in this corner, but you didn't look in that corner, so you never found it. So, I think the whole goal of this is to try to expand the search space of what you're trying to do.,,,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 当你那样思考时，当你说“嘿，什么是 11 星体验？”你真正问的是，“嘿，这次酒店住宿最豪华的版本是什么？或者我们要给人们什么样的最难忘的体验？”你要抛开一些东西，我不知道，比如成本。你要抛开实用性之类的东西，因为那不是有趣的地方。有趣的是我想真正探索可能性空间（possibility space），我认为这非常重要，因为目标是让你超越你的默认设置（defaults）。我们在各种约束下运作，这些约束存在于我们的潜意识里，我们甚至都没有意识到它们的存在。所以，只要突破所有这些，你就能真正看到你的选项是什么，因为我们谈论产品决策时，就像是，“噢，是的，你有这些选择。你要决定哪个？”有各种各样的决策理论。但最大的风险在于你一开始就没看到正确的选择。你有这三个选择，但没有一个是正确的。正确的其实是角落里的第四个，但你没往那个角落看，所以你永远找不到它。所以，我认为这一切的目标就是试图扩大你想要做的事情的搜索空间。

[原文] [Lenny]: So, what you're saying is people often don't think out of the box enough by not thinking too radically enough. So, the choices they're deciding between are just meh options and there's this process of breaking out of that, and I think you could hear this and be like, "Yeah, sure." I could spend 10 minutes being like, "Oh, hey, what's the craziest [inaudible 00:47:35]- "

[译文] [Lenny]: 所以你的意思是，人们通常因为想得不够激进，所以跳不出框框。所以他们在之间做决定的那些选择都只是平庸的选项，而这是一个打破这种局面的过程。我想大家听到这可能会觉得，“是的，当然。”我可以花 10 分钟去想，“噢，嘿，最疯狂的……”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, and you actually build it. You can think of a very extreme version of a product and you can say, "Hey, let's actually... " For the first version, we talked about, like the first version, you know it's not really the right answer. Sometimes, you know it's so hard because you know this is the most extreme version of the answer. So, let's build that as fast as we can and see how it feels, and then we're going to learn so much about what the right actual answer is because we have seen this area of the product space and really felt it.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，而且你实际上要去构建它。你可以构思一个产品的极端版本，然后你可以说，“嘿，让我们实际上……”对于我们讨论过的第一个版本，你知道那其实不是正确答案。有时这很难，因为你知道这是答案的最极端版本。所以，让我们尽可能快地把它构建出来，看看感觉如何，然后我们将学到很多关于什么是真正的正确答案的东西，因为我们已经看到了产品空间的这个区域并真正感受到了它。

[原文] [Lenny]: Awesome. Let's talk about an example of this because this feels awesome.

[译文] [Lenny]: 太棒了。让我们举个例子吧，因为这感觉太棒了。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I can talk to an example. Actually, is it okay if I demo something?

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 好的，我可以讲个例子。事实上，我可以演示一下吗？

[原文] [Lenny]: Absolutely. Let's do it. Show and tell.

[译文] [Lenny]: 当然。来吧。展示与讲述（Show and tell）。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, let me do that right now. Here we go. We're going to share screen. All right. So, this is just like a demo space instead of Linear. So, the feature where we did this that I remember very clearly, because it was recent, is we built this feature to save drafts for your issues. So, Linear, as hard as an issue tracker, if I make a new issue and let's say I'm trying to report a bug or something, so it's like I make a bug report, then I might start thinking through like, "Okay, what are the repro steps?" And then I start typing them, and this happens all the time. When you're at work, you're doing this and someone distracts you. If someone pings you on Slack or you have to go to a meeting or something like that, you're like, "I got to put this away for a second. I'll come back to it later." Note to self, figure out the actual repro steps and do it.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 好的，我现在就演示。来了。我们要共享屏幕。好的。这就像是一个 Demo 空间而不是（真实的）Linear。关于这一点，我记得非常清楚的一个功能，因为是最近做的，就是我们构建了这个为你的议题（Issues）保存草稿的功能。Linear 本质上是一个议题追踪器，如果我新建一个议题，假设我要报告一个 Bug 之类的，我就做个 Bug 报告，然后我可能开始思考，“好的，复现步骤（repro steps）是什么？”然后我开始打字，这种情况经常发生。当你在工作时，你在做这个，然后有人打扰你。如果有人在 Slack 上 @ 你，或者你得去开会之类的，你会想，“我得先把这个放一放。稍后再回来处理。”给自己留个言，弄清楚实际的复现步骤再做。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, what can you do? Well, you want to save it as a draft. So, we're like, "Okay, this is the problem," and the first version of this, we're like, "What do we want to do? Linear is about being fast." So, we don't want to get in your way. We want to say like, "What is the fastest draft saving experience possible?" So, if you save it as draft, you can save it as draft. If you decide to not... you want to throw it away, you don't want it, just hit the X button, and it'll just throw it away. We're not going to interrupt you with a popup that says like, "Do you want to save your changes," or any of that kind of stuff. We'll just absolutely get out of your way fast as possible.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 那么你能做什么呢？嗯，你想把它保存为草稿。所以我们想，“好的，这就是问题所在，”对于第一个版本，我们想，“我们想做什么？Linear 的核心是快。”所以我们不想挡你的路。我们想，“最快的草稿保存体验是什么样的？”所以，如果你保存为草稿，你可以保存为草稿。如果你决定不……你想把它扔掉，你不想要了，只需点击 X 按钮，它就会直接扔掉。我们不会用那种“你想保存更改吗”之类的弹窗来打断你。我们会以最快的速度绝对不挡你的路。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, we're like, "What's the risk here?" Well, it might feel really unsafe. If you close this, and we don't ask you if you want to save change, you might feel like, "Oh, I just lost my changes on accident." We knew that going in. We built this anyway, and it felt super unsafe. It turns out that sort of inkling that we had was true, and we really felt exactly how unsafe it was. So, then we were like, "Okay, well, what's the safest thing we could possibly do?",

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 然后我们想，“这里的风险是什么？”嗯，这可能让人感觉非常不安全。如果你关掉它，而我们不问你是否要保存更改，你可能会觉得，“噢，我不小心弄丢了我的更改。”我们一开始就知道这点。不管怎样我们还是构建了它，结果感觉超级不安全。事实证明我们的那种预感是对的，我们真切地感受到了它到底有多不安全。所以，然后我们就想，“好吧，那我们能做的最安全的事情是什么？”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: The safest thing is just auto save everything. So, you start a new issue, and then you start typing some stuff, and it's just like auto saving as soon as you type a single character and that did feel quite safe. So, cool, but it also ended up leaving behind a whole bunch of like a paper trail of things you change your mind about. You've probably had this happen in document tools where you have a whole bunch of things in your space called like Untitled Document or New Document and stuff like that. It's just like-

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 最安全的事情就是自动保存一切。所以，你开始一个新的议题，然后你开始输入一些东西，哪怕你只输入一个字符它就开始自动保存，这确实感觉很安全。很酷，但这也导致留下一大堆你改变主意的文书痕迹（paper trail）。你可能在文档工具里遇到过这种情况，你的空间里有一大堆叫“无标题文档”或“新文档”之类的东西。就像——

[原文] [Lenny]: So many untitled folders.

