章节 01：大陆帝国的生存法则与中俄关系的起点

📝 本节摘要：

本章为全篇访谈奠定了理论基石。主讲人Sarah Paine首先明确了“俄罗斯”这一概念的历史连续性，指出无论是沙皇时代、苏维埃时期还是现代俄罗斯，其地缘政治本质从未改变。

随后，她提出了核心理论框架——“大陆帝国”（Continental Empire）的生存法则。她指出，中俄两国历史上都遵循这一残酷逻辑：为了生存，必须避免两线作战，且绝不允许边境存在强权。为了达成这一目标，它们倾向于通过“先动荡、后吞并”的策略处理邻国，在边境制造缓冲区。这一逻辑不仅解释了历史上中俄周边的动荡，也直接映射了普京当下的战略行为。

[原文] [Speaker A]: People are worried about whether there's going to be an enduring relationship with China and Russia. If you look at this picture, the relations look more glacial than cordial and the little one's hauling on the arm of the big one. One wonders about that. It turns out my expertise is on Russo-Chinese relations. That's what I studied in graduate school. My dissertation was a history of their border from the Opium Wars in the mid-19th century until Outer Mongolia was snatched from the Chinese sphere of influence

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 人们很担心中国和俄罗斯之间是否会形成一种持久的关系。如果你看这张照片，两国的关系看起来更像是冷若冰霜而非亲密无间，而且那个小个子正拽着大个子的胳膊。人们对此感到疑惑。事实证明，我的专长正是俄中关系。这是我在研究生阶段研究的课题。我的博士论文写的正是从19世纪中叶鸦片战争开始，直到外蒙古被从中国的势力范围中夺走这段时期的两国边界史。

[原文] [Speaker A]: and parked in the Russian sphere in the 1920s. So it's fun to talk about this particular topic. Before I get going, I'm going to do some terminology. I'm going to use the word Russia to refer to the czarist, Soviet, and modern periods, the same way that you use France to describe its many monarchies and many republics. The Bolsheviks thought they were special, so they came up with special words for special people: Soviet, Soviet Union. But it turns out they were temporary and Russia is the enduring thing. So that's it on terminology.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 并于1920年代被划入俄罗斯势力范围的那段历史。所以谈论这个特定话题很有趣。在开始之前，我要先说明一下术语。我将用“俄罗斯”一词来指代沙皇时期、苏联时期和现代时期，就像你们用“法国”来描述它历经的多个君主制和共和制时期一样。布尔什维克认为自己很特别，所以他们为特别的人发明了特别的词：苏维埃、苏联。但事实证明，他们只是暂时的，而俄罗斯才是那个恒久的存在。术语方面就是这样。

[原文] [Speaker A]: Before I speculate on what the future is going to look like, our only database that we have is whatever happened from this second backwards, what people call history. It's just whatever is in the past. That's it, that's our database. So I'm going to look at when Russia was strong and China was weak, from the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century, then the reversal of the power balance, and then in the recent period when China has been strong and Russia weak. China and Russia discovered each other late in their histories.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 在我推测未来会是什么样子之前，我们拥有的唯一数据库就是从这一秒倒推回去发生的所有事情，也就是人们所说的历史。它只是过去发生的一切。就是这样，这就是我们的数据库。所以我将审视俄罗斯强而中国弱的时期，即从19世纪中叶到20世纪中叶，然后是权力平衡的逆转，接着是近期中国强而俄罗斯弱的时期。中国和俄罗斯在各自的历史长河中很晚才发现彼此。

[原文] [Speaker A]: It was the early part of their last dynasties when the Russians were after fur, very lucrative in those days. That brings them out to the Pacific. But their relations are only episodic until we get to the mid-19th century, which is where my story's going to begin. So in the 18th century, China was strong, Russia was weak. But that doesn't last very long. Both empires followed the rules for continental empire. If you want to survive in a continental world— that's what both of them historically

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 那是在它们末代王朝的早期，当时俄国人追逐的是毛皮，那在当时是非常暴利的行当。这把他们带到了太平洋。但在19世纪中叶之前，也就是我的故事即将开始的地方，他们的关系只是断断续续的。所以在18世纪，中国强，俄罗斯弱。但这并没有持续很久。两个帝国都遵循大陆帝国的法则。如果你想在一个大陆世界中生存——这正是它们两者在历史上的形态——

[原文] [Speaker A]: have been—you don't want to have two-front wars because you have multiple neighbors. Any one of them can come in at any time. If they gang up on you, that's trouble. So you take on one at a time. Also you don't want any great powers on the borders. This is the fundamental problem with their relationship. Today's friend can be tomorrow's foe. That is truly problematic. So what do you do to solve that problem? Well, you take on your neighbors sequentially. You set them up to fail. You destabilize the rising, ingest the failing, and you set up buffer zones in between.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: ——你不会想要陷入两线作战，因为你有多个邻国。任何一个邻国都可能随时打进来。如果他们联合起来对付你，那就麻烦了。所以你要一次对付一个。此外，你不希望边境上有任何大国。这是它们关系中的根本问题。今日的朋友可能是明日的敌人。这确实是个大问题。那么你如何解决这个问题呢？好吧，你按顺序对付你的邻居。你给他们下套让他们失败。你动摇崛起的，吞并失败的，并在中间建立缓冲区。

[原文] [Speaker A]: You wait for the opportune moment to pounce and absorb. That is Vladimir Putin's game. But if you play this game, you're surrounding yourself with failing states, because you're either busy destabilizing them or ingesting them. So the curious might ask, are Russia and China unlucky with all the very dysfunctional places that surround them, or are they complicit? Also, there are no enduring alliances in this world because the neighbors figure it out that the hegemonic power offers nothing but trouble in the long term.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 你等待最佳时机猛扑上去并将其吸收。这就是弗拉基米尔·普京的游戏。但如果你玩这个游戏，你的周围就会被失败国家所包围，因为你要么忙着破坏它们，要么忙着吞并它们。所以好奇的人可能会问，俄罗斯和中国被所有这些极其功能失调的地方包围是运气不好，还是它们本身就是共犯？此外，在这个世界上没有持久的联盟，因为邻国们最终会明白，这个霸权国家从长远来看除了麻烦什么都给不了。

[原文] [Speaker A]: There's also no counsel on when to stop expanding. So both Russia and China are known for overextending, overdoing it. That may help explain some of their periodic implosions over their long and bloody histories. Very high mortality rates. Before you dismiss this paradigm, you've seen it operating in real time in Syria and Ukraine. There are people who do this. It also explains why all those ancient ruins are ruins. This sort of warfare is ruinous. But anyway, it lies at the basis of many

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 而且也没人建议何时停止扩张。所以俄罗斯和中国都以过度扩张、做得过火而闻名。这或许有助于解释它们漫长而血腥的历史中出现的一些周期性崩溃。死亡率非常高。在你否定这个范式之前，你已经在叙利亚和乌克兰实时看到它的运作了。确实有人这么做。这也解释了为什么那些古代遗迹变成了废墟。这种战争是毁灭性的。无论如何，这是欧亚大陆许多——

[原文] [Speaker A]: of the great civilizations of Eurasia. This is how they did things. I'm going to start my story in the mid-19th century, when the Chinese were beset by a whole series of rebellions that just about wrecked them. The Russians take advantage of all of this. Remember the second rule of continental empires? No great power neighbors. The Russians repeatedly derail the rise of China by scripting the Chinese to do things that are remarkably detrimental to Chinese interests, but pretty good for Russian interests.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: ——伟大文明的基础。这就是它们行事的方式。我的故事将从19世纪中叶讲起，当时中国正被一系列几乎将其摧毁的叛乱所困扰。俄国人利用了这一切。还记得大陆帝国的第二条法则吗？没有大国邻居。俄国人反复破坏中国的崛起，通过给中国人写剧本（设局），诱导中国人去做那些对中国利益极其有害，但对俄罗斯利益相当有利的事情。

章节 02：趁火打劫：沙俄在晚清的领土扩张与操纵

📝 本节摘要：

本章详细通过历史案例阐述了俄罗斯如何利用中国的内部危机进行领土掠夺。Sarah Paine指出，在晚清时期，中国面临“两线作战”的困境：外部有英法发动的鸦片战争，内部有太平天国和捻军起义。

俄罗斯利用这一混乱局面，以“调停人”自居，诱骗清政府签署了1858年《瑷珲条约》和1860年《北京条约》，夺取了中亚和太平洋沿岸的大片领土。随后的甲午战争中，俄罗斯再次上演“毁灭性调停”：先是联合法德“三国干涉还辽”，随后却迅速将辽东半岛据为己有，不仅没有保护中国，反而引发了列强瓜分中国的狂潮，导致中国在数代人的时间里丧失了完整的领土主权。

[原文] [Speaker A]: It takes the Chinese a long time to figure it out. They have governments coming and going in this period. It's a difficult period, but they eventually figure it out by the time Mao reunifies China in 1949. So I'm going to go through each of those examples in turn, starting with a really big one, which is the Opium Wars.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 中国人花了很长时间才明白过来。这一时期他们的政府换了一茬又一茬。这是一个艰难的时期，但等到1949年毛泽东统一中国时，他们终于明白了。所以我将逐一分析这些例子，首先从一个非常大的事件开始，那就是鸦片战争。

[原文] [Speaker A]: This is when Britain and France are coming at China in order to force China to trade on their terms. This corresponds with the two biggest rebellions of China's period of rebellions, the Taiping and the Nian Rebellion. Here's a big chart. That's a simplified chart. The rebellions start in the late 18th century. Rebellion is a misnomer. These are civil wars.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 这就是当时英国和法国进攻中国，强迫中国按他们的条款进行贸易的时期。这恰逢中国叛乱频发时期中规模最大的两次叛乱：太平天国运动和捻军起义。这是一张大图表。这是简化版的。叛乱始于18世纪末。“叛乱”这个词其实用词不当。这些实际上是内战。

[原文] [Speaker A]: Either people are minority peoples who want out of the empire, they want to secede, or other people who want to overthrow the government in Beijing. The peak period is in red. The really big ones are in white. So China has got the two-front war problem. It's got Europeans coming at them, plus all of this. In fact, the Chinese have so many fronts, they don't know how to deal with it.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 要么是少数民族想要脱离帝国，他们想要分裂出去；要么是其他人想要推翻北京的政府。高峰期用红色标出。真正大规模的用白色标出。所以中国面临着两线作战的问题。既有欧洲人打过来，又有所有这些内部动乱。事实上，中国面临的战线太多了，他们根本不知道该如何应对。

[原文] [Speaker A]: The Russians come to the Chinese and say, "Hey, we can deal with the British and French for you and solve that problem. You can deal with all the internal stuff. However, we need to have you sign a couple pieces of paper for us, the Treaty of Aigun of 1858 and the Treaty of Peking of 1860." What do they do?