[译文] [Lenny]: 太多无标题文件夹了。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, so many untitled folders because the moment you say new folder, it starts saving it, and then you don't actually mean for that to happen. So, we had those two sorts of variations that we built, and we fell through and where we ended up was a balance between those two. So, what happens is if I'm creating a new issue, like I am here, and I close it out, it'll interrupt me, like we have to interrupt you, otherwise it feels too unsafe. So, I can save the draft, I can go to my drafts, and then if I'm in this draft I've already made, and I go in there, and I start to say, "Okay, I'm going to keep working on it," but then I get interrupted again, then I'm just going to auto-save it for you. There's no point. I'm not going to ask you again. I'm always going to auto save it because I'm not going to create a new object. I'm just making modifications in place.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，太多无标题文件夹了，因为你一说新建文件夹，它就开始保存，而你其实并不想那样。所以，我们构建了这两类变体，我们体验了一遍，最终我们找到了这二者之间的平衡点。所以现在的逻辑是，如果我正在创建一个新的议题，就像我现在这样，然后我把它关掉，它会打断我，比如我们必须打断你，否则感觉太不安全了。所以我可以保存草稿，我可以去我的草稿箱，如果我在我已经创建的这个草稿里，我进去，开始说，“好的，我要继续处理它，”但随后我又被打断了，那么我就直接为你自动保存。没必要（再问）。我不会再问你了。我会一直自动保存，因为我不是在创建一个新对象。我只是在原地进行修改。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, we made this very specific choice of on a brand new issue, we will interrupt you, and then on an existing draft that you're messing around with, we're just going to auto save everything and someone doing a analysis. If they did a detailed teardown of these decisions, they might say like, "Wow, they made very specific choices here," but the path to get there is to do something totally extreme in one direction and then totally extreme in another direction and then find where they really meet up.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 所以，我们做出了这个非常具体的选择：对于全新的议题，我们会打断你；而对于你正在处理的现有草稿，我们就自动保存一切。如果有人在做分析，如果他们详细拆解这些决策，他们可能会说，“哇，他们在这里做了非常具体的选择，”但达成这一点的路径是先在一个方向上做得极其极端，然后在另一个方向上做得极其极端，最后找到它们真正交汇的地方。

[原文] [Lenny]: Such a good example, the way that you described it is you went like here's the safest route. Here's the fastest version. Where did you come up with these list of options? And for folks that are trying to do this for their company, are these like... Because these are Linear principles, we're going to be very fast. Is this the way you think most companies should operate these sorts of attributes? Do you think it's specific to what makes their product different? How do you think about that?,

[译文] [Lenny]: 这是一个非常好的例子，你描述它的方式就像是，这是最安全的路线，这是最快的版本。你是从哪里想出这些选项清单的？对于那些试图在自己公司这样做的人来说，这些是不是……因为这些是 Linear 的原则，我们要非常快。你认为这是大多数公司应该运作这些属性的方式吗？还是你认为这是针对让他们的产品与众不同的特定因素？你是怎么想的？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I think for a lot of companies, you have to ask, "What is the promise that your product or your business is making people?" It might be you always have a car available if you need it, and if you do that, then maybe we're going to have to implement search pricing to make that happen. It's always going to be available. So, here's the trade-off that we have to make. It's a very extreme point of view to do that. Or you might say the price is always predictable, but sometimes you can't have a car in the first place. Those are all choices that you get to make, and you have to sort decide, like where in that spectrum does it make sense based on the promise of your company?,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我认为对于很多公司来说，你必须问，“你的产品或业务给人们的承诺是什么？”这可能是“你需要时总是有车可用”，如果你要做到这一点，那么也许我们必须实施溢价（search pricing/surge pricing）来实现它。车总是可用的。所以这就是我们必须做出的权衡。这是一个非常极端的观点。或者你可以说价格总是可预测的，但有时你可能根本打不到车。这些都是你可以做的选择，你必须决定，基于你公司的承诺，在这个光谱的哪个位置是有意义的？

[原文] [Lenny]: A lot of people talk about this idea of working backwards. Brian Chesky in Airbnb has a big concept of working backwards from the ideal. Let's design the best possible scenario and work backwards. I love that this is even more tactical, which is just pick the extreme version of very specific attributes. Probably not that ideal, but it'll give us insight into a version of the ideal and an element that works well and then what doesn't. Yeah, exactly. I did this a lot actually at Airbnb, just like testing the extreme. So, it super resonates, this idea, and when you say test, so was it like you build it and play with it? Do you roll it out to some of these circles of users or is it often just internal, and then you learn and then iterate?,,

[译文] [Lenny]: 很多人谈论“逆向工作（working backwards）”的想法。Airbnb 的 Brian Chesky 有一个重要的概念是从理想状态逆向工作。让我们设计最好的可能场景，然后逆向推导。我喜欢你这个方法因为它更具战术性，就是选择非常具体属性的极端版本。可能不那么理想，但它能让我们洞察到理想版本的一个侧面，以及哪些元素运作良好，哪些不行。是的，没错。实际上我在 Airbnb 经常这样做，就像测试极端情况一样。所以这个想法非常引起共鸣。当你说测试时，你是说你们把它构建出来并把玩它吗？你们会把它通过那些用户圈子发布出去吗？还是通常只是内部测试，然后学习并迭代？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, we rolled out some of these versions to people.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我们将其中一些版本发布给了用户。

[原文] [Lenny]: Oh, wow. Okay.

[译文] [Lenny]: 噢，哇。好的。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, the super-fast version that was unsafe, that only went interna, and everyone felt it was too unsafe, but then we thought, "Okay, let's go to the super-safe version," and then we rolled that out and everyone started having a whole bunch of... Like how many drafts are people making? I'm like, "This is too many." The people are leaving behind this crazy paper trail. Okay, we got to figure out some difference here.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 那个超级快但不安全的版本，只在内部发布了，大家都觉得太不安全了。然后我们想，“好的，那我们试试超级安全的版本，”然后我们把它发布出去了，结果每个人都开始有一大堆……比如人们在制造多少草稿？我想，“这太多了。”人们留下了这种疯狂的文书痕迹。好吧，我们得找出一些不同之处。

[原文] [Lenny]: Awesome. So, this very much connects to your first point of get things out really quick, and in this case, it's like extreme versions. You're probably not going to work long term, but it will teach you.

[译文] [Lenny]: 太棒了。所以这非常紧密地联系到了你的第一个观点，即把东西真正快速地发布出来，而在这种情况下，是极端版本。这可能不会长期有效，但它会教会你东西。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，完全正确。

[原文] [Lenny]: Amazing. Okay, and seeing it in action, I'm like, "Okay, obviously, this is the solution," and that's how the way this should feel, and to your point, it was not an obvious solution when you started thinking about it.

[译文] [Lenny]: 真是太棒了。好的，看到实际演示后，我就觉得，“好的，显然这就是解决方案，”这就是它应该给人的感觉，而且正如你所说，当你开始思考它时，这并不是一个显而易见的解决方案。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. I mean, the best solutions are always obvious in hindsight, and it's just like you have to develop a process internally that to eventually find your way there.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。我是说，最好的解决方案在事后看来总是显而易见的，这就像你必须在内部开发一个流程，以便最终找到通往那里的路。

章节 8：软件即方法论：购买工具就是购买工作方式

📝 本节摘要：

本章探讨了 B2B 软件的本质。Nan Yu 提出，许多成功的 B2B 工具最初都是大公司内部为了优化特定流程而开发的，因此它们封装了某种“基准能力（Baseline Competency）”。当企业购买软件（如营销工具或 ERP）时，实际上是在购买一套经过验证的工作方式和管理理念。Linear 亦是如此——它不仅是项目管理工具，更包含了一套基于高效能团队共识的“Linear 方法论（The Linear Method）”。因此，Nan 认为软件应该“观点鲜明（Opinionated）”，引导用户采用更优的流程（如自动化的分诊队列），而非仅仅提供随意定制的空白画布。

[原文] [Lenny]: Something else that you've mentioned when we were chatting that connects to some of the things we've been talking about is you have this perspective that B2B software isn't just solving people's problems, it's also teaching them how to work, and it's this accumulation of information. Can you talk about that? Because I thought that was really fascinating.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我们之前聊天时你提到的另一点，与我们一直在谈论的一些事情有关，那就是你有一个观点：B2B 软件不仅仅是在解决人们的问题，它还在教人们如何工作，它是信息的积累。你能谈谈这个吗？因为我觉得这真的很迷人。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: If you think about how a lot of B2B software gets created, it's because there was some person in the middle of some giant company who implemented some kind of process, and they're like, "Wow, this process is really working for us. Maybe we should make it easier," and they build a little tool internally and then all of their colleagues can now press on buttons and good things happen, and then they turn that process and that tool. They spin it off into a startup, and they make a startup. This process repeats thousands of times. So, when you adopt that tool, you're not just adopting the actual software, you're adopting the idea that this is a practice that you ought to be doing in the first place.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 如果你思考很多 B2B 软件是如何被创造出来的，往往是因为某个大公司中间层的某个人实施了某种流程，然后他们觉得，“哇，这个流程对我们真的很有效。也许我们应该让它变得更简单，”于是他们在内部构建了一个小工具，然后他们所有的同事现在都可以按按钮，好事就发生了。接着他们把那个流程和那个工具转化了。他们把它分拆成一家初创公司，这就成了一个创业项目。这个过程重复了成千上万次。所以，当你采用那个工具时，你不仅仅是在采用实际的软件，你是在采纳这样一个观念：这本身就是你应该去做的实践。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, if you're a marketing person, and you adopt some marketing software, you're not just saying, "Okay, now, I can write emails and send them to people." There's all sorts of process around that. You're organizing stuff into campaigns. You're measuring click-through rates. You're calculating cost of acquisition and all that stuff probably comes equipped with a tool because those are the right practices to do when you're doing this sort of marketing exercise. And whether you knew about it before or you learned it from the tool, like as a buyer for this kind of product, what I'm doing is I'm saying like, "Hey, I'm going to bring in this baseline level of marketing competency into my organization, that this is the worst we can do is whatever the tool defaults are."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 所以，如果你是个营销人员，你采用了一些营销软件，你不仅仅是在说，“好的，现在我可以写邮件发给别人了。”这周围有各种各样的流程。你要把东西组织成活动（Campaigns）。你要测量点击率。你要计算获客成本，所有这些东西可能都随工具自带了，因为当你做这类营销活动时，这些就是正确的实践。无论你之前是否知道，还是从工具中学到的，作为一个这类产品的买家，我在做的是在说：“嘿，我要把这种基准水平的营销能力引入我的组织，我们能做的最差程度也就是这个工具的默认设置了。”,

[原文] [Lenny]: Interesting. So, you're basically buying into a way of working when you're adopting a piece of software, not just have this problem I need solved.

[译文] [Lenny]: 有趣。所以，当你采用一款软件时，你基本上是在买入一种工作方式，而不仅仅是我有一个需要解决的问题。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly, and I think the most salient example of this is if you've ever seen like a company adopt an ERP product, it's the most painful thing you can imagine. It's doing deep surgery. They have to redo all of their internal processes and the way they manage inventory and all this kind of stuff, but they're willing to do it because they know that this is a battle-tested way of making sure that you're actually doing good management of resources. So, they're like, "We're growing up now. It's time for us to adopt these best practices. In order to do that, we have to adopt this tool, and we will conform to whatever the tool is best is to do."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，没错。我认为最显著的例子是，如果你见过一家公司采用 ERP 产品，那是你能想象到的最痛苦的事情。这就像是在做深度手术（deep surgery）。他们必须重做所有的内部流程、库存管理方式以及诸如此类的事情，但他们愿意这样做，因为他们知道这是一种经过实战检验（battle-tested）的方式，能确保你真正做好资源管理。所以，他们会觉得，“我们要长大了。是时候采用这些最佳实践了。为了做到这一点，我们必须采用这个工具，我们将顺从这个工具最擅长做的事情。”,

[原文] [Lenny]: This connects to a couple things I know about Linear, one is what you've shared of just avoiding these customizations requests from people. Do you have a very opinionated way of here's how you should operate in order to build a great functioning product, org, and company in general? I'm just connecting threads here. One is like we're going to avoid letting people customize too much because we know they'll have a bad time, and then two is just this idea of we are opinionated about the way you should work in Linear, and it's like you have a Linear method, I think it's called, of just like here's how product team should operate based on everything we've seen be successful.

[译文] [Lenny]: 这联系到我对 Linear 了解的几件事，一就是你分享过的避免人们的那些定制化请求。为了建立一个运作良好的产品、组织和公司，你们是否有一种非常观点鲜明（opinionated）的运作方式？我正在把这些线索串联起来。一是我们会避免让人们过度定制，因为我们知道那样他们会过得很惨；二是这种想法，即我们对你应该如何在 Linear 中工作持有鲜明观点，就像你们有一个“Linear 方法论（Linear Method）”——我想是这么叫的——即基于我们看到的所有成功案例，产品团队应该这样运作。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. Yeah. It's definitely connected in a way, and I think sometimes when people talk about... You mentioned like being opinionated, and I think sometimes when people talk about being opinionated, it can feel like they're almost saying like, "Hey, this is arbitrary," like your opinion and my opinion, they're just too opinions, man. Neither is right or wrong. What we try to do is find where there's actual consensus amongst a lot of different high performing teams, and then we can take those practices and say like, "Okay, for a team that isn't already practicing this, can we give them a button so that they can start practicing this?"

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。是的。这肯定在某种程度上是相关的。我认为有时候当人们谈论……你提到了“观点鲜明”，我觉得有时候当人们谈论观点鲜明时，感觉就像他们在说，“嘿，这是武断的，”就像你的观点和我的观点，只是两个观点而已，伙计。没有对错之分。而我们试图做的是找到许多不同高效能团队之间真正的共识在哪里，然后我们可以提取这些实践并说：“好的，对于一个还没实践这个的团队，我们能不能给他们一个按钮，让他们可以开始实践这个？”,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: When we see companies doing a really good job of managing their triage queue, but it's very manual, we're like, "Okay, can we automate this? And then for this other company that really needs it that they don't know this is what they need, can we just give them a button to activate this?" And now they have the practice within their org, too.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 当我们看到有些公司在管理分诊队列（triage queue）方面做得很好，但完全是手动的，我们会想，“好的，我们能自动化这个吗？然后对于另一家真正需要这个但不知道自己需要这个的公司，我们能不能只给他们一个按钮来激活这个？”这样一来，他们的组织内部也就拥有了这种实践。,

[原文] [Lenny]: So, I think the takeaway here is when you choose a tool, recognize it's going to change the way you operate and be thoughtful about is this the way we want to work versus just we just have a problem we want solved?

[译文] [Lenny]: 所以，我认为这里的结论是，当你选择一个工具时，要意识到它将改变你的运作方式，并且要深思熟虑：这是否就是我们想要的工作方式？而不仅仅是我们有一个想要解决的问题。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，完全正确。

章节 9：内部协作：PM 即 PMM 的“双三角”模型

📝 本节摘要：

本章打破了传统的产品管理边界。Nan Yu 提出，产品管理（PM）不仅是研发职能，更是一门进入市场（Go-To-Market）的学科。他介绍了“双三角”模型：PM 不仅要与工程和设计（构建者）组成铁三角，还必须连接销售和营销（销售者）。由于 Linear 的客户（工程师）拥有敏锐的“胡扯探测器（BS detector）”，一旦用词不当（如把产品经理称为项目经理）就会失去信任。因此，Nan 建议 PM 必须主导“原生语言”的制定，负责撰写发布说明和营销话术，确保对外沟通的专业性。

[原文] [Lenny]: I want to come back to something, a thread that's come up a couple of times in our chat is the way you collaborate internally. It feels like there's a pretty unique way. You said you were on all the sales calls. Is there anything that you can share about how you collaborate internally, how the different functions collaborate that may be unlike how other companies operate that might be helpful for them to learn from?

[译文] [Lenny]: 我想回到一个话题，在我们聊天中出现过好几次的一条线索，就是你们内部协作的方式。感觉有一种非常独特的方式。你说过你会参加所有的销售电话会议。关于你们如何在内部协作，不同的职能部门如何协作，有什么可以分享的吗？也许这与其他公司的运作方式不同，对他们学习会有帮助。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yes. Something that's worked really, really well for us is we think of product management as partially like a go-to-market discipline in the same way that sales and marketing are, right? When you talk to people and like, "Hey, tell me how product management works in your company," they'll probably say something about like, "Well, there's engineering product and design. They work in this triad, and here's how they interact and collaborate," and we all understand why that's useful, why that's helpful, but this other form of collaboration between product management, sales and marketing, I think it's something that's probably really underexamined and often I feel like in organizations, you actually see some antagonism between product and sales and marketing, and I think that's a shame because when we come together, the way we think about the way that we think about selling is a matter of like... especially because we sell to very expert practitioners, and they have a very sensitive BS detector.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。对我们来说非常非常有效的一点是，我们认为产品管理在某种程度上就像销售和市场营销一样，是一门进入市场（go-to-market）的学科，对吧？当你和人们交谈，比如问“嘿，告诉我你们公司的产品管理是如何运作的，”他们可能会说，“嗯，有工程、产品和设计。他们在这个三人组（triad）中工作，这是他们互动和协作的方式，”我们要都明白这为什么有用，为什么有帮助。但我认为产品管理、销售和市场营销之间的这种协作形式，可能是一个真正被低估的领域，而且我经常觉得在组织中，你实际上会看到产品部门与销售及市场部门之间存在某种对抗（antagonism）。我认为这很遗憾，因为当我们聚在一起时，我们思考销售的方式就像……特别是因我们要把东西卖给非常专业的从业者，而他们有一个非常敏锐的“胡扯探测器”（BS detector）。,,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, a big part of what we try to do is we try to help our marketing team pick exactly the right word and the right phrasing to make us sound native to the language that our customers speak and also-

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 所以，我们要做的很大一部分工作是尝试帮助我们的营销团队挑选完全正确的词汇和措辞，让我们听起来像是用客户的原生语言在说话，而且——

[原文] [Lenny]: You're talking about engineers is my sense, right?