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄国人来找中国人说：“嘿，我们可以帮你们对付英国人和法国人，解决那个问题。你们去处理内部事务就好。不过，我们需要你们帮我们签几张纸，也就是1858年的《瑷珲条约》和1860年的《北京条约》。”他们做了什么呢？

[原文] [Speaker A]: They cede to Russia large swaths of territory in Central Asia and the Pacific coastline. The Qing Dynasty was vague on geography. They're beset by these other things. They don't understand that Europeans think these pieces of paper are permanent things. They figure that once they put their house back in order, they're going to come back and get the territory later.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他们将中亚和太平洋沿岸的大片领土割让给了俄罗斯。清朝对地理概念很模糊。他们被其他事情搞得焦头烂额。他们不明白欧洲人认为这些白纸黑字的文件是永久性的东西。他们原本以为，一旦把家里收拾好了，以后还可以回来把领土拿回来。

[原文] [Speaker A]: Okay, the second example of ruinous Russian mediation that is going to keep China in turmoil. So in the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan trounces China, boots them from their tributary in Korea. Then the Japanese also want some territory on the Liaodong Peninsula. The Chinese go to the Russians to help them counterbalance Japan so that Japan doesn't take this Chinese territory in the Asian mainland.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 好，第二个关于俄罗斯那“毁灭性调停”的例子，这让中国持续陷入动荡。在第一次中日战争（甲午战争）中，日本痛击中国，将他们逐出了其附属国朝鲜。然后日本人还想要辽东半岛的一些领土。中国人向俄国人求助，希望他们帮忙制衡日本，不让日本夺走这块亚洲大陆上的中国领土。

[原文] [Speaker A]: Russia gets its buddies, France and Germany, the so-called Triple Intervention, to gang up on Japan. Japan looks at three great powers and says, "I don't think so." So they bail. From the Chinese point of view, so far so good. Except what the Russians promptly do is take for themselves the very territory that had just been denied to Japan.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄罗斯找来了它的伙伴法国和德国，即所谓的“三国干涉还辽”，联合起来对付日本。日本看着这三个大国，心想：“还是算了吧。”于是他们撤退了。从中国的角度来看，到目前为止一切都好。除了俄国人紧接着就将那块刚刚不让日本拿走的领土，据为了己有。

[原文] [Speaker A]: The story gets worse. All the European powers, or many of them plus Japan, come in and they carve out big concession areas throughout China. So China's not going to have full sovereignty over its territory for several generations. So instead of one relatively small Japanese concession area, they get foreigners everywhere.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 故事还没完，情况变得更糟了。所有的欧洲列强，或者说其中许多国家加上日本，都进来了，他们在中国各地划分了巨大的租界区。因此，中国在好几代人的时间里都无法对其领土拥有完整的各权。结果，原本只是一个相对较小的日本租界区，变成了到处都是外国人。

[原文] [Speaker A]: Think about the second rule of continental empire, no great power neighbors. That’s not happening while this is going on.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 想想大陆帝国的第二条法则：没有大国邻居。而在这一切发生的时候，这显然没有实现。

章节 03：虚假的承诺：布尔什维克的外交欺骗与第一次国共合作

📝 本节摘要：

本章揭露了苏联（布尔什维克）掌权初期对中国的“两面派”策略。Paine 教授指出，虽然列宁政府通过《加拉罕宣言》声称要废除不平等条约并归还领土，但这实为虚假宣传，其真实意图是利用反帝情绪拉拢中国，同时保留沙俄时期巨大的租界利益。

随后，苏联介入中国内战，资助黄埔军校并强行促成第一次国共合作。然而，这一策略深受苏联内部斯大林与托洛茨基权力斗争的影响。为了证明托洛茨基的“世界革命论”是错误的，斯大林错误的指挥导致中共留在国民党内，最终引发了蒋介石在上海的“四一二”大屠杀。讽刺的是，斯大林却利用这一悲剧在国内斗争中彻底击败了托洛茨基。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Bolsheviks come to power and then they're going to apply these rules as well. When they do come to power, they're very weak because Russia's been devastated by World War I. The Bolsheviks don't win their own bitter Civil War until 1922.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 布尔什维克上台后，他们也打算运用这些法则。当他们刚掌权时，力量非常薄弱，因为俄罗斯已经被第一次世界大战摧残得满目疮痍。布尔什维克直到1922年才打赢了他们自己那场残酷的内战。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So then as now, they relied on a really cheap but incredibly effective strategy of strategic communication. The Russians really understand other people's emotional life and what sets them at odds with each other. They know just how to serve out the propaganda that sets people at each other's throats.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以，无论是当时还是现在，他们都依赖一种非常廉价但极其有效的策略——战略传播。俄国人真正理解其他人的情感生活，以及是什么让人们彼此对立。他们确切地知道如何散布宣传，让人们互相掐住对方的喉咙。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Their propaganda is going to help the Chinese really despise the Japanese and the Europeans, while Russia's even greater predations, the ones you've already seen, go unnoticed. Here's Lev Karakhan. He was a deputy foreign minister. In 1919, he sends a missive, his Karakhan Manifesto, to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他们的宣传将助推中国人痛恨日本人和欧洲人，而俄罗斯那更为巨大的掠夺行径——也就是你们刚刚看到的那些——却被忽视了。这是列夫·加拉罕（Lev Karakhan）。他曾是副外交部长。1919年，他向中国外交部发了一份公文，即他的《加拉罕宣言》。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: He says, "Hey, we're not imperialists, we're Bolsheviks. We're gonna return all the lands from those unequal treaties and be your friend forevermore, unlike all the other evil imperialist powers. We're not like that anymore."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他说：“嘿，我们不是帝国主义者，我们是布尔什维克。我们将归还所有不平等条约中的土地，并永远做你们的朋友，不像其他那些邪恶的帝国主义列强。我们要改头换面了。”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Chinese are looking at this and thinking, "Wow, here are the Bolsheviks who've gotten rid of their imperialistic government. They're putting together their shattered land." So this offers hope to the Chinese that they can do likewise. It's a model potentially to follow and a mentor who might help them.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 中国人看着这个心想：“哇，这些布尔什维克推翻了他们自己的帝国主义政府。他们正在重组那片破碎的土地。”所以这给了中国人希望，觉得他们也可以这样做。这是一个潜在的效仿榜样，也是一个可能帮助他们的导师。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Except here's the detail. When the Bolsheviks started doing better in their civil war, they really dialed back what their offer was. The original offer was, "tear up treaties, China gets all territory back, no payments necessary."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 除了一点细节。当布尔什维克在内战中局势好转后，他们真的大幅缩水了他们的报价。最初的提议是：“撕毁条约，中国拿回所有领土，不需要任何赔款。”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Under the new version of the Karakhan Manifesto, which the Russian Foreign Ministry goes and telegraphs to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. I've seen the document, or at least a copy of it in the archives in Taiwan. They send it back and say, "We're willing to talk about these things. We're going to hold some negotiations."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 在新版《加拉罕宣言》中——那是俄国外交部发电报给中国外交部的，我看过那份文件，或者至少在台湾的档案中看过副本——他们回信说：“我们愿意谈谈这些事情。我们将举行一些谈判。”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The facts are they didn't return these concessionaries until the mid-20th century, 1950s, after the Westerners had returned almost all of their concession areas. This is not trivial. When we think of concession areas in the age of imperialism in China, you think of British ones: Hong Kong.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 事实是，他们直到20世纪中叶，即1950年代，在西方人几乎归还了所有租界之后，才归还这些租界。这可不是小事。当我们想到中国帝国主义时代的租界时，你会想到英国的：香港。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Well, Hong Kong isn't actually very big. The reason you know about Hong Kong is it makes lots of money, or at least it used to. The Russian concessionaries were huge. They didn't make money but what else is new? But the Russians had by far the largest concession area of any other country.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 嗯，香港其实并不大。你知道香港是因为它赚了很多钱，或者至少过去是这样。而俄国的租界巨大无比。它们不赚钱，但这又有什么新鲜的呢？但俄国拥有的租界通过远比其他任何国家的都要大。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: But from the Karakhan Manifesto is the origin of the myth of Sino-Soviet friendship, that the Russians somehow treated the Chinese nicely. And the Chinese Foreign Ministry officials, who would've known better, their government is overthrown within the decade. And presumably these documents just gather dust in the archives.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 但《加拉罕宣言》正是“中苏友谊”神话的起源，让人误以为俄国人对中国人很好。而那些本该更清楚内情的中国外交部官员，他们的政府在十年内就被推翻了。想必这些文件只能在档案馆里吃灰了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: My fourth example of derailing China's rise concerns the First United Front between the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communist Party. Here's the leader of the Nationalist Party and also leader of its armies, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我关于破坏中国崛起的第四个例子涉及国民党与中国共产党之间的第一次统一战线（国共合作）。这是国民党的领袖，也是其军队的统帅，蒋介石委员长。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: He led the Northern Expedition, reunifying China at least nominally by either defeating or co-opting all those warlords. There you can see different colors of where the major warlords were. Previous South China attempts to do this or to secede from China, one or the other, had failed for lack of a proficient military.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他领导了北伐，通过击败或收编所有那些军阀，至少在名义上统一了中国。你可以看到不同颜色标注的主要军阀所在地。此前华南地区想要做到这一点或试图脱离中国的尝试，都因为缺乏一支精良的军队而失败了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: But Russia changes that. It provides aid, arms, and expertise and structures and things to fund the Whampoa Military Academy, which is in Canton/Guangzhou. That institution is going to educate the officers, both Communist and Nationalists, who would lead not only this, but some of their civil war-era officers that make this reunification of China possible.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 但俄罗斯改变了这一切。它提供了援助、武器、专业知识和组织结构，并资助了位于广州的黄埔军校。这所机构将培养出一批军官，既有共产党人也有国民党人，他们不仅领导了这次行动，其中一些内战时期的军官还使得中国的统一成为可能。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: But the Russians had a price. Give the Nationalists the aid, but the Nationalists then have to let the Communists into the Nationalist Party. That's what the United Front is. This all coincides with a bitter succession struggle in Russia.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 但俄国人是有条件的。给国民党援助可以，但国民党必须让共产党加入国民党。这就是统一战线。这一切都恰逢俄罗斯内部发生了一场残酷的继位斗争。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: This is the problem with dictatorships. They really don't do succession well. It's why elections are so convenient. Instead you have Stalin and Trotsky going at it over which one was going to be the big cheese.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 这就是独裁政权的问题。他们真的搞不好权力交接。这就是为什么选举如此方便。相反，你有斯大林和托洛茨基在争夺谁将成为头号人物（大老板）。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Stalin is all about socialism in one country. He thinks that Russia ought to focus on its own internal development. Whereas Trotsky says, "Nonsense, we need to focus on world revolution because only if there are sister revolutions abroad can ours survive."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 斯大林主张“一国社会主义”。他认为俄罗斯应该专注于自身的内部发展。而托洛茨基说：“胡说八道，我们需要专注于世界革命，因为只有国外发生姊妹革命，我们的革命才能生存。”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: While this is all going on, the Chinese Communists really want to get out of that United Front. Why? Because it puts them in close proximity to the army, which is controlled by the Nationalists. They're getting worried whether they're about to get killed.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 在这一切发生的同时，中国共产党人其实非常想退出统一战线。为什么？因为这让他们离军队太近了，而军队是由国民党控制的。他们开始担心自己是不是快要被杀掉了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Russians say "No, no, no, no, it's good. You stay in that United Front." So they do. Chiang Kai-shek goes roaring up China. I've shown you the map. He reaches his home base in Shanghai, pauses, and he turns his guns on the Communists and just massacres them in droves.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄国人说：“不不不，这很好。你们待在统一战线里。”于是他们照做了。蒋介石在中国一路猛进。我给你们看过地图了。他到达了他的大本营上海，停了下来，然后调转枪口对准共产党，成群结队地屠杀他们。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: This is when Mao has to think of a rural strategy to power because the urban strategy is no longer feasible. Once this happens, Stalin can use it to just trounce Trotsky in the internal power struggle because he can say, "Look, see, revolution in one country. It doesn't work abroad." A lot of Chinese died proving Stalin's point.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 这就是毛泽东不得不构想出一套农村夺权战略的时候，因为城市战略已不再可行。一旦这件事发生，斯大林就可以利用它在内部权力斗争中彻底击败托洛茨基，因为他可以说：“看吧，我就说‘一国革命’嘛。在国外是行不通的。”许多中国人为了证明斯大林的观点而死。

章节 04：斯大林的棋局：从满洲铁路冲突到逼迫中国抗日

📝 本节摘要：

本章揭示了斯大林如何为了苏联的生存，冷酷地牺牲中国的利益。首先，Paine 教授通过1929年的“中东路事件”指出，当中国试图收回满洲铁路主权时，苏联毫不犹豫地动用重兵碾压了中国军队，以此维持其在华特权。