[译文] [Lenny]: 我的感觉是你指的是工程师，对吧？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. Engineers is a big one, but even product managers, right?

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。工程师是一大群体，但甚至是产品经理，对吧？

[原文] [Lenny]: Mm-hmm.

[译文] [Lenny]: 嗯哼。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Like product managers know when... They know what the job is like. So, when you come in, you say the wrong words, people give you stink eye.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 就像产品经理知道什么时候……他们知道这份工作是什么样的。所以，如果你进来，说了错误的词，人们会给你白眼。

[原文] [Lenny]: Don't call them project managers.

[译文] [Lenny]: 别叫他们项目经理。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly, for example. So, I think that's a big part of what we have to do. So, on our PM team, we actually have a full-time product marketer, and her job is to... Tactically, it's like all the change logs come from her, all the release notes, and also she's always crafting the language for whatever upcoming release that we're building and working directly with the teams and trying to figure out how to talk about it, and then once we go out and build the campaigns, build assets and things like that, that's where a lot of the language is coming from. It's coming from the work that she's doing and then with sales, they're validating all that message in the field. They're saying the words to customers directly and telling you if it's sticking or not, and then you can have a really good feedback cycle between those three disciplines.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，没错，这就是个例子。所以我认为这是我们必须做的一大部分工作。所以，在我们的 PM 团队中，我们实际上有一位全职的产品营销人员，她的工作是……从战术上讲，所有的变更日志（change logs）都由她负责，所有的发布说明（release notes）也是。而且她总是为我们要构建的任何即将发布的版本推敲语言，直接与团队合作，试图弄清楚该如何谈论它。然后一旦我们出去开展营销活动、制作资产等等，很多语言都是从那里来的。它来自于她所做的工作，然后销售部门会在现场验证所有这些信息。他们直接对客户说这些话，并告诉你是否奏效，这样你就可以在这三个学科之间建立一个非常好的反馈循环。,

[原文] [Lenny]: What I've seen you refer to this way of working as is a double triangle, which is I think a complement to the PM, engineer, designer. Talk about that and give us a visual of what that looks like.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我看你把这种工作方式称为“双三角”（double triangle），我想这是对 PM、工程师、设计师那个三角的补充。谈谈这个，给我们描绘一下它看起来是什么样的。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I think PMs, like product managers, we often have a tough time trying to explain like, "What is your job?" It's a little bit of everything. I think the job that I do that we see it as is you're taking the building side of the organization and the selling side of the organization and bringing it together. You're taking all of the commercial motivations and goals of the company and making sure that what you build actually solves for those goals, and you're tempering that with what's possible and where the opportunities are to actually build stuff. So, to me, it's the PM in the middle, and then you have engineering, product design, and then sales, marketing, product management on the other side.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我认为 PM，就像产品经理，我们经常很难解释清楚，“你的工作是什么？”这有点像什么都做。我认为我所做的工作，我们将其视为你把组织的构建端（building side）和组织的销售端（selling side）结合在一起。你把公司的所有商业动机和目标拿来，确保你构建的东西实际上能解决这些目标，并用什么是可能的、构建东西的机会在哪里来调和它。所以，对我来说，PM 在中间，然后你有工程、产品设计（在一边），然后是销售、市场营销、产品管理在另一边。,

[原文] [Lenny]: PM is always in the middle-

[译文] [Lenny]: PM 永远在中间——

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Indeed.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 确实。

[原文] [Lenny]: ... but I think that's true from the perspective of PM, and I love this visual of just the PM is connecting the builders to the sellers, and you're involved in both worlds. This connects very directly to Brian Chesky's whole thing about how PMs should be doing marketing. So, the way they changed it, every PM is also PMM, and there's no more... They're product marketers now. That's their title and that's like the extreme version of what you're describing.

[译文] [Lenny]: ……但我认为从 PM 的角度来看这是真的，我喜欢这个视觉形象，即 PM 正在连接构建者和销售者，而你涉足两个世界。这与 Brian Chesky 关于 PM 应该做营销的整个观点有着非常直接的联系。所以，他们改变的方式是，每个 PM 也是 PMM（产品营销经理），不再有……他们现在是产品营销人员了。那是他们的头衔，这就像是你所描述的那个极端版本。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. Yeah, and I think Apple's been doing that way for forever, too.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。是的，而且我认为苹果公司也一直都是这么做的。

[原文] [Lenny]: Got it. So, the advice here is if you're a PM at a B2B business, lean into the sales and marketing side of it, lean into the go-to-market.

[译文] [Lenny]: 明白了。所以这里的建议是，如果你是 B2B 业务的 PM，向销售和营销那边倾斜，向进入市场（go-to-market）倾斜。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, and in fact, if you're leaving something on the table in terms of the kind of impact that you are having at your job, that's probably the thing that you're leaving on the table. You're probably already doing a good job of collaborating with engineering and design. It's probably the sort of sell side that there's an opportunity for you to have more impact.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，事实上，如果你觉得你在工作中的影响力有什么遗漏的话，那可能就是你遗漏的东西。你可能在与工程和设计协作方面已经做得很好。实际上是在销售端，你有机会产生更大的影响力。,

[原文] [Lenny]: Just to make it even more concrete for PMs that are like, "Okay, I want to do this. I want to do what Linear's doing. I'm going to get more salesy." What does it look like when someone is more is in this double triangle working more closely with sales? You talked about being on sales calls. What else there can you share of just like, "Here, try these things"?

[译文] [Lenny]: 为了让那些想“好吧，我想做这个。我想做 Linear 正在做的事。我要变得更像销售”的 PM 们更具体一点。当一个人在这个“双三角”中更紧密地与销售合作时，那看起来像什么？你提到了参加销售电话会议。还有什么你可以分享的，就像“给，试试这些事情”？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I think originate the message that you send to your audience. There's a lot of things that marketing does, which you are never going to necessarily touch. There's always demand gen and figuring out channel strategy and all this kind of stuff, like sure. That's a peer marketing concern, but actually picking the words and where the emphasis is, like you should understand the customer at a pretty deep level, probably deeper than any other group at the company because of the kinds of requirements gathering, discovery that you're doing. So, you're going to know the native language that your customers speak a lot better and help your marketing team originate those words.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我认为要发起发送给受众的信息（Message）。营销部门做很多事情，你不一定非要碰。总是有需求挖掘、弄清楚渠道策略之类的事情，当然。那是纯粹的营销关注点，但实际上挑选词汇和重点在哪里，你应该对客户有相当深层次的了解，可能比公司里任何其他群体都要深，因为你在做那种需求收集和发现工作。所以，你会更了解你客户所说的原生语言，并帮助你的营销团队发起那些词汇。,

[原文] [Lenny]: Got it. So, basically be really involved in the product marketing, the writing, the emails, the headlines, the website?