随后，面对1930年代德日签署《反共产国际协定》带来的“两线作战”威胁，斯大林再次通过“写剧本”的方式操纵中国局势。他利用手中的筹码强迫国共两党建立“第二次统一战线”，成功将日本的侵略矛头从苏联引向了中国腹地。这一战略虽然保全了苏联，却导致中国在随后的全面抗战中付出了数百万生命和国家发展的惨痛代价。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Another example where Russia literally derails the rise of China. There's a railway system in Manchuria. We're going to talk rails. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and 1905, Japan wins it and gets from Russia, which built all these things in Chinese territory, the southern half of that railway net in lieu of an indemnity.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 另一个俄罗斯字面意义上“让中国脱轨”（破坏中国崛起）的例子。满洲有一个铁路系统。我们要谈谈铁路。在1904年到1905年的日俄战争中，日本赢了，并从在其中国领土上修建了所有这些设施的俄罗斯手中，获得了该铁路网的南半部分，以此代替赔款。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Japan invests massively in railways, infrastructure, and apparently local politicians. But the ruling warlord apparently wasn't sufficiently attentive to Japanese needs, so they assassinated him in 1928. His son, Zhang Xueliang, the following year in 1929 decides he wants his railways back from Russia. What does Russia do? It's not either version of the Karakhan Manifesto.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 日本在铁路、基础设施以及显然还有当地政客身上进行了大规模投资。但当时的统治军阀显然对日本的需求不够重视，所以他们在1928年暗杀了他。他的儿子张学良在次年，即1929年，决定要从俄罗斯手中收回他的铁路。俄罗斯做了什么？这可不是任何版本的《加拉罕宣言》。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Russians deploy over 100,000 troops, tanks, airplanes, the works, and just pound this man. The Russians keep their railways. So if you want to delay the rise of China, that sort of thing delays the rise of China.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄国人出动了超过10万名士兵、坦克、飞机，全套装备，狠狠地痛击了这个人。俄国人保住了他们的铁路。所以如果你想延缓中国的崛起，这种事情确实会延缓中国的崛起,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: But now for the first rule of continental empire: no two-front wars. You move fast-forward to the 1930s and Stalin thinks he may very well face a two-front war with Germans in the west and Japanese in the east. Why would he think such thoughts? The Anti-Comintern Pact. Comintern is short for Communist International. It is the Soviet outreach program. It's signed in 1936 between the Japanese and the Germans. Stalin goes, "Uh-oh, they're after me."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 但现在来看看大陆帝国的第一条法则：不要陷入两线作战。快进到1930年代，斯大林认为他极有可能面临两线作战：西边是德国人，东边是日本人。他为什么会有这种想法？因为《反共产国际协定》。Comintern 是“共产国际”的简称。这是苏联的对外扩张项目。该协定于1936年由日本人和德国人签署。斯大林心想：“糟了，他们是冲着我来的。”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: He plays every one of his China cards and he holds lots of them. If you want to disintegrate the neighbors in order to delay their rise, well then you fund all sides of their civil wars and any side in between because you just want them to go at it. So he plays every card he's got.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他打出了手中的每一张“中国牌”，而他手里有很多张。如果你想瓦解邻国以延缓他们的崛起，那么你就资助他们内战的各方以及中间的任何一方，因为你只是想让他们互相厮杀。所以他打出了他所有的牌。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: What he wants are the Nationalists to stop fighting the Communists, vice versa, and unite to fight the Japanese. They're willing to do this provided Stalin provides conventional aid, which he does, but they think he's also going to provide soldiers. They don't get it. Once they're in, Russia is out of this thing.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他想要的是国民党停止攻打共产党，反之亦然，并联合起来对抗日本。他们愿意这么做，前提是斯大林提供常规援助，他确实提供了，但他们以为斯大林还会派兵。他们没搞懂。一旦他们卷进去，俄罗斯就从这件事里脱身了,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Stalin's plan, his script for the Chinese and Japanese, works beautifully. Because when the Nationalists unite in the Second United Front with the Communists, going back to the dark side, the Japanese are apoplectic. This is when they do the massive escalation in 1937 and they are off to overextension into parts due south of Russia.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 斯大林的计划，他为中国人和日本人写的剧本，运作得极其完美。因为当国民党与共产党在第二次统一战线中联合起来——又回到了“黑暗面”——日本人气疯了。这就是他们在1937年进行大规模升级的时候，他们开始向俄罗斯以南的地区过度扩张。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So this two-front Japanese-German war never materialized. Stalin was very successful, the Chinese less so because the Chinese are fighting the Japanese so the Russians don't have to. That comes at the price of millions of deaths, millions of refugees, that does indeed derail China's rise yet again.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以这场日德两线作战从未成为现实。斯大林非常成功，而中国则不然，因为中国人在替俄国人打日本人。这是以数百万人的死亡、数百万难民为代价的，这确实再次让中国的崛起脱轨了,。

章节 05：二战终章与内战转折：掠夺满洲、分裂蒙古与被叫停的过江

📝 本节摘要：

本章聚焦于二战结束前后的关键转折点。Sarah Paine 详细描述了苏联在二战最后时刻发动的“八月风暴”行动。斯大林虽然出兵满洲，但其目的并非单纯帮助中国，而是为了掠夺其工业基础（拆走了80%以上的重工业设备）并确立地缘优势。

随后，斯大林利用《雅尔塔协定》中的“维持现状”条款，不仅正式将外蒙古从中国剥离，还吞并了唐努乌梁海。在国共内战中，苏联虽然向中共移交了缴获的日军装备，将其转化为正规军，但在毛泽东即将渡过长江统一全国时，斯大林却出于“弱邻”的考量，试图阻止解放军过江，意图在中国制造“划江而治”的分裂局面。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Next example. Per the Yalta agreement, Russia finally gets into the war in Asia. About time. In the very final weeks, in this August Storm the Russians deploy 1.5 million soldiers. It's one of the largest military operations of World War II. They rapidly take Manchuria. That would be the normal thing, but here's the abnormal thing.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 下一个例子。根据《雅尔塔协定》，俄罗斯终于加入了亚洲战场的战争。真是时候。在最后几周，在这场“八月风暴”行动中，俄国人部署了150万士兵。这是二战中规模最大的军事行动之一。他们迅速占领了满洲。这本来是很正常的事，但接下来的事情就不正常了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: They also take away Manchuria's industrial base. That would not normally be what you do to someone. They take 83% of the electrical power equipment, take it home to Russia, not turning lights on in Manchuria. 86% of mining, 82% of cement making, 80% of metalworking equipment. Plus they take 640,000 Japanese POWs to be slave labor for decades, if they ever get home at all.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他们还搬空了满洲的工业基础。通常你不会对别人做这种事。他们拆走了83%的电力设备，运回俄罗斯，根本不管满洲还能不能亮灯。还有86%的采矿设备、82%的水泥制造设备、80%的金属加工设备。此外，他们还抓了64万名日本战俘去做奴工，这一去就是几十年，如果他们还能活着回家的话。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: And they also take the northern islands, which are still under dispute today. But if you think about it, if you're going to do indemnities or reparations or whatever this is, China had been fighting Japan in one form or another for 15 long years. Russia comes in for the cameo performance at the very end. So if there are indemnities to be paid for whatever Japan did in this war, surely China, not Russia, should have been the recipient for all this stuff.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他们还占领了北方岛屿（南千岛群岛/北方四岛），这些岛屿至今仍有争议。但如果你仔细想想，如果要谈赔偿或补偿之类的，中国以各种形式与日本抗战了漫长的15年。俄罗斯只是在最后时刻跑来客串了一把。所以，如果日本要为这场战争支付赔偿，理应是中国，而不是俄罗斯，来接收所有这些东西。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: In addition, there’s another example. Not only does Stalin walk away with the industrial base, but he walks away with Mongolia as well. How does that work? The Yalta agreement also stipulates that the status quo shall be maintained in Mongolia. So then you have to look at, well, what was the status quo?

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 此外，还有一个例子。斯大林不仅拿走了工业基础，他还拿走了蒙古。这是怎么回事呢？《雅尔塔协定》还规定蒙古应维持“现状”。那么你就得看看，所谓的“现状”是什么？

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: It was the Russian sphere of influence in the north, Chinese continuing control in the south. Mongolia, which had always been both those places, had been part of the Qing Empire, never been part of the Russian Empire. Moreover, Stalin had already taken Tannu Tuva in 1944. It looks small on this map, but it's bigger than England. It had lots of gold, which the Soviets had monetized long ago.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 那是俄罗斯在北部的势力范围，以及中国在南部持续的控制。蒙古，向来包含这两个部分，它曾是清帝国的一部分，从未属于俄罗斯帝国。此外，斯大林早在1944年就吞并了唐努乌梁海（Tannu Tuva）。在地图上它看着不大，但其实比英格兰还大。那里有大量的黄金，苏联人早就把它们变现了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So if you add up all the territory that the Russians took from the Chinese sphere of influence from the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and 1860 Treaty of Peking, fast-forward to detaching Outer Mongolia from the Chinese sphere of influence. Here's what it really is. It's greater than all US territory east of the Mississippi. This is not your normal land grab. So talk about derailing somebody, that would do it.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以，如果你把俄国人从1858年《瑷珲条约》和1860年《北京条约》中从中国势力范围夺走的领土加起来，再快进到将外蒙古从中国势力范围中剥离出去。事实是这样的：其总面积超过了美国密西西比河以东的所有领土。这可不是普通的土地掠夺。所以说到要让某人“脱轨”（阻碍发展），这一招够狠的。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: To be fair to the Russians, they did, albeit slowly, turn over all this Japanese-stockpiled military equipment in Manchuria to the Communists. They also, albeit belatedly, trained them on how to use the equipment and also how to run the Manchurian railway system. The Chinese Communists, as a rural peasant movement, how would they know how to do these things? They wouldn't.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 对俄国人公道一点说，他们确实——尽管动作很慢——把日本在满洲囤积的所有军事装备都移交给了共产党。他们也确实——尽管迟了点——训练了他们如何使用这些装备以及如何运营满洲铁路系统。中国共产党作为一个农村农民运动，怎么会懂这些呢？他们本来是不会的。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: It allows this conventional aid and logistics of being able to move people around. It transforms the Communists from a lightly armed guerrilla movement to a very heavily armed conventional force capable for the showdown phase of the Chinese Civil War. So like the Whampoa Military Academy, this is essential aid for the Communist victory.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 这提供了常规援助和能够调动人员的后勤保障。它将共产党从一支轻武装的游击队，转变为一支全副武装、有能力进行中国内战决战阶段作战的正规军。就像黄埔军校一样，这对共产党的胜利是至关重要的援助。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So neither the Communists or the Nationalists complain about the deindustrialization of Manchuria. The Communists probably traded that industry for all the conventional aid that they got. The Nationalists traded it and also Outer Mongolian independence for a promise from Stalin not to aid the Communists, a promise that he promptly breaks.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以无论是共产党还是国民党，都没有对满洲的“去工业化”进行抱怨。共产党可能用那些工业交换了他们得到的所有常规援助。国民党则用它以及外蒙古的独立，换取了斯大林不援助共产党的承诺——一个他转头就违背了的承诺。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So Mao starts to figure out that something is up here. So when he's on a roll in his offensives in the civil war, there's really bitter fighting. The real movement in the last phase, the post-1940 phase of the Chinese Civil War, is in 1948. That year Mao just moves and he is roaring down south.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 于是毛泽东开始察觉到这里面有猫腻。当他在内战攻势中势如破竹时，战斗非常惨烈。中国内战最后阶段，即1940年代后期真正的关键行动是在1948年。那一年毛泽东一路向南猛进。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: He's about to get to the Yangtze River and Stalin's like, "Hey buddy, take a break at the Yangtze, don't exhaust yourself." Mao ignores it. Whereas Stalin might have wanted to keep a Nationalist rump state south of the Yangtze River, yielding a divided China in keeping with weakening your neighbor, Mao is not remotely interested in that.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他快要打到长江了，斯大林却说：“嘿，老兄，在长江歇歇吧，别把自己累坏了。”毛泽东没理他。虽然斯大林可能想在长江以南保留一个国民党残余政权，以此造成一个分裂的中国，符合“削弱邻国”的策略，但毛泽东对此完全没兴趣。

章节 06：消耗战与决裂：朝鲜战争、赫鲁晓夫与中苏交恶

📝 本节摘要：

本章揭示了“中苏友谊”表象下的残酷算计与最终破裂。在朝鲜战争中，斯大林采取了“低风险、高回报”的策略，利用中国军队在朝鲜半岛修建庞大的坑道体系阻挡美军，既保卫了苏联边境，又通过消耗战削弱美国并“延缓中国的崛起”。他让中国孤立无援，从而不得不更加依附于苏联。

斯大林死后，矛盾迅速激化。毛泽东自认为凭资历应成为国际共运的新领袖，但赫鲁晓夫的“去斯大林化”和“与西方和平共处”政策直接挑战了毛泽东的个人崇拜与反帝路线。随着赫鲁晓夫拒绝向中国提供原子弹技术，并在台海危机和长波电台问题上爆发激烈争吵，中苏同盟最终在1960年彻底公开决裂。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Here's my 10th example, which is the Korean War. If you look at the Korean War, the first year is a war of movement. It’s up and down, up and down the peninsula. It's unbelievable how much movement there is. But then it stalemates for the last two years and you think, "Well, what's going on? Why don't they settle the war sooner?"

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 这是我的第10个例子，朝鲜战争。如果你观察朝鲜战争，第一年是运动战。战线在半岛上来回拉锯，极其剧烈。令人难以置信的是运动量如此之大。但在最后两年陷入了僵局，你会想：“这到底是怎么回事？为什么他们不早点结束战争？”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Both sides are taking incredible losses. Well, here's how it goes. Once China intervenes in the Korean War and once they halt various offensives to start peace talks, the Chinese do incredible tunnel work, probably the North Koreans as well, and build an incredible tunnel system. It means the South Koreans and the UN forces are never going to get anywhere near the Soviet border ever again.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 双方都承受了惊人的损失。其实情况是这样的。一旦中国介入朝鲜战争并停止各路攻势开始和谈，中国人——可能还有北朝鲜人——就进行了惊人的坑道作业，建立了一个不可思议的坑道系统。这意味着韩国人和联合国军再也无法靠近苏联边境了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: From that moment on, Stalin thinks he's got a low-risk, high-reward strategy where he's going to weaken the United States and delay the rise of China. So what's not to love about fighting to the last Chinese in Korea? Stalin thinks this is great and it's going to retard Chinese development.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 从那一刻起，斯大林认为他拥有了一个低风险、高回报的战略，既能削弱美国，又能延缓中国的崛起。所以，在朝鲜战斗到最后一个中国人有什么不好的呢？斯大林觉得这太棒了，这将阻碍中国的发展。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Also because China is so isolated by this war, it has no international friends but Russia, it's going to tie China to Russia ever more firmly and give Russia breathing space to rebuild after World War II while its Western enemies are wasting time in Korea.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 此外，由于中国因这场战争而被极度孤立，除了俄罗斯没有其他国际盟友，这将把中国更紧紧地绑在俄罗斯战车上，并让俄罗斯在二战后获得重建的喘息空间，而其西方敌人则在朝鲜浪费时间。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you put it all together—Chinese Civil War, Korean War, Russia's on-and-off again aid to different sides in the civil war, his double-dealing with both of them and what happened with Outer Mongolia and the Manchurian industrial base, Stalin's advice to Mao to halt at the Yangtze, and then he's fighting to the last Chinese in Korea—this is all consistent with the second rule of continental empire: no great power neighbors.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你把这一切放在一起看——中国内战、朝鲜战争、俄罗斯在内战中对不同派别断断续续的援助、他对双方的两面三刀、在外蒙古和满洲工业基地发生的事情、斯大林建议毛泽东止步长江，以及他在朝鲜“战斗到最后一个中国人”——这一切都符合大陆帝国的第二条法则：没有大国邻居。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Once Stalin dies, finest day of his life, there's never as strong a leader in Russia again. By this time, Mao has figured out that the Russians don't want a strong China. He has to bide his time for a while, but he understands what is going on.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 斯大林死后——那是他一生中最美好的一天——俄罗斯再也没有出现过如此强势的领导人。到这时，毛泽东已经明白俄国人不想要一个强大的中国。他不得不暂时隐忍，但他心里清楚发生了什么。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Mao has a growing list of gripes. It's not only that he didn't like Stalin's tributary treatment, but also Mao thinks, with his resume, that he should become the leader of international communism. Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, is like, "No way." Khrushchev does not remotely have Mao's resume. Mao has just put together a continent by reunifying China. That's not remotely what Khrushchev's ever been able to do.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 毛泽东的怨气清单越来越长。不仅是因为他不喜欢斯大林那种对待附属国的态度，而且毛泽东认为，凭借他的履历，他应该成为国际共产主义运动的领袖。斯大林的继任者尼基塔·赫鲁晓夫对此的态度是：“没门儿。”赫鲁晓夫的履历根本无法与毛泽东相提并论。毛泽东刚刚通过统一中国整合了一个大陆。这根本不是赫鲁晓夫能做到的事。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Mao also can't stand either Khrushchev's domestic or foreign policy. Domestically, Khrushchev is all about de-Stalinization. Mao doesn't like that, he's got a cult of personality. He doesn't want to do things like that. Khrushchev is also interested in peaceful coexistence with the West, or at least nominally, whereas Mao is in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, which is based on a virulently anti-Western foreign policy.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 毛泽东也无法忍受赫鲁晓夫的国内或外交政策。在国内，赫鲁晓夫大搞“去斯大林化”。毛泽东不喜欢这样，他自己就在搞个人崇拜。他不想做那种事。赫鲁晓夫还对与西方“和平共处”感兴趣，或者至少名义上如此，而毛泽东当时正处于文化大革命（此处指当时激进的政治氛围，文革实际稍晚于此阶段，但反西方情绪一致）之中，这是基于一种剧烈反西方的外交政策。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Now, Khrushchev has his own gripes about the Chinese. He looks around at the United States. The United States has got basing all over the world. Its allies allow the United States to have bases. China has hardly any Russian bases, these leftover concession areas, and China wants them back. Khrushchev can't understand this.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 现在，赫鲁晓夫对中国人也有一肚子怨气。他环顾美国。美国在世界各地都有基地。盟友们允许美国建立基地。而中国几乎没有俄罗斯基地，只有那些遗留的租借区，而且中国还想要回去。赫鲁晓夫无法理解这一点。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: What he really can't understand are the two Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958, where Mao started lobbing ordnance on Nationalist islands that are very close to mainland shores. Khrushchev is apoplectic because Mao hasn't given him any advance warning. By the way, this sort of thing could trigger some of the security clauses of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty with nuclear follow-on effects.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他真正无法理解的是1954年和1958年的两次台海危机，毛泽东开始向离大陆海岸很近的国民党控制岛屿倾泻弹药。赫鲁晓夫气疯了，因为毛泽东根本没有提前通知他。顺便说一句，这种事情可能会触发《中苏友好同盟互助条约》中的安全条款，并引发核战争的连带后果。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Then while this is going on, Khrushchev wants to have a combined sub fleet base. If we're going to take all these risks, we need to have subs in different places. Mao says, "No way." Then Khrushchev has had enough and says, "Well, you're not going to get the plans for the atomic bomb." The whole thing becomes public in 1960 with anger all around.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 在这期间，赫鲁晓夫想建立一个联合潜艇舰队基地（长波电台）。如果我们都要承担这些风险，我们需要在不同地方部署潜艇。毛泽东说：“没门。”于是赫鲁晓夫受够了，说：“好吧，那你也别想得到原子弹的图纸了。”整件事在1960年公开化，双方都充满了愤怒。

章节 07：珍宝岛冲突与大三角重组：美国如何利用中苏对立

📝 本节摘要：

本章讲述了中苏关系如何从“口水战”升级为核战争边缘的武装冲突。随着1964年中国成功试爆原子弹，毛泽东开始强硬地向苏联索要被沙俄掠夺的领土。

1969年，双方在珍宝岛（Damansky Island）爆发武装冲突。Paine 教授披露了一个惊人的细节：苏联曾私下询问美国是否可以对中国使用核武器，但遭到了拒绝。这一事件让毛泽东意识到苏联才是头号生存威胁，从而促成了中美关系的破冰。美国因此获得了冷战中的“摇摆位置”（Swing Role），而苏联被迫在漫长的中苏边境部署重兵，这种巨大的财政负担加速了其经济的崩溃。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The two, Russia and China, squabbled incessantly over the Vietnam War. The North Vietnamese were interested in getting maximum aid from both, which it did. They begged the Chinese to allow the Russians to ship things overland through China. The Chinese felt obliged to do it, but the terms of that overland trade were just food for all kinds of squabbling. It just didn't end.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄罗斯和中国在越南战争问题上争吵不休。北越方面想要从双方获得最大化的援助，他们也确实做到了。他们恳求中国人允许俄国人通过陆路经过中国运输物资。中国人觉得有义务这么做，但这种陆路贸易的条款成了各种争吵的导火索。这种争吵没完没了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So the story of the reversal in the balance of power between Russia and China arose from multiple factors. It doesn't happen all at once. It is both a story of China's rise and of Russia's decline. Step one for China is getting its own atomic weapon, which it does in 1964, so that it can get itself free of Soviet bondage.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以，俄罗斯和中国之间力量对比发生逆转的故事是由多种因素造成的。它不是一蹴而就的。这既是中国崛起的故事，也是俄罗斯衰落的故事。中国的第一步是拥有自己的原子武器，它在1964年做到了，这样它就能从苏联的束缚中解脱出来。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: In 1964, after they detonated that bomb, Mao goes, "Okay, there are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union. The Russians took everything they could. We have not yet presented an account for this list of stolen territory." All the territory I've shown you, "We want it back." Russians' jaws drop, panic.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 1964年，在引爆那颗原子弹后，毛泽东说：“好吧，苏联占领的地方太多了。俄国人能拿的都拿走了。我们还没有这就这份被盗领土的清单算过账呢。”就是我给你们看过的所有那些领土，“我们要拿回来。”俄国人惊得下巴都掉了，陷入恐慌。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Chinese then are much more aggressive about what they consider to be their territorial rights. There is a border war over territories, and in particular this one island, Zhenbao, or Damansky Island in the Amur River. Here's how riverine borders work, international ones. Under international law, the border is the thalweg, which is the center of the main channel of whatever the river is.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 随后，中国人在他们认为属于自己的领土权利上变得更加咄咄逼人。双方在领土问题上爆发了边境战争，特别是关于阿穆尔河（黑龙江）上的这个岛屿——珍宝岛，或者叫达曼斯基岛。国际河流的边界是这样确定的：根据国际法，边界是主航道中心线（thalweg），即无论什么河流，其主航道的中心。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Russia had followed that with its European borders, not with China. It claimed both banks of the Amur. The Chinese are fed up with that and they take Zhenbao Island and the Russians are furious and they come to the United States. They say, "Would it be okay if we nuke these people?" We're like, "No." The Russians scratch their heads and they come back and they go, "Okay, would it be okay if we use conventional weapons to blow up their nuclear stuff?" We go, "No, still not okay."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄罗斯在其欧洲边界上遵循了这一原则，但对中国却没有。它声称阿穆尔河的两岸都归它所有。中国人受够了，于是夺取了珍宝岛。俄国人被激怒了，他们找到美国。他们说：“如果我们用核武器炸这些人，行不行？”我们的反应是：“不行。”俄国人挠挠头，又回来说：“好吧，那如果我们用常规武器炸掉他们的核设施行不行？”我们说：“不行，还是不行。”。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Mao gets it. The one that wants to nuke you is your primary adversary. So there's a reshuffling of the primary adversaries. Formerly the United States was the primary adversary of both China and Russia. That would be a reason for them to cooperate. Now they're primary adversaries for each other.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 毛泽东明白了。那个想用核武器炸你的人就是你的主要对手。所以主要对手的关系发生了重组。以前，美国是中国和俄罗斯共同的主要对手。那是它们合作的理由。现在，它们互为主要对手。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The United States can play the swing thing with all of this. For Russia it's really devastating having China as an enemy because it's going to have to deploy mechanized nuclear-armed troops all along its really long Chinese border, Central Asia, the works. It's already doing this with its European borders and occupying Eastern Europe where the garrisoning costs are significant.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 美国可以在这一切中扮演摇摆角色（平衡者）。对俄罗斯来说，拥有中国作为敌人确实是毁灭性的，因为它不得不沿着漫长的中国边境、中亚等地部署机械化核武装部队。它在欧洲边境已经这么做了，还要占领东欧，那里的驻军成本本就非常高昂。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Imagine if this country had to put those kinds of forces on our long Canadian and Mexican borders. It'd be bankrupting. Their economy was and remains a fraction of ours. But this breaking up of the earlier version of the bromance allows the United States to play the swing role. Then we cooperate. Both Nixon and Mao think ganging up on Russia would be a good thing, overextending Russia financially by overextending it militarily with all these armaments and things.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 想象一下，如果美国不得不在我们要漫长的加拿大和墨西哥边境部署那种规模的军队。那会让我们破产的。他们的经济规模过去是、现在仍然只是我们的一小部分。但这打破了早期版本的“兄弟情”，让美国得以扮演摇摆角色。于是我们开始合作。尼克松和毛泽东都认为联合起来对付俄罗斯是件好事，通过所有这些军备竞赛在军事上过度消耗俄罗斯，从而在财政上拖垮它。