[译文] [Lenny]: 明白了。所以，基本上就是真正参与到产品营销、写作、邮件、标题和网站中去？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, yeah, exactly. I know the word product marketing is also so overloaded. They do so many different things, but it's that sort of content creation piece that you really have an opportunity to contributes to.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，是的，没错。我知道“产品营销”这个词也被过度使用了。他们做很多不同的事情，但正是这种内容创作的部分，你真的有机会做出贡献。

章节 10：求职建议：像顾问一样面试

📝 本节摘要：

本章聚焦于职业发展。Nan Yu 提出了一个反直觉的求职策略：不要试图证明自己“什么都擅长”，那样只会让你成为众多候选人中的普通一员（1 of N）。相反，求职者应当在面试中戴上“探索帽（Discovery Hat）”，通过提问（如询问季度 OKR）来挖掘招聘经理面临的“紧迫问题（Burning Problem）”。一旦你明确了那个问题并把自己定位为解决方案，录用决策就变成了一个简单的二元选择：是雇佣你这个确定的解决方案，还是雇佣其他人并在这个问题上“掷骰子”碰运气。他还建议在面试过程中主动要求与未来的平级同事（如工程经理）对话，表现得就像已经入职（act like you already work there）一样。

[原文] [Lenny]: Yeah, I love how concrete that is. It's like don't think about this concept, product marketing. Just think about the words that your potential customers and customers see. Okay, final area I want to spend a lot of time on is totally different. It's around getting a job.

[译文] [Lenny]: 是的，我喜欢这建议的具体程度。就像不要去想产品营销这个概念。只要想想你的潜在客户和现有客户看到的词汇就行了。好的，我想花大量时间探讨的最后一个领域完全不同。是关于找工作的。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Oh, yeah. Okay.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 噢，好的。没问题。

[原文] [Lenny]: You have a pretty unique approach to finding a gig. I heard from the founder of Mode about the very unique way you approached getting a job there. I imagine Linear is a similar boat. What advice can you share with folks that are looking for a job, maybe struggling, that work for you when you were looking for your next gig?,

[译文] [Lenny]: 你在找工作方面有一套相当独特的方法。我从 Mode 的创始人那里听说过你当时为了得到那份工作所采用的非常独特的方式。我想 Linear 的情况也差不多。对于那些正在找工作、也许正在挣扎的人，有什么在你寻找下一份工作时行之有效的建议可以分享给他们吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Project management is a unique role. Because we do just about everything, you don't really get pigeonholed into being compared along a single dimension with everyone else, and everyone who's hiring PMs, just like when they're hiring execs, they're hoping that they bring them on to solve some burning problem that they have. So, it's your job when you're in the interview process to figure out what that burning problem is. So, put on your discovery hat and go figure out what is the actual job to be done of the hiring manager when they're bringing on a new PM onto their team?,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 项目管理（此处指产品管理）是一个独特的角色。因为我们几乎什么都做，所以你不会真正被局限在单一维度上与其他人进行比较。每一个招聘 PM 的人，就像他们在招聘高管时一样，都希望招进来的人能解决他们面临的某种紧迫问题（burning problem）。所以，当你在面试过程中，你的工作就是弄清楚那个紧迫问题是什么。所以，戴上你的“探索帽（discovery hat）”，去弄清楚招聘经理把一个新的 PM 招进团队时，他们实际的“待完成任务（Job to be Done）”是什么？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: And if you can do that and then make a good case that you are the person to solve that problem, then hiring you becomes a binary choice between do I hire the solution to my problem or do I hire someone else? And I think what ends up happening a lot is when you're in a interview process, you're just trying to put your best foot forward, trying to say that you're great at everything. You have very few weaknesses. Maybe you tried too hard, like whatever, but everyone's going to say that. So, you're just one of end people, and you want to make yourself a little bit of just you versus the field. You're the solution to a problem and then everyone else is like a roll of the dice.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 如果你能做到这一点，并有力地证明你就是解决那个问题的人，那么雇佣你就变成了一个二元选择（binary choice）：我是雇佣这个能解决我问题的人，还是雇佣别人？我认为很多时候发生的情况是，当你在面试过程中，你只是试图展现最好的一面，试图说你在各方面都很棒。你几乎没有弱点。也许你用力过猛，不管怎样，但每个人都会这么说。所以，你只是 N 个人中的一个。而你想让自己变得有点像“你 vs 其他所有人”。你是某个问题的解决方案，而其他人就像是在掷骰子（roll of the dice）。

[原文] [Lenny]: So, the way you're describing it is the company has a job to be done, say it's drive growth of some feature. In this case, it's like for Linear, just build a killer or successful B2B product. I don't know. That's a broad one. Usually, you're not interviewing for head of product role, so that's maybe too broad. So, it's like what is this PM role's job to be done at the company and then help convince them you are the best person to do that job and solve this problem for them.,

[译文] [Lenny]: 所以，你描述的方式是公司有一个“待完成的任务”，比如推动某个功能的增长。在这个案例中，对于 Linear 来说，就是构建一个杀手级或成功的 B2B 产品。我不知道。那个太宽泛了。通常你不是在面试产品负责人的职位，所以那个可能太宽泛了。所以，重点在于这个 PM 角色在公司的“待完成任务”是什么，然后帮助说服他们你是做这项工作并为他们解决这个问题的最佳人选。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, and a lot of times when you take that approach, it'll feel like you already work there, and the way that I did this, like I got advice from a friend. He said like, "I was interviewing for this job at Mode that you referenced." I'm like, "How should I approach it?" He's like, "Just act like you already worked there. What would you do?" And then it's like, "Okay, I could do that." So, then when you're in this interview process and someone's asking you questions. He goes, "Do you have any questions for me?" You can ask them like, "What are your OKRs this quarter? How can someone help you achieve those?",

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，而且很多时候当你采取这种方法时，感觉就像你已经在那里工作了一样。我就是这么做的，我从一个朋友那里得到了建议。他说……就像你提到的我在面试 Mode 的工作时。我问，“我该怎么做？”他说，“就表现得好像你已经在那里工作了一样。你会怎么做？”然后我就想，“好吧，我可以那样做。”所以，当你在面试过程中，有人问你问题。他说，“你有什么问题要问我吗？”你可以问他们：“你们这个季度的 OKR 是什么？ 某人如何能帮助你们实现这些目标？”

[原文] [Nan Yu]: You can be that specific about it, and they're like, "Oh, yeah, sure. I can tell you about the exact thing that I'm doing this quarter, and then you'll have some level of intelligence about what people are actually trying to solve because I think often we just get stuck in these very high level general types of questions like, "What's the company goals sand all that kind of stuff, and it's like, no, you can get really specific. If you were collaborating with that person in your job, what would you say to them?,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 你可以问得那么具体，他们会觉得，“噢，是的，当然。我可以告诉你我这个季度具体在做什么，”然后你就对人们实际上试图解决的问题有了一定程度的了解，因为我认为我们经常陷入那些非常高层次、笼统的问题，比如“公司的目标是什么”之类的话，不，你可以变得非常具体。如果你在工作中与那个人合作，你会对他们说什么？

[原文] [Lenny]: I love how actionable this advice is. There's obviously an element of this takes work and time. A lot of people are interviewing at a lot of companies, trying to find a job, is part of your advice. Pick the ones you're most excited about and invest a lot of time in this way of interviewing.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我喜欢这个建议的可操作性。显然这其中有一个因素是这需要精力和时间。很多人在很多公司面试，试图找工作。你的建议是不是有一部分是：挑选那些你最兴奋的公司，并在这种面试方式上投入大量时间？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: You can invest a lot in the ones where you know that you're going to be able to over deliver on. If you understand what they're actually trying to solve, then you know where you're going to have both the highest chance of success of getting hired, but also doing a really great job on the other end of it.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 你可以在那些你知道自己能够超额交付（over deliver）的公司上投入大量精力。如果你理解他们实际上试图解决什么问题，那么你就知道在哪里你既有最高的成功被录用的几率，又能在入职后真正出色地完成工作。

[原文] [Lenny]: And you talk about how you're like pretending you have the job, pretending you actually have this job as part of the interview process. Oftentimes, as an outsider, you don't have enough information to have a really good thought on what the solution is, and maybe part of it is going to be so wrong because you're like, "I don't actually know. I don't have the data." Do you actually try to reach out to the engineers and designers on the team to try to understand things? How far do you go to try to solve these problems and show them what you can do?,

[译文] [Lenny]: 你谈到了假装你已经得到了这份工作，假装你实际上拥有这份工作作为面试过程的一部分。通常，作为一个局外人，你没有足够的信息来对解决方案有一个真正好的想法，也许其中一部分会错得很离谱，因为你会觉得，“我其实不知道。我没有数据。”你实际上会尝试联系团队中的工程师和设计师来试图了解情况吗？为了解决这些问题并向他们展示你的能力，你会做到什么程度？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I mean, you're in the interview loop. These are people that you're going to be working closely with. So, start there. Do your discovery questions, and if there's an area that you think you want to dig, you can ask. There's no harm asking, "Hey, can you put me in touch with an engineering manager who's working on the same problem?" And if no one else is asking, again, you're going to have an extra piece of feedback from that eng manager. So, yeah, like this guy asks really good questions, and it seems like they're really with it. No one else is going to have that piece of feedback. So, during the debrief process.,

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我是说，你在面试流程（loop）中。这些人是你将来要密切合作的人。所以，从那里开始。做你的发现提问，如果你觉得某个领域你想深挖，你可以问。问这个没有坏处：“嘿，你能让我联系一下正在处理同一个问题的工程经理吗？”如果没人在问这个问题，同样的，你会从那位工程经理那里得到一份额外的反馈。所以，是的，就像“这家伙问的问题真的很棒，看起来他们真的很懂行（really with it）。”没有其他人会有那份反馈。所以在汇报（debrief）过程中（这会很有优势）。

[原文] [Lenny]: And just asking that question alone will show them how deeply you're thinking about this already?