章节 08：此消彼长：中国的崛起与苏联的体制性崩溃

📝 本节摘要：

本章详细阐述了中苏力量对比发生根本性逆转的原因。Sarah Paine 指出，中国在邓小平的领导下，果断放弃了共产主义的经济教条，通过内部改革实现了长达20年的两位数增长。

相比之下，苏联陷入了“反乌托邦式的衰退”。勃列日涅夫时期的苏联对外盲目进行昂贵的帝国扩张（收集“不良资产”），对内依赖石油收入维持生存。当油价下跌且戈尔巴乔夫试图进行政治改革时，这个僵化的体制彻底崩塌。最终，苏联不仅失去了东欧卫星国，甚至解体为一个大大缩水的“残余国家”，而中国则强势崛起。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: In addition, what's going on as part of China's rise are internal reforms under Deng Xiaoping when he abandons certain communist principles of economic management and gets a much more productive agricultural sector and industry and commerce. So China's running double-digit growth rates for about 20 years with significant compounding effects. That's the story of China's rise.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 此外，伴随中国崛起的还有邓小平领导下的内部改革，当时他放弃了某些共产主义的经济管理原则，从而获得了一个生产力高得多的农业部门以及工商业。因此，中国保持了约20年的两位数增长率，并产生了显著的复利效应。这就是中国崛起的故事。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Now for this dystopian alternate universe of Russian decline. Here on the left is Leonid Brezhnev, who apparently had a stroke in 1976 that permanently impaired his thinking and whose death in 1982 finished him off. He was replaced by Yuri Andropov, whose own health was pretty parlous and he dies within two years. Then Konstantin Chernenko barely makes it a year before he's dead. It sort of sounds like us, but anyway it doesn't work well.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 现在来看看俄罗斯衰落的这个反乌托邦式的平行宇宙。左边这位是列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫，他在1976年显然中风了，这永久性地损害了他的思维能力，1982年的死亡彻底终结了他。接替他的是尤里·安德罗波夫，他自己的健康状况也相当糟糕，不到两年就去世了。然后是康斯坦丁·契尔年科，勉强撑了一年就死了。这听起来有点像我们（现在的美国政坛），但不管怎样，这种状况运作得并不好,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you look at Soviet growth statistics, they're really good right after the end of World War II. They're busy rebuilding. But when you get to the mid-'70s, they're going into terminal decline. When Gorbachev comes to power in 1985, Soviet growth rates have been 1–2% less than U.S. growth rates for the preceding decade. The compounding effects of that are pretty horrendous.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你看苏联的增长统计数据，二战结束后初期的数据非常好。他们正忙着重建。但到了70年代中期，他们开始进入晚期衰退。当戈尔巴乔夫于1985年上台时，苏联的增长率在过去十年里一直比美国低1到2个百分点。这种（负向的）复利效应是相当可怕的,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: In addition, there are other problems. Leonid Brezhnev was in power for 18 long years and not only did he collect cars, that was apparently the go-to gift for him, but in addition he was collecting a bunch of non-performing piles across the Third World because this is manifesting Russian power. But it's expensive and he doesn't have much of an economy to pay for it.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 此外，还有其他问题。列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫掌权长达18年，他不仅收集汽车——那显然是送给他的首选礼物——而且他还在第三世界收集了一堆毫无效益的烂摊子（non-performing piles），因为这能彰显俄罗斯的国威。但这非常昂贵，而他并没有多少经济实力来为此买单。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you look at oil prices, they're very much associated with the decline of the Soviet Union, rise of Vladimir Putin. It's because in the Soviet era, government budgets relied as much as 55% on oil or energy revenues. So piggy banks are going to shrink if oil prices aren't doing very well.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你看油价，它们与苏联的衰落以及弗拉基米尔·普京的崛起密切相关。这是因为在苏联时代，政府预算有多达55%依赖石油或能源收入。所以如果油价表现不佳，储蓄罐就会缩水。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Gorbachev repeatedly said, "You know, we can't live this way anymore." He wanted, and he did initiate political and economic reforms to try to save communism, except he really ruined the sclerotic patient doing what he did. There are massive territorial implications for what he did. It's the loss of empire in Eastern Europe and also the loss of the ethnically-based constituent republics of the Soviet Union.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 戈尔巴乔夫反复说：“你知道，我们不能再这样活下去了。”他想要，也确实启动了政治和经济改革，试图挽救共产主义，但他所做的一切实际上毁掉了这个僵化的病人（sclerotic patient）。他的所作所为造成了巨大的领土后果。那就是失去了在东欧的帝国，也失去了苏联内部以民族为基础的各个加盟共和国,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: I'm going to show you Russia's territorial odyssey in maps. So this is 1938... This is before then, but by the time you get to the end of the war, Russia's got the Baltic states, it's got Kaliningrad, it's got all of Belarus, all of Ukraine. Then of course it gets Eastern Europe. Gorbachev works his magic and you're down to Kaliningrad... So it was significant. At the end of 1991, when Russia's lost everything, they're down to a much diminished rump state. That’s followed by years of instability in Russia.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我将用地图向你们展示俄罗斯的领土变迁史。这是1938年……这是在那之前，但当你看到战争结束时，俄罗斯拥有了波罗的海国家，拥有了加里宁格勒，拥有了整个白俄罗斯、整个乌克兰。然后当然还有东欧。戈尔巴乔夫施展了他的“魔法”，结果你们只剩下加里宁格勒了……所以这很重大。在1991年底，当俄罗斯失去一切时，他们沦为一个大大缩水的残余国家（rump state）。随之而来的是俄罗斯多年的动荡,。

章节 09：俄罗斯的帝国基因：领土强迫症与东欧卫星国模板

📝 本节摘要：

本章深入剖析了俄罗斯地缘政治的核心逻辑。Paine 指出，俄罗斯对“伟大”的定义并非基于财富，而是基于广阔的领土和强迫邻国服从的能力。为了维持这种安全感，俄罗斯在历史上不断吞并邻国（从诺夫哥罗德到中亚汗国）。

二战后，斯大林在东欧实施了一套标准化的“卫星国模板”：他不仅强行将波兰版图整体西移200公里并进行种族清洗，还通过安插亲信掌控各国的“强力部门”（国防部与内政部），以此垄断暴力并铲除异己。这种残酷的统治方式，而非西方的“阴谋”，才是东欧国家在冷战后争相加入北约的根本原因。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Russians agree that their country always has been, always should be, always will be a great power, but they don't measure it in wealth. Their wealth has always been much less than their Western neighbors, although they often confiscate the wealth of other people. What they measure their strength, their greatness, is in vast territorial extent and the ability to run roughshod over others and make them do whatever it is Russia wants.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄罗斯人一致认为，他们的国家一直以来、理应如此、且永远将是一个大国，但他们并不以财富来衡量这一点。他们的财富一直远少于西方的邻居，尽管他们经常没收别人的财富。他们衡量其实力、其伟大的标准，在于广阔的领土范围，以及能够肆意践踏他人并强迫他人做俄罗斯想做的任何事的能力。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Also when they look at their security, they also look at it this way. "We need this vast territorial extent to be secure." But they never turn it around. They're always worried about other people invading them. "Do you suppose we pose a threat to anybody else?" They never turn it around that way. Except Russia has posed existential threat to its neighbors forever.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 此外，当他们审视自身安全时，也是这么看的。“我们需要这样广阔的领土才能安全。”但他们从不换位思考。他们总是担心别人入侵他们。至于“你觉得我们对其他人构成威胁了吗？”他们从来不这么反思。然而事实是，俄罗斯永远在对其邻国构成生存威胁-。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: There are so many neighbors you have never heard of because they've disappeared from the pages of history, courtesy of the Russians. Let's go to the medieval period where Russia starts out as the princely state of Muscovy, Moscow. Well, it wipes out the other princely states. There was Novgorod the Great. It was a more progressive place. They wiped that place out, Rostov, there are a lot of other places.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 有太多你从未听说过的邻居，因为它们已经从历史书页中消失了，这都要“归功”于俄国人。让我们回到中世纪，当时俄罗斯起步于莫斯科公国。好吧，它消灭了其他的公国。曾经有个大诺夫哥罗德（Novgorod the Great）。那是个更进步的地方。他们把那地方抹平了，还有罗斯托夫，以及许多其他地方-。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Later they're eliminating the Khanates of Central Asia... The Khanate of Crimea, Kazan, Astrakhan, Kokand, Khiva, Bukhara, they get rid of all of it. Then there's been this repeated vivisecting of European neighbors—Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Sweden and Finland—taking their territory one bite at a time. You can see it going on today. The Russians just don't see that if you do this to other people… This is why at the end of the Cold War, everyone is stampeding into NATO. It's not some conspiracy, it's just what the Russians have done to them.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 后来他们消灭了中亚的各个汗国……克里米亚汗国、喀山、阿斯特拉罕、浩罕、希瓦、布哈拉，他们把这些统统干掉了。然后是对欧洲邻国——乌克兰、波兰、立陶宛、瑞典和芬兰——反复进行的“活体解剖”，一口接一口地蚕食它们的领土。你可以看到这种行为今天仍在继续。俄国人就是看不出，如果你对别人这么做……这就是为什么在冷战结束时，所有人争先恐后地涌入北约。这并不是什么阴谋，这只是因为俄国人对他们所做的一切-。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: It would also be the genocide-laced occupation of Poland that went on for several generations after World War II. Part of that, it’s Yalta again. The Russians insisted on moving Poland 200 kilometers to the west. That is not the normal thing to do to a country. It's deep into German territory, so Russia can go eat a big part of Poland. Then Russia decides it's going to cleanse the whole place, ethnically cleanse. So Germans are going to live in Germany, Poles in Poland, Ukrainians going to live in Ukraine.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 还有二战后对波兰持续了几代人的、带有种族灭绝色彩的占领。部分原因，又是雅尔塔会议。俄国人坚持要把波兰向西移动200公里。这可不是对一个国家做的正常事。这深深切入德国领土，这样俄罗斯就能吞掉波兰的一大块。然后俄罗斯决定要清洗整个地方，进行种族清洗。于是德国人去德国住，波兰人去波兰住，乌克兰人去乌克兰住-。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you compare it to what the West is doing in the United States, the United States has a Marshall Plan... The United States is pouring aid into our Western allies to restore them after the war. Well, this is what Russia's doing. They've won the war, so their troops are there, but they never take their troops home. Then they're busy running coups. Then they're busy shooting anyone who disagrees with them or they send them to labor camps... It's called communism. It doesn't work.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你将其与西方（美国）正在做的事相比，美国有马歇尔计划……美国正在向我们的西方盟友倾注援助，以在战后恢复它们。好吧，这就是俄罗斯在做的事：他们赢了战争，所以他们的军队在那里，但他们从来不把军队撤回家。然后他们忙着搞政变。然后他们忙着枪毙任何不同意他们的人，或者把人送进劳改营……这叫共产主义。这行不通-。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The people who made all this happen include... Andrey Vyshinsky goes to Romania, lucky Romanians. He was running the show trials that were sending the original Bolshevik leaders to summary execution. What does he do when he gets to Romania? He appoints the Ministers of Justice, War and Interior. If you do that, you control the courts, army and police. You can start expropriating everything and nationalizing things.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 促成这一切的人包括……安德烈·维辛斯基（Andrey Vyshinsky）去了罗马尼亚，罗马尼亚人真走运。他曾负责那些将最初的布尔什维克领导人送去即决处决的作秀公审。当他到了罗马尼亚他做了什么？他任命了司法部长、战争部长和内政部长。如果你这么做，你就控制了法院、军队和警察。你就可以开始没收一切并将其国有化。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Russia had a template for bloc building. I'm giving the details because you get a sense of how a continental empire runs business... Here's their template. They're controlling the power ministries. What are they? Defense and Interior. If you do that, you're going to monopolize coercion and eliminate your opposition. If you control the Justice and Information ministries, you can arrest or kill at will. Then you control all the stories that are never told about this.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄罗斯有一套建立集团的模板。我提供这些细节是因为你能从中感觉到一个大陆帝国是如何运作的……这就是他们的模板。他们控制着强力部门（Power Ministries）。那是些什么？国防部和内政部。如果你这么做，你就垄断了强制力并消灭了反对派。如果你控制了司法部和信息部，你可以随意逮捕或杀人。然后你控制了所有关于这一切永远不会被讲出来的故事,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Yet there’s this big lie, the big fiction that the Russians are somehow nice guys. They're using democratic forms. They don't eliminate Poland as a state, as the czars had done. It’s still called Poland, but it's a fiction that it's independent. It's not. There's a fiction that they hold elections, but they're not democratic. We already know the outcome. It's a dictatorship in reality.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 然而这里存在一个弥天大谎，一个巨大的虚构故事，即俄国人某种程度上是好人。他们使用民主的形式。他们没有像沙皇那样废除波兰的国家地位。它仍然叫波兰，但它所谓的独立只是一个虚构。它并不独立。还有一个虚构是他们举行选举，但这并不民主。我们早就知道结果了。实际上这就是独裁统治。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Under the czars, the ideology was this Third Rome, of the Russian Orthodox Church... When the Communists get in, they're not spreading Russian Orthodoxy, they're spreading communism. The problem for Putin is that today neither communism nor Russian Orthodoxy are marketable ideologies. He's just stuck with being a really big place. That's where his little focus is.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 在沙皇统治下，意识形态是俄罗斯东正教的“第三罗马”……当共产党人进来时，他们不再传播俄罗斯东正教，他们在传播共产主义。普京面临的问题是，今天无论是共产主义还是俄罗斯东正教都不是有市场的意识形态。他只能死守着“做一个非常大的地方”这一点。这就是他那狭隘的关注点所在-。

章节 10：恐惧与生存：中俄不同的“噩梦”剧本与统治合法性危机

📝 本节摘要：

本章深入剖析了中俄两国截然不同的战略恐惧与生存逻辑。Paine 教授指出，俄罗斯的噩梦是“被入侵”（源于蒙古枷锁及拿破仑、希特勒的入侵），因此它总是试图通过扩张来寻求安全；而中国的噩梦则是“乱”（内部崩溃与分裂）。

面对合法性危机（共产主义信仰破产、经济增长放缓），中国共产党吸取了苏共垮台的教训。不同于戈尔巴乔夫的政治改革，中共得出的结论是：绝不能犹豫使用武力（如天安门事件），必须优先保证党的垄断地位而非经济效率，并通过激进的民族主义和强制同化少数民族（如维吾尔族）来维持统治。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Russia has a nightmare scenario. They don't always win these wars. They lose quite often. The Mongol yoke or the Yellow Peril, their terminology, not mine, is the 13th century when the Mongols just swept in and the Russian elites became tax collectors for the Mongols, an extractive role that has endured.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄罗斯有一个噩梦剧本。他们并不总是赢得战争。他们经常输。所谓的“蒙古枷锁”（Mongol yoke）或“黄祸”（Yellow Peril）——这是他们的术语，不是我的——是指13世纪蒙古人席卷而来，俄罗斯精英沦为蒙古人的税吏，这种“榨取者”的角色一直延续至今。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: You think about Russians, they extract resources, their own, other peoples, but they're not known for producing wealth. It's just resource extraction. This is some of the legacy of all of that. The Russians have also suffered devastating defeats, to Napoleon, in World War I and World War II, that just devastated Western Russia.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 想想俄罗斯人，他们榨取资源，不管是他们自己的还是别人的，但他们并不以创造财富而闻名。仅仅是资源榨取。这就是那段历史的部分遗产。俄罗斯人还遭受过毁灭性的失败，输给拿破仑，还有第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战，这些战争彻底摧毁了俄罗斯西部,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So they've had bad times. In our own time, Putin is dumping all of his ordnance on Ukraine, leaving Siberia wide open to China's ambitions. So if he keeps the game up, he may well wind up with a Chinese yoke, and his nightmare will be there for him.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以他们有过艰难的时期。在我们这个时代，普京正把他所有的军火倾泻在乌克兰，导致西伯利亚对中国的野心敞开大门。所以如果他继续玩这个游戏，他很可能会落得个“中国枷锁”的下场，那他的噩梦就真的降临了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Chinese also have their own big ideas, not religious ideas or empire, but about civilization itself. Traditionally, the Chinese believe there's only one civilization, that would be theirs. It's based on Confucianism. That would be a world order unto itself. That worked for them for a couple thousand years.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 中国人也有他们自己的大观念，不是关于宗教或帝国，而是关于文明本身。传统上，中国人认为只有一个文明，那就是他们的文明。它基于儒家思想。那本身就是一个世界秩序。这套东西对他们来说行之有效地运作了几千年,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: There are certain pillars of legitimacy that have endured, probably originating from this, but enduring ones. One is ethical rule. Well, that's gone for the Communist Party. Let's try the next one. Economic prosperity. Whoops, going fast. That leaves the Communists today with territorial expansion.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 有一些合法性的支柱一直延续下来，可能源于此，但确实持久。一个是德治（ethical rule）。嗯，对共产党来说这已经没了。让我们试试下一个。经济繁荣。哎哟，这个也正在快速消失。这就给今天的共产党只剩下一条路：领土扩张。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: That's ongoing with territory incursions into India, South China Sea island building, and then all these gathering threats to Taiwan. In part, what's going on is that the Communist Party wants to play the nationalism card the same way Putin is.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 这种扩张正在进行中，包括对印度的领土入侵、南海造岛，以及对台湾不断聚集的威胁。在某种程度上，正在发生的是共产党想要打民族主义牌，就像普京所做的那样。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you haven't got anything else for you, play jingoistic nationalism, because we human beings seem to be particularly attentive to that one. So if you focus on that, maybe the Chinese people won't look at the ethical lapses of the Communist Party or the fact that their paychecks aren't going anywhere anymore.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你手里没别的牌可打，就打沙文主义的民族主义（jingoistic nationalism），因为我们人类似乎对此特别受用。所以如果你聚焦于此，也许中国人民就不会去关注共产党的道德缺失，或者他们的工资单不再增长的事实了,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Good old Xi, he doesn't have a marketable ideology anymore. What's really scary is that Confucianism had just been this enduring feature of China—dynasties came and went, but Confucianism stayed—until China was unable to fend off Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War that I told you about and the Europeans in the Opium Wars, when all of a sudden Confucianism just seemed totally inadequate.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我们的老朋友习，他已经没有一个有市场的意识形态了。真正可怕的是，儒家思想曾是中国一个持久的特征——王朝来来去去，但儒家思想始终存在——直到中国无法抵御我告诉过你们的甲午战争中的日本，以及鸦片战争中的欧洲人，突然之间，儒家思想似乎变得完全不足以应付局面了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: When enough Chinese cease believing in Confucianism, that's when you get the 1911 Revolution and it just vanishes as an organizing principle for running your government. This is the total nightmare. One of the frightening things for the Communist Party is when people cease believing in communism.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 当足够多的中国人不再相信儒家思想时，你就迎来了1911年的辛亥革命，它作为治理国家的组织原则就这样消失了。这是彻底的噩梦。对共产党来说，最可怕的事情之一就是当人们不再相信共产主义的时候,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: China's nightmare scenario is these horrible periods of chaos. They're afraid that if the Communists go, that China's going to devolve into these civil wars, these periods of Luàn (乱). A second one is that maybe the Soviet Union when it's shattered, that may well be their fate, that maybe these communist regimes can't last forever.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 中国的噩梦剧本是那些可怕的混乱时期。他们担心如果共产党下台，中国将退化为内战，进入这些“乱”（Luàn）的时期。第二个噩梦是，也许苏联解体就是他们的命运，也许这些共产主义政权无法永远持续下去,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So Russia's nightmare scenario is other people invading Russia. China's nightmare scenario is the collapse of China. It's two different ways, two different things to worry about.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以，俄罗斯的噩梦剧本是别人入侵俄罗斯。中国的噩梦剧本是中国的崩溃。这是两条不同的路，两件不同的担忧之事。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Chinese have learned a great deal from watching Russians as they play around with big ideas. They learned a great deal from Mikhail Gorbachev when he tries to fix communism, but he winds up killing the patient. The Chinese, I think, their takeaways from what Gorbachev did is don't hesitate to deploy the tanks.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 中国人从观察俄罗斯人玩弄大观念的过程中学到了很多。他们从米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫那里学到了很多，当时他试图修补共产主义，结果却弄死了病人。我认为，中国人从戈尔巴乔夫的所作所为中得出的教训是：不要犹豫，出动坦克,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you've got unrest in the streets, you just send tanks, tanks against civilians. It's a really quick fix. You want to focus on economic reforms to the extent you can, certainly not political reforms. You also really want to sinify your minorities.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果街头出现动乱，你就直接派坦克，用坦克对付平民。这是一种非常快速的解决方法。你要尽可能专注于经济改革，但绝不进行政治改革。此外，你还必须汉化（sinify）你的少数民族。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Why? In the Soviet Union, the Russians had had this fiction that all these occupied minority people wanted to be there and had equal rights... But basically they had no power. It meant when the Soviet Union shattered, there were plausible divisions already set up on an ethnic basis. That is how you get places like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, et cetera.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 为什么？在苏联，俄罗斯人曾编造了一个虚构故事，说所有这些被占领的少数民族都想留在那里并拥有平等权利……但基本上他们没有任何权力。这意味着当苏联解体时，已经存在基于民族基础的合理划分。这就是为什么会出现乌兹别克斯坦、塔吉克斯坦等国家,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: China's like, "No way." This helps explain the genocide of the Uyghurs that's ongoing now. This is their rationale for doing it. Then what you want to do, you can see Xi Jinping doing it, is prioritize maintaining the monopoly of the Chinese Communist Party over economic efficiency when those two things run at cross purposes.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 中国的态度是：“没门。”这有助于解释目前正在发生的针对维吾尔族的种族灭绝。这就是他们这样做的理由。然后你要做的是——你可以看到习近平正在这样做——当维持中国共产党的垄断地位与经济效率发生冲突时，优先考虑前者,。