[译文] [Lenny]: 光是问那个问题本身就能向他们展示你对这件事的思考有多深了吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。

章节 11：截止日期的哲学：P0 级对待与削减范围

📝 本节摘要：

本章聚焦于如何让工程团队严肃对待截止日期。Nan Yu 指出，工程师通常认为截止日期是捏造的，因此容易忽视它们。为了改变这一点，Linear 的策略是：设定极少的截止日期，但一旦设定，就将其视为 P0 级（最高优先级）任务，其他任何事情都要为其让路。Nan 强调，产品经理在此期间的核心职责不是催促，而是疯狂削减范围（Cut Scope），确保在日期到达时有一个“可发布”的产品，哪怕功能不全。他指出，这是因为市场营销的时间窗口（一年仅有的 50 次周更机会）是不可再生的资源。最后，他提出了一个反直觉的观点：不做估算（No Estimating），而是依靠项目初期 10% 时间产出的原型来动态判断交付风险。

[原文] [Lenny]: Amazing. Nan, is there anything else that we have not covered that you want to touch on or share or you think might be helpful to listeners before we get to a very exciting lightning round?

[译文] [Lenny]: 太棒了。Nan，在我们进入非常激动人心的快问快答环节之前，还有什么我们没涵盖但你想谈谈、分享或者觉得对听众有帮助的内容吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I have a very specific point of view on deadlines. I don't know if that's [inaudible 01:09:34] you care.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我对截止日期（deadlines）有一个非常具体的观点。我不知道你是否……感兴趣。

[原文] [Lenny]: Let's do it. Fire away.

[译文] [Lenny]: 来吧。请讲。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I think what often happens is people get depressed about deadlines. It's like, "Hey, here's the ship date," and then you never make it. I don't know if you've had this feeling before.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我觉得通常发生的情况是，人们会对截止日期感到沮丧。就像是，“嘿，这是发布日期，”然后你永远赶不上。我不知道你以前是否有过这种感觉。

[原文] [Lenny]: Absolutely, with some deadlines.

[译文] [Lenny]: 当然，有些截止日期确实如此。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: You were an engineer before too, right? So, it's just like engineers is basically like, "Oh, yeah. Yeah, deadlines, they're complete fabrications," and the only way to make deadlines real is to take them so seriously that they are basically like a P0 problem, and everything else has to not matter in comparison to the deadline because that's the only way you're going to be able to signal to the team and also to all the stakeholders that you're actually taking it seriously. So, my feeling on deadlines is don't have too many of them, and when you do, it's a P0. So, the engineer is working on it. They don't get to work on anything else. It's like, "Oh, I need them for this," like nope.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 你以前也是个工程师，对吧？所以，工程师们基本上会觉得，“噢，是的。是的，截止日期，它们完全是捏造的（fabrications），”而让截止日期变得真实的唯一方法，就是极其严肃地对待它们，以至于它们基本上就是一个 P0 级问题，与截止日期相比，其他任何事情都必须变得不重要，因为这是你向团队以及所有利益相关者发出信号，表明你真的在认真对待它的唯一方式。所以，我对截止日期的感觉是，不要定太多，但当你定了一个，它就是 P0。所以，工程师就在做这个。他们不能做其他任何事情。就像有人说，“噢，我这件事需要他们，”回答是：不行。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Nope. You're not pulling them off of anything. We're doing this. As a PM, your job is to just cut as much scope as possible to make it possible to hit that deadline. Like what are the things actually blocking us from doing it? Because what you want to do is at the moment where you have to make the go, no-go call on whether to ship, you want to be able to actually have a product that you can say yes to. It might not have all the features you had wanted or whatever, and you can say no. You can make that choice, but you want to set yourself up to be in a position where you can actually say yes or no to something, because what often happens is like we want this thing. Well, it's not even close to being done yet, so there's no possible way we can say yes. I can't ship it. It's half broken. It's like, "No, no, no. You want to get to a point where it works. It might not be the product that you want, but it is an actual real product that you can conceivably ship."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 不行。你不能把他们从这件事上拉走。我们就要做这个。作为一名产品经理（PM），你的工作就是尽可能多地削减范围（cut scope），以确保有可能赶上那个截止日期。比如，到底是什么在阻碍我们完成它？因为你想要做的是，当你必须做出发布还是不发布的决定（go, no-go call）的那一刻，你要能够拥有一个你实际上可以说“Yes”的产品。它可能没有你想要的所有功能或其他什么，你可以说“No”。你可以做那个选择，但你要让自己处于一个你实际上可以对某件事说“Yes”或“No”的位置，因为通常发生的情况是，我们想要这个东西。嗯，它甚至还差得远没做完，所以我们根本不可能说“Yes”。我发不了。它是半残废的。这就像，“不，不，不。你要达到一个它能工作的程度。它可能不是你（最初）想要的产品，但它是一个实际上可以想象能够发布的真实产品。”,

[原文] [Lenny]: So, you said that don't have too many deadlines, but when you do, make sure you... Everyone understands these are actual deadlines. When do you decide it's worth having a deadline? Is it like a marketing launch sort of thing? What's worthy of a deadline in your experience?

[译文] [Lenny]: 所以，你说不要有太多的截止日期，但当你有的时候，要确保……每个人都明白这是真正的截止日期。你什么时候决定值得设定一个截止日期？是像市场发布之类的活动吗？根据你的经验，什么值得设定截止日期？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, it's usually having to do with some kind of external marketing type of exercise that you're try to hit.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，通常这与你要努力赶上的某种外部营销活动有关。

[原文] [Lenny]: Got it.

[译文] [Lenny]: 明白了。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: And I think that that's the other thing that I think. As builders, we can often look at launch dates and stuff like that. It's like, "Oh, who cares if it's a little bit later or we skip this change log," or whatever it is, and I think that that's really a... I don't know. It makes me go crazy when I hear people say that in all honesty. With marketing and communication with customers, you basically have a limited amount of opportunities to do so. A year is 365 days. There are 12 months. Each of those months has about four weeks. There's some rhythm where you get to have 50-ish weeks to say something to your audience once a week, or you get to have 12 months to say something really big or four quarters to say something huge. If you miss one of those opportunities, you don't get it back again. You can't time travel back and say like, "Okay, actually, let's redo first quarter and say this message that we wish we could have gotten into the field."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我认为这是另一件我想说的事。作为构建者，我们经常看待发布日期这类东西时会觉得，“噢，如果晚一点或者我们跳过这次更新日志（change log）又有谁在乎呢，”或者诸如此类。我觉得这真的是一种……我不知道。老实说，听到人们这么说我会抓狂。在市场营销和与客户沟通方面，你基本上只有有限的机会去做这件事。一年有 365 天。有 12 个月。每个月大约有 4 周。有一种节奏是，你有大约 50 周的机会每周对你的受众说点什么，或者你有 12 个月说点真正重要的事情，或者 4 个季度说点巨大的事情。如果你错过了其中一个机会，你就再也找不回来了。你不能时间旅行（time travel）回去说，“好的，其实，让我们重做第一季度，把我们希望当时能发布的信息发出去。”,,

[原文] [Lenny]: That is such a powerful point. I could see the sales marketing, go-to-market element of your job coming out there. I imagine everyone that's in that field's like, "Yes, this is exactly right." Maybe just the last question along this line. So, I love this idea of taking deadlines very seriously when you commit to a deadline. At the same time, as you pointed out, it creates a lot of stress knowing there's a deadline we have to hit. So, one lever you've mentioned is cutting scope. Another is just people spending more time estimating to have more accurate deadlines. You invest in that. How do you think about just for an engineering team to come into a deadline, how much to spend on de-risking and estimating versus just, "Let's just do our best and then we'll cut and adjust"?

[译文] [Lenny]: 这是一个非常有力的观点。我能看到你工作中销售营销、进入市场（go-to-market）的那一面显露出来了。我想每个在这个领域的人都会说，“是的，完全正确。”也许这方面的最后一个问题。我喜欢这个一旦承诺就极其严肃对待截止日期的想法。但同时，正如你指出的，知道有一个必须赶上的截止日期会造成很大的压力。所以，你提到的一个杠杆是削减范围。另一个杠杆是人们花更多时间去估算，以获得更准确的截止日期。你们在这方面有投入。你是怎么考虑工程团队面对截止日期的，要花多少时间在去风险（de-risking）和估算上，还是说就，“让我们尽力而为，然后我们再削减和调整”？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: This might be my hot take, but we do almost no estimating in order to hit deadlines. What we do is we ship as early as we can. The thing we talked about earlier where if by the time that 10% of the time has elapsed, you have a working thing, you can now spend the rest of the time deciding whether or not you want to do another iteration or you want to polish that thing and get it to be a shippable state. So, you're setting up your future self to be able to make that decision. So, none of this is... You can't go into this at the very last moment and say like, "Okay, now, we have to take the deadline seriously." You have to do it from the beginning and commit to the process of going very fast, iterating early, and then putting yourself in a position where you can say yes or no to a product.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 这可能是我的激进观点（hot take），但为了赶上截止日期，我们几乎不做估算（almost no estimating）。我们做的是尽可能早地发布。就像我们之前谈到的那样，如果在 10% 的时间过去时，你已经有了一个能工作的东西，你现在就可以花剩下的时间来决定你是想再做一次迭代，还是想打磨那个东西让它达到可发布的状态。所以，你是在为未来的自己设定能够做那个决定的条件。所以，这都不是……你不能在最后时刻才进来说，“好了，现在我们必须严肃对待截止日期了。”你必须从一开始就这么做，并致力于非常快速、早期迭代的过程，然后让自己处于一个你可以对产品说“Yes”或“No”的位置。,,

章节 12：快问快答与结语

📝 本节摘要：

在最后的快问快答环节中，Nan 推荐了经典书籍《设计心理学》，强调“万物皆产品”的视角。他分享了一个有趣的发现：一种日本绘图笔因不透墨特性被亚马逊商家重新包装为“圣经研读套装”。他提出了一条实用的人生格言：“正确的数量是‘太多’减去一”，主张通过触碰极限来寻找最佳平衡点。最后，他讲述了在 Everlane 工作时的一个传奇故事：一批因尺寸过短而报废的男士 T 恤，经过裁剪和重新定位，竟意外成为了畅销的女士箱型 T 恤（Box-Cut Tee），完美诠释了意外的产品市场契合度（PMF）。

[原文] [Lenny]: So interesting and so different from the way most companies operate. Nan, this was everything I was hoping it'd be. I think this is going to help a lot of people build much better product, which would be good for the world if more products are like Linear. With that, we reached our very exciting lightning round. Are you ready?

[译文] [Lenny]: 太有趣了，而且跟大多数公司的运作方式太不一样了。Nan，这正如我所期待的一样。我认为这将帮助很多人构建更好的产品，如果更多的产品能像 Linear 一样，这对世界来说是件好事。至此，我们到了非常激动人心的快问快答环节（lightning round）。准备好了吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, let's do it.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 好的，来吧。

[原文] [Lenny]: Okay, let's do it. Okay, first question. What are two or three books that you have recommended most to other people?

[译文] [Lenny]: 好，开始。第一个问题。你向其他人推荐最多的两三本书是什么？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I think the one book that I recommend the most is The Design of Everyday Things by Don Norman. I read it originally in college for an HCI class I was taking, and I think of everything I've ever read, it's the thing that caused me to see the world from the perspective of everything you interact with as a product. Every pencil that you use, every door that you open is a product that somebody designed.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我想我推荐最多的一本书是 Don Norman 的《设计心理学》（The Design of Everyday Things）。我最初是在大学上人机交互（HCI）课时读的，我觉得在我读过的所有书中，正是这本书让我开始从“你互动的每一样东西都是产品”这个角度来看待世界。你用的每一支铅笔，你打开的每一扇门，都是某人设计的产品。

[原文] [Lenny]: And is that the big takeaway from that book? Because it comes up a lot, and it's such an old book. So, I guess for someone that hasn't read or maybe doesn't have time to read, it is the big takeaway for you. Someone designed everything and there's a reason things aren't great, and they can be improved.

[译文] [Lenny]: 这就是那本书最大的收获吗？因为这本书经常被提到，而且它是一本很老的书了。所以，我想对于那些还没读过或者没时间读的人来说，这就是对你来说最大的收获：某人设计了一切，东西之所以不够好是有原因的，而且它们是可以被改进的。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. I mean, I saw this the other day. I was at a café in my neighborhood, and I saw a kid rip a handle off a door, like of the café. He pulled it so hard, it came right off because it was a push door, but it had a handle that looked like you could pull it, and that's one of the canonical examples of the book because [inaudible 01:15:25] are just mysteries. Yeah.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。我是说，我前几天还看到了这一幕。我在我家附近的咖啡馆，看到一个孩子把门把手拽下来了，就是咖啡馆的门。他拉得太用力，把手直接掉了下来，因为那是扇推门（push door），但它装了一个看起来像是让你拉的把手，这也是书中最典型的例子之一，因为（诺曼门）简直就是谜团。是的。,

[原文] [Lenny]: Awesome. Next question. Do you have a favorite recent movie or TV show you've really enjoyed?

[译文] [Lenny]: 太棒了。下一个问题。你最近有没有特别喜欢的电影或电视节目？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I watched The Diplomat on Netflix. I think it was terrific. It's really fun, easy watch. It has some West Wing vibes if you were into that back in the day.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我看了 Netflix 上的《头号外交官》（The Diplomat）。我觉得非常棒。真的很有趣，看起来很轻松。如果你以前喜欢那种类型的话，它有点《白宫风云》（West Wing）的氛围。

[原文] [Lenny]: Yeah, have you seen the second season?

[译文] [Lenny]: 是啊，你看过第二季了吗？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I finished the second season. Yeah.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我看完了第二季。是的。

[原文] [Lenny]: I wasn't as excited about the second season, just to put that out there. The first season was really good and then just went off a little like, "Okay. I guess it's cool," but stuff like that.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我得说我对第二季没那么兴奋。第一季真的很好，后来就有点走偏了，感觉像，“好吧，我想这也还行，”诸如此类的。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, it got a little like spy thrillery, I think.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，我觉得它变得有点像间谍惊悚片了。

[原文] [Lenny]: Okay, cool, but still really good and on Netflix. Okay, cool. Do you have a favorite product you recently discovered that you really like?

[译文] [Lenny]: 好的，酷，但还是很不错，在 Netflix 上。好的，酷。你最近有没有发现什么特别喜欢的产品？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I didn't discover it, but I discovered a version of it that was really interesting. There's a pen. Actually, I have one on my desk. It's called the Sakura Micron. I don't know if you use these. It's like a felt tip pen. It's really great. It was originally invented in Japan for artists to draw comic books and stuff, and you can use it for anything. I use it for journaling or whatever, but I was on Amazon. I was trying to buy more, and I found a package that said like, "Bible Study Kit."