章节 11：普京的赌注：从蚕食邻国到乌克兰战争的战略误判

📝 本节摘要：

本章深入剖析了普京的战略逻辑及其对苏联“冷战智慧”的背离。Sarah Paine 指出，普京打破了苏联领导人“避免热战”的规则，他的权力之路是靠一场场战争铺就的（车臣、格鲁吉亚、克里米亚）。

普京将地缘政治视为一种“填色游戏”，通过“切香肠”式的战术逐步蚕食邻国领土。针对所谓“北约东扩引发俄乌战争”的论调，Paine 予以严厉驳斥，将其定性为俄式的“煤气灯效应”（Gaslighting）——即颠倒黑白，将受害者的自卫反应（争相加入北约）扭曲为对俄罗斯的侵略。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: In Putin's case, he has thrown away the Soviet addendum to the rules for continental empire. What was that one? No hot wars. If you think about Soviet rulers, they were all veterans of World War II through Leonid Brezhnev. They understood that war is easy to get into, hard to get out of, very unpredictable.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 就普京而言，他抛弃了苏联时期对大陆帝国法则的补充条款。那条款是什么？不要打热战。如果你想想苏联的统治者，直到列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫，他们全都是二战老兵。他们明白，战争一旦卷入就很容易，但想脱身却很难，而且充满了不可预测性。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you look at Putin, he has risen to power on a diet of hot wars. He comes to power in the early phase of the Second Chechen War, where he levels the Chechen capital of Grozny and leaves most of the rest of Chechnya an environmental waste zone. But he sorts that one out.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你观察普京，你会发现他是靠吃“热战”这碗饭起家掌权的。他在第二次车臣战争早期上台，夷平了车臣首府格罗兹尼，让车臣大部分地区变成了一片环境废墟。但他把那件事摆平了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Then he gets quite popular for his war with Georgia in 2008, where he detaches South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia... Then when he eliminates term limits for himself in 2012, which isn't very popular in Russia, he solves that by going into Ukraine in 2014 and walks off with about 7% of Ukrainian territory at very little cost. And Russians think that's great!

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 然后他在2008年因格鲁吉亚战争而变得相当受欢迎，在那场战争中他将南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹从格鲁吉亚剥离出来……接着当他在2012年取消自己的任期限制时——这在俄罗斯并不怎么受欢迎——他通过2014年进军乌克兰解决了这个问题，并以极小的代价拿走了乌克兰约7%的领土。俄国人觉得这太棒了！

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you look at these little stepping stones, this is the way continentalists look at it. You’ve got all these little places lined up. You want to color it in. That's where Ukraine comes in, in 2022. Putin wants to reverse all these territorial losses. He wants the green things and the purple things.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你看着这些小小的垫脚石，这就是大陆帝国主义者看待问题的方式。你把所有这些小地方排成一排。你想把它们涂上颜色。这就是2022年乌克兰战争的由来。普京想要逆转所有这些领土损失。他想要地图上那些绿色的和紫色的区域。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Who knows? Here's how he looks at NATO or doesn't look at it. You look at when people join. There are two great big periods of accession to NATO. One is in the early Cold War with all the smaller countries of Europe... The Europeans join to protect themselves from Soviet imperialism.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 谁知道呢？这也是他看待或不看待北约的方式。你看看人们是什么时候加入的。北约有两大加入时期。一个是冷战初期，欧洲所有的小国都加入了……欧洲人加入是为了保护自己免受苏联帝国主义的侵害。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Then at the end of the Cold War, when these Soviet satellites can finally slip the leash, I've given you all the reasons why, they stampede into NATO. It is not NATO tricking them to join. They're stampeding in for excellent reasons. They've been proven right.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 然后在冷战结束时，当这些苏联卫星国终于能挣脱束缚时——我已经告诉过你们所有原因了——它们争先恐后地涌入（stampede）北约。这不是北约诱骗它们加入。它们是为了极好的理由而争相加入。事实证明它们是对的。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: But when Putin looks at this, he goes, "Oh, they're coming at us in arcs." Well, this is ludicrous. Russia has posed an existential threat to these places forever. No one today wants to invade Russia. Who'd want it? It's full of Russians. We want them to stay home. There's no one there who wants Russia.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 但当普京看着这一切时，他说：“哦，他们正呈弧形向我们包围过来。”这就太荒谬了。俄罗斯一直以来都对这些地方构成生存威胁。今天没人想入侵俄罗斯。谁会想要它？那里全是俄国人。我们只想让他们待在家里。那边没谁想要俄罗斯。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Russians like to gaslight everybody else, like, "You're the problem." It's been very effective. Lots of Americans will talk about NATO expansion and say, "Oh, this is why Putin went to Ukraine. You did NATO expansion." He's gaslighting everybody. Russians are the problem. Also it is their totally dysfunctional domestic system that offers everybody else nothing but problems.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄国人喜欢对所有人进行“煤气灯操纵”（gaslight，指心理操控、颠倒黑白），就像在说：“你们才是问题所在。”这招非常有效。许多美国人会谈论北约扩张，并说：“哦，这就是普京进攻乌克兰的原因。你们搞了北约扩张。”他这是在对所有人进行煤气灯操纵。俄国人才是问题所在。此外，正是他们那完全功能失调的国内体系，除了麻烦之外给不了其他人任何东西。

章节 11：普京的赌注：从蚕食邻国到乌克兰战争的战略误判

📝 本节摘要：

本章深入剖析了普京的战略逻辑及其对苏联“冷战智慧”的背离。Sarah Paine 指出，普京打破了苏联领导人“避免热战”的规则，他的权力之路是靠一场场战争铺就的（车臣、格鲁吉亚、克里米亚）。

普京将地缘政治视为一种“填色游戏”，通过“切香肠”式的战术逐步蚕食邻国领土。针对所谓“北约东扩引发俄乌战争”的论调，Paine 予以严厉驳斥，将其定性为俄式的“煤气灯效应”（Gaslighting）——即颠倒黑白，将受害者的自卫反应（争相加入北约）扭曲为对俄罗斯的侵略。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: In Putin's case, he has thrown away the Soviet addendum to the rules for continental empire. What was that one? No hot wars. If you think about Soviet rulers, they were all veterans of World War II through Leonid Brezhnev. They understood that war is easy to get into, hard to get out of, very unpredictable.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 就普京而言，他抛弃了苏联时期对大陆帝国法则的补充条款。那条款是什么？不要打热战。如果你想想苏联的统治者，直到列昂尼德·勃列日涅夫，他们全都是二战老兵。他们明白，战争一旦卷入就很容易，但想脱身却很难，而且充满了不可预测性。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you look at Putin, he has risen to power on a diet of hot wars. He comes to power in the early phase of the Second Chechen War, where he levels the Chechen capital of Grozny and leaves most of the rest of Chechnya an environmental waste zone. But he sorts that one out.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你观察普京，你会发现他是靠吃“热战”这碗饭起家掌权的。他在第二次车臣战争早期上台，夷平了车臣首府格罗兹尼，让车臣大部分地区变成了一片环境废墟。但他把那件事摆平了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Then he gets quite popular for his war with Georgia in 2008, where he detaches South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia... Then when he eliminates term limits for himself in 2012, which isn't very popular in Russia, he solves that by going into Ukraine in 2014 and walks off with about 7% of Ukrainian territory at very little cost. And Russians think that's great!

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 然后他在2008年因格鲁吉亚战争而变得相当受欢迎，在那场战争中他将南奥塞梯和阿布哈兹从格鲁吉亚剥离出来……接着当他在2012年取消自己的任期限制时——这在俄罗斯并不怎么受欢迎——他通过2014年进军乌克兰解决了这个问题，并以极小的代价拿走了乌克兰约7%的领土。俄国人觉得这太棒了！

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you look at these little stepping stones, this is the way continentalists look at it. You’ve got all these little places lined up. You want to color it in. That's where Ukraine comes in, in 2022. Putin wants to reverse all these territorial losses. He wants the green things and the purple things.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你看着这些小小的垫脚石，这就是大陆帝国主义者看待问题的方式。你把所有这些小地方排成一排。你想把它们涂上颜色。这就是2022年乌克兰战争的由来。普京想要逆转所有这些领土损失。他想要地图上那些绿色的和紫色的区域。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Who knows? Here's how he looks at NATO or doesn't look at it. You look at when people join. There are two great big periods of accession to NATO. One is in the early Cold War with all the smaller countries of Europe... The Europeans join to protect themselves from Soviet imperialism.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 谁知道呢？这也是他看待或不看待北约的方式。你看看人们是什么时候加入的。北约有两大加入时期。一个是冷战初期，欧洲所有的小国都加入了……欧洲人加入是为了保护自己免受苏联帝国主义的侵害。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Then at the end of the Cold War, when these Soviet satellites can finally slip the leash, I've given you all the reasons why, they stampede into NATO. It is not NATO tricking them to join. They're stampeding in for excellent reasons. They've been proven right.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 然后在冷战结束时，当这些苏联卫星国终于能挣脱束缚时——我已经告诉过你们所有原因了——它们争先恐后地涌入（stampede）北约。这不是北约诱骗它们加入。它们是为了极好的理由而争相加入。事实证明它们是对的。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: But when Putin looks at this, he goes, "Oh, they're coming at us in arcs." Well, this is ludicrous. Russia has posed an existential threat to these places forever. No one today wants to invade Russia. Who'd want it? It's full of Russians. We want them to stay home. There's no one there who wants Russia.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 但当普京看着这一切时，他说：“哦，他们正呈弧形向我们包围过来。”这就太荒谬了。俄罗斯一直以来都对这些地方构成生存威胁。今天没人想入侵俄罗斯。谁会想要它？那里全是俄国人。我们只想让他们待在家里。那边没谁想要俄罗斯。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The Russians like to gaslight everybody else, like, "You're the problem." It's been very effective. Lots of Americans will talk about NATO expansion and say, "Oh, this is why Putin went to Ukraine. You did NATO expansion." He's gaslighting everybody. Russians are the problem. Also it is their totally dysfunctional domestic system that offers everybody else nothing but problems.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 俄国人喜欢对所有人进行“煤气灯操纵”（gaslight，指心理操控、颠倒黑白），就像在说：“你们才是问题所在。”这招非常有效。许多美国人会谈论北约扩张，并说：“哦，这就是普京进攻乌克兰的原因。你们搞了北约扩张。”他这是在对所有人进行煤气灯操纵。俄国人才是问题所在。此外，正是他们那完全功能失调的国内体系，除了麻烦之外给不了其他人任何东西。

章节 12：变质的“兄弟情”：俄罗斯沦为中国的资源附庸

📝 本节摘要：

本章揭示了中俄关系的惊天逆转。Sarah Paine 指出，普京在俄罗斯衰弱而中国强盛时发动战争，这不仅烧光了俄罗斯的资产，更导致西伯利亚对中国门户大开。

如今，习近平掌握了所有筹码（9倍于俄罗斯的人口与GDP）。中国不再需要通过战争夺取西伯利亚，只需通过不对等的贸易条款，以极低的价格购买俄罗斯的石油和贝加尔湖的淡水。Paine 提出了一个发人深省的比喻：俄罗斯正在变成下一个“朝鲜”——一个因极度绝望而完全依附于中国的附庸国。这就像是“朝鲜战争的逆转版”，中国像当年的斯大林一样，冷眼旁观并“滴水式”地提供援助，看着俄罗斯在战场上流干鲜血。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Putin is doing this hot war gambit when Russia's weak and China is strong, making it particularly damaging. Why would it matter? Siberia has precisely the resources that China now needs and covets and wants to have them contiguous so other people can't mess with them. In particular they want water because they've blown through their water table in North China. Lake Baikal has over 20% of the world's surface fresh water.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 普京是在俄罗斯虚弱而中国强盛的时候进行这场热战赌博的，这使得破坏性尤为巨大。为什么这很重要？西伯利亚恰恰拥有中国现在需要且觊觎的资源，而且中国希望这些资源是邻接的，这样别人就搞不了破坏。特别是他们想要水，因为他们已经抽干了华北的地下水位。贝加尔湖拥有世界上超过20%的地表淡水资源。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So if you want a quick fix, it's the best one. China is known for big water projects... Xi Jinping now holds all of the cards. China has nine times the population, nine times the GNP of Russia, and their per capita GNPs are converging. Not good news for Putin. The question isn't whether this bromance is going to last forever, but rather when it's going to end.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以如果你想要一个快速的解决方案，那就是最好的一个。中国以大型水利工程闻名……习近平现在掌握了所有的牌。中国拥有俄罗斯9倍的人口，9倍的国民生产总值（GNP），而且他们的人均GNP正在趋同。这对普京来说不是好消息。问题不在于这段“兄弟情”是否会天长地久，而在于它何时会终结。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: I agree with the idea that China has a lot of people and a lot of wealth. Russia has a lot of water, and it has a lot of resources. These are complementary resources. They both have things that the other party has. The question is, will they attain these things through war or through trade? It seems very improbable to me that… China's got a lot of money. It can just pay for Russian oil, it can just pay for water. Why would it invade a nuclear-armed nation?