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 不是我新发现的，但我发现了它的一个版本非常有趣。有一种笔。其实我桌上就有一支。叫 Sakura Micron（樱花针管笔）。不知道你用不用这个。它就像那种毡尖笔。真的很棒。它最初是在日本发明给艺术家画漫画之类的，你可以用它做任何事。我用它写日记什么的，但我当时在亚马逊上想多买点，结果发现了一个包装上写着“圣经研读套装（Bible Study Kit）”。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: I was like, "Why is this labeled Bible Study Kit?" And it was literally just the pen in four different colors, and it was because the thing doesn't bleed through pages. So, if you have a Bible, which they often have these really flimsy newsprint pages. It's not going to bleed through. And it's just really interesting to me that someone marketed a normal package of these pens as a Bible study kit and for people who were looking for that keyword, and it was official, too. It was not something hacked together. It was actually an official packaging of this.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 我当时想，“为什么这被标记为圣经研读套装？”结果里面真的就是那支笔，有四种不同颜色，原因是因为这笔不会透纸（bleed through）。如果你有一本圣经，通常那是很薄的新闻纸印刷的。它不会渗透过去。对我来说真的很有趣，有人把这种普通的笔包装成圣经研读套装进行营销，针对那些搜索该关键词的人，而且这也是官方的。不是随便拼凑的。这实际上是官方的包装。,

[原文] [Lenny]: Amazing. What a unique pen choice. Two more questions. Do you have a favorite life motto that you often come back to and find useful in work or in life?

[译文] [Lenny]: 太神奇了。多么独特的笔的选择。还有两个问题。你有没有最喜欢的人生格言，是你经常回顾并发现对工作或生活有用的？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: The correct amount is too much minus one, and I think this ties into the try the extreme version of it of a thing where... I don't know, like a stupid example, like how much pizza do you want to eat? It's like, well, five slices was too many. I feel bad. Then four was probably the right number, and then if you want to find the right number, sometimes you just have to really shoot for the edge and then find out what's too much, and then you'll find out exactly what the right amount is.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 正确的数量是“太多”减去一。我认为这与“尝试事物的极端版本”有关……我不知道，举个愚蠢的例子，比如你想吃多少披萨？就像，嗯，五片太多了，我感觉不舒服。那么四片可能是正确的数量。如果你想找到正确的数量，有时你必须真的冲向边缘（shoot for the edge），找出什么是“太多”，然后你会准确地发现什么是正确的数量。,

[原文] [Lenny]: I love how tactical that is, makes me think about Elon Musk's thing about cutting things. Like one of his formulas for just getting stuff done, one of them is just cut stuff before trying to optimize it and automate it, and his advice is if you don't bring back 10% of things, you cut, you're not cutting enough.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我喜欢这个建议的战术性，这让我想起埃隆·马斯克关于削减事情的观点。就像他完成任务的公式之一，就是在尝试优化和自动化之前先削减，他的建议是，如果你不需要把削减掉的东西中的 10% 加回来，那就说明你剪得还不够多。,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, exactly.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，正是这样。

[原文] [Lenny]: Final question. You worked at Everlane for a number of years, and you shared the rough idea of a story around a shirt, maybe a bestseller that they have now, and how you helped create a bestselling women's shirt. Can you share that story?

[译文] [Lenny]: 最后一个问题。你在 Everlane 工作了很多年，你分享过一个关于一件衬衫的故事梗概，也许那是他们现在的畅销款，关于你是如何帮助打造一款畅销女式衬衫的。能分享一下那个故事吗？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah. So, I mean, to be clear, I witnessed the creation. I don't think I had a direct hand in it, but yeah. So, I saw this advertisement the other day on Instagram for... It's called the Women's Box-Cut Tee, and it's a wide and short for women, and I looked, and it had 20 colors of it, and it sells super well, and I remember when we created this thing, and it was because there was a batch of defective men's t-shirts. They all came in an inch and a half too short. So, we couldn't sell them. You would have your belly button sticking out. No one wants to wear of that.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的。声明一下，我是见证了它的创造，我不认为我直接参与了，但是是的。前几天我在 Instagram 上看到了这个广告……它叫女士箱型 T 恤（Women's Box-Cut Tee），是一种宽短款的女装，我看了一下，有 20 种颜色，卖得超级好。我记得我们创造这个东西的时候，是因为有一批有缺陷的男士 T 恤。它们全都短了一英寸半。所以我们没法卖。穿上肚脐眼会露出来。没人想穿那个。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: So, what we did was like, well, we have to salvage the inventory because we were a very small company, and we had to make cash flow, and we couldn't just damage it out. So, the design team and the marketing team came together, and they said, "Okay. Here's what we're going to do. We're going to cut another two inches off of this and make it really cropped and market it towards women as like a cropped boxed-tee silhouette, and we did that. We're like, "Okay, hopefully, we can salvage this inventory and not have to take a write-down." It sold out in a week, and we're like, "Oh, okay. I guess we just made a hit product," and it's one of these things where it's very hard to know what this was. Was this a marketing thing? Was this a design thing? I don't know, but you just come together, and you find the right product market fit in the weirdest way.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 所以，我们当时想，好吧，我们要挽救这批库存，因为我们当时是一家非常小的公司，我们必须保证现金流，不能直接报损。所以设计团队和市场团队聚在一起，他们说，“好吧，我们打算这么做。我们要把这个再剪短两英寸，做成真正的短款，然后针对女性市场把它作为一种短款箱型 T 恤（cropped boxed-tee）廓形来推广。”我们这么做了。我们想，“好的，希望能挽救这批库存，不用进行减记（write-down）。”结果一周内就卖光了，我们想，“噢，好吧。我想我们刚刚制造了一个爆款，”这就是那种很难知道到底是什么原因的事情。是市场营销的功劳？还是设计的功劳？我不知道，但大家聚在一起，以最奇怪的方式找到了正确的产品市场契合度（PMF）。,,

[原文] [Lenny]: I love that it's still going.

[译文] [Lenny]: 我喜欢它现在还在卖。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, it's still going. Originally, it was just white. Now, there's like 20 colors.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，还在卖。最初只有白色的。现在大概有 20 种颜色了。

[原文] [Lenny]: Oh, man. I love how many industries you have worked in: fashion, data analytics, project management. I don't know what's next. There's more, I imagine. Nan, this was incredible. I really appreciate making time for this. Like I said, I think we're going to have helped a lot of people build better products. Two final questions, where can folks find you online if they want to reach out and learn more? And how can listeners be useful to you?

[译文] [Lenny]: 噢，天哪。我喜欢你涉足了这么多行业：时尚、数据分析、项目管理。我不知道接下来会是什么。我想会有更多的。Nan，这太不可思议了。真的非常感谢你抽出时间。就像我说的，我认为我们将帮助很多人构建更好的产品。最后两个问题，如果大家想联系你并了解更多，在哪里可以找到你？听众能为你做些什么？,

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, I'm on X/Twitter as the thenanyu. It's T-H-E and then my name, and if they have any feedback about Linear, we're very happy to take it, especially for people who use it in their day-to-day. We really want to hear from users.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 好的，我在 X/Twitter 上的账号是 @thenanyu。是 T-H-E 加上我的名字。如果大家对 Linear 有任何反馈，我们非常乐意接受，特别是那些日常使用它的人。我们真的很想听到用户的声音。

[原文] [Lenny]: What's the best way for them to share that? Is it tweet at you? Is it go to the website? What do you recommend?

[译文] [Lenny]: 分享反馈最好的方式是什么？是发推特给你？还是去网站？你推荐什么？

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Oh, yeah. You can tweet at us. You can DM me on Twitter. My DMs are open, so it's all good.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 噢，是的。你可以发推特给我们。你可以在 Twitter 上给我发私信。我的私信是开放的，所以都可以。

[原文] [Lenny]: Amazing. Nan, thank you so much for being here.

[译文] [Lenny]: 太棒了。Nan，非常感谢你的到来。

[原文] [Nan Yu]: Yeah, of course. Thanks, Lenny. Bye, everyone.

[译文] [Nan Yu]: 是的，当然。谢谢，Lenny。大家再见。

[原文] [Lenny]: Thank you so much for listening. If you found this valuable, you can subscribe to the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your favorite podcast app. Also, please consider giving us a rating or leaving a review as that really helps other listeners find the podcast. You can find all past episodes or learn more about the show at lennyspodcast.com. See you in the next episode.

[译文] [Lenny]: 非常感谢大家的收听。如果你觉得这对你有价值，你可以在 Apple Podcasts、Spotify 或你喜欢的播客应用上订阅本节目。另外，请考虑给我们评分或留言评论，因为这真的能帮助其他听众发现这个播客。你可以在 lennyspodcast.com 找到所有往期节目或了解更多关于本节目的信息。下期节目见。