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 我同意中国拥有大量人口和财富的观点。而俄罗斯拥有大量的水和资源。这些是互补的资源。双方都有对方想要的东西。问题是，他们会通过战争还是贸易来获得这些东西？在我看来战争是非常不可能的……中国有很多钱。它完全可以直接花钱买俄罗斯的石油，直接花钱买水。为什么要入侵一个拥有核武器的国家呢,？

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: I never said it would do that. It's a question of if Putin feels that his back is up against the wall. What price? We don't really know the terms of their trade... I suspect that whatever the terms of trade are going to be, the Chinese are going to get a really good deal.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我从来没说过它会那样做（入侵）。问题在于如果普京觉得他已经被逼到了墙角。代价是什么？我们并不真正知道他们的贸易条款……但我怀疑无论贸易条款是什么，中国人都将获得一笔非常划算的交易,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Apparently certain Russians, when Putin had invaded the big way in Ukraine, said, "Oh my God, that's our future. It's North Korea. That's where we're headed." That could well be their future. It'll just keep going as they pour out wealth and the Chinese will try to get very good terms of trade for resources and be niggardly, meaning giving very few things back.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 显然，当普京在乌克兰大举入侵时，某些俄国人说：“天哪，那就是我们的未来。就是朝鲜。那就是我们要去的地方。”这很可能就是他们的未来。这将继续下去，随着他们耗尽财富，中国人将试图获得非常优厚的资源贸易条款，并且表现得非常吝啬（niggardly），意味着只回馈极少的东西,。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: An interesting connection to make between World War II and this Russo-Chinese relationship is that the way that we used Russia—as this reservoir of military men that we can just ship armaments to and they can do the dying for us—that’s similar to how Russia uses China in the war against Japan... Interestingly, Russia is doing to them the kind of alliance that we had with Russia during World War II.

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 在二战和这段俄中关系之间可以建立一个有趣的联系，那就是我们利用俄罗斯的方式——把它当作一个兵源库，我们只需运送武器，让他们替我们去死——这类似于俄罗斯在对日战争中利用中国的方式……有趣的是，俄罗斯现在正对他们（中国）做着我们在二战期间与俄罗斯做的那种同盟关系,。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Think about today. It's like the Korean War in reverse because China's dribbling out aid to Russia. Russia's getting wrecked by Ukraine... Look at it from Xi Jinping’s perspective, the longer this goes on, the better. Just let Putin keep on working his magic and I get to sell him stuff. I'll get him to lower the prices of resources because the man's desperate. Putin will find himself under a Chinese yoke that he does not like.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 想想今天。这就像是朝鲜战争的逆转版，因为现在是中国在向俄罗斯“滴水式”地提供援助。俄罗斯正被乌克兰摧毁……从习近平的角度来看，这事拖得越久越好。就让普京继续施展他的“魔法”（折腾），而我正好可以卖东西给他。我会让他降低资源价格，因为这家伙已经绝望了。普京会发现自己处于一个他不喜欢的“中国枷锁”（Chinese yoke）之下,。

章节 13：问答（上）：意识形态的虚妄与独裁者的生存术

📝 本节摘要：

本章进入访谈的问答环节。主持人首先提出了一个关键悖论：为何中苏作为两个主要的共产主义国家，共同的意识形态未能阻止它们分裂甚至爆发冲突？

Sarah Paine 指出，意识形态（无论是沙皇的东正教还是共产主义）只是外衣，其内核依然是“大陆帝国”的一山不容二虎（King of the roost）逻辑。她进一步揭示了独裁者的生存哲学：无论是斯大林在1936年阻止中共杀害蒋介石（为了利用国民党抗日），还是他建立职能重叠的安全机构来监控下属，都表明地缘政治的现实利益和个人权力的维持远高于意识形态的纯洁性。这些独裁者拥有极高的“生存情商”，能够敏锐地感知谁对自己构成威胁并先下手为强。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: First question, I want to understand the role of ideology in the Sino-Soviet split. These are the two major communist countries in the world. They have this big ideological, world-changing mission. We're going to spread communism around the world. That isn't enough to prevent war over, in the case of 1969, literally just some islands in the middle of a river. There's nothing super consequential at stake here. Why didn't the fact that they were both these communist countries do more to cement the relationship?

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 第一个问题，我想了解意识形态在中苏分裂中的作用。这是世界上两个主要的共产主义国家。它们肩负着宏大的、改变世界的意识形态使命。我们要把共产主义传播到全世界。但这却不足以阻止战争爆发，以1969年为例，仅仅是为了河中间的几个岛屿。这并没有什么极其重大的利益攸关。为什么它们同为共产主义国家这一事实，没能进一步巩固它们的关系呢？

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: I gave you all these bad things that Russia had done to China, which are not small things. Then isn't the problem with communism that the economics of it don't actually work? Fundamentally these two countries are continental powers, they're continental empires. Sure they change out ideologies. The ideology of the tsars changes out to communism and China is changing out Confucianism for communism. But the principle that each one should be king of the roost hasn't changed.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我已经给你们列举了俄罗斯对中国做的所有那些坏事，这些可不是小事。而且共产主义的问题不正是其经济模式实际上行不通吗？归根结底，这两个国家是大陆强权，它们是大陆帝国。当然，它们更换了意识形态。沙皇的意识形态换成了共产主义，中国则把儒家思想换成了共产主义。但每一个都想当家做主（king of the roost/一山不容二虎）的原则从未改变。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: That would be a mutually exclusive proposition of who's going to run Asia and then Eurasia, because they have a shared address, this long border. Also with communism, it's supposed to take over the whole world. We're supposed to have a classless society. That's why we don't even worry about governments and things because they're eventually going to melt away. Well, that's all nonsense.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 关于谁来统治亚洲进而统治欧亚大陆，这是一个互斥的命题，因为它们拥有共同的地址——那条漫长的边界。此外，共产主义本该接管全世界。我们要建立一个无阶级社会。这就是为什么我们甚至不担心政府之类的事情，因为它们最终会消亡。嗯，那全是胡扯。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: As things go on further and further, you have dictators more and more entrenched and they're using communism. There's another piece where it's just amazing, about the big lie. I don't know whether it was Stalin who said it, that if the lie is big enough, people will believe you. It's just so out there, it's so preposterous, they go with it. Which is this notion that it's the West through these imperial powers, right?

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 随着事态的发展，你会发现独裁者们的地位越来越稳固，而他们正在利用共产主义。还有一点令人惊叹，那就是关于“弥天大谎”（The Big Lie）。我不知道是不是斯大林说过这句话：如果谎言大到一定程度，人们就会相信你。因为它太离谱、太荒谬了，人们反而信了。这个谎言就是：这一切都是西方那些帝国主义列强造成的，对吧？

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: And we buy this, that they're not the ones. But if you look at it, I've given you the data. Then this other one in our own time, this lie about, "Oh, it's the West, it's NATO expansion, this explains Putin." I’ve given you the data, it's nonsense. Now why the Russians feel obliged to take other people's territory, part of it is feeling good while other people squirm. There's that aspect. They're not the only people who do those sorts of things. But it's also from being on the plains of Eurasia where, throughout history, people have invaded you.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我们居然信了这一套，觉得他们不是始作俑者。但如果你看事实，我已经给你们展示了数据。然后是我们这个时代的另一个谎言，关于“哦，是西方，是北约东扩，这解释了普京的行为。”我已经给你们展示了数据，那是胡扯。至于为什么俄罗斯人觉得有义务夺取别人的领土，部分原因是看到别人痛苦挣扎自己感觉很爽。有这方面的因素。他们不是唯一做这种事的人。但这同样源于身处欧亚大平原，纵观历史，总是有人入侵你。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: I want to understand Stalin's decisions in particular in the case of telling the Communists during the Chinese Civil War that they can't go below the Yangtze River, so that he can split up the Chinese... We know from all the actions in Stalin's life that he was a devoted communist. He does collectivization and almost destroys his regime because he's a devoted communist. At the same time, communism says that there has to be this worldwide revolution at some point... But at the same time he doesn't seem communist enough to want China to become fully communist. He cares more about real geopolitik. Tell me about how this works.

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 我想特别了解斯大林的决策，特别是在中国内战期间告诉共产党不能过长江，这样他就可以分裂中国……我们从斯大林一生的行动中知道他是一个忠诚的共产主义者。他搞集体化，差点毁了自己的政权，因为他是一个忠诚的共产主义者。同时，共产主义说在某个时刻必须有世界革命……但同时，他似乎又没那么“共产主义”，因为他不希望中国完全变成共产主义国家。他更在乎现实地缘政治（real geopolitik）。请告诉我这是怎么回事。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: His version of communism, the Russians invented it. Actually they didn't, Marx invented it. But they are the guys who think, "Well, we operationalized it so we should run it forever." So of course Russia is going to be the big communist country. A bunch of Chinese upstarts, from their point of view, are claiming, "No, no, no, we're going to run the show."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他的那个版本的共产主义，是俄国人发明的。其实不是，是马克思发明的。但他们是那种认为“好吧，我们将其实践化了，所以我们应该永远掌管它”的人。所以当然，俄罗斯要做那个共产主义大国。而一群中国暴发户（upstarts），在他们看来，却声称：“不不不，我们要来当家做主。”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: But did Stalin as a communist think, "Okay at some point the whole world is going to be communist." He thought that he personally would be managing the whole world? Unclear. It's a long horizon. In his lifetime he's initially about communism in one country, then communism on your borders, which is what he's working on. As for the rest of the world, it takes Brezhnev to start going all deep into Africa. Stalin wasn't interested in, say, India because he thought they're a bunch of lackeys of the British.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 但是作为一个共产主义者，斯大林是否认为“好吧，在某个时刻全世界都会变成共产主义”？他是否认为他个人将管理整个世界？不清楚。那是很遥远的事。在他有生之年，他最初关注的是“一国共产主义”，然后是“边境上的共产主义”，这才是他在做的事。至于世界其他地方，直到勃列日涅夫时期才开始深入非洲。斯大林对印度等地不感兴趣，因为他认为他们是一群英国人的走狗。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: I want to zoom in on one particular episode during this period that I think is fascinating. In 1936, the Communists in China kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek, who's the leader of the Nationalists, and they're about to kill him. Stalin radios in over the Comintern. He says, "No, you can't kill Chiang Kai-shek even though he's your enemy, he's been massacring you. You gotta let him go." In exchange, Chiang Kai-shek has to promise to create a united front against the Japanese... This just seems like a brilliant move on Stalin's part in retrospect... What is the understanding, big picture, that lets him?

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 我想聚焦于这一时期一个特别的插曲，我觉得非常迷人。1936年，中国共产党绑架了国民党领袖蒋介石（西安事变），他们正准备杀了他。斯大林通过共产国际发来电报。他说：“不，你们不能杀蒋介石，尽管他是你们的敌人，尽管他一直在屠杀你们。你们必须放了他。”作为交换，蒋介石必须承诺建立抗日统一战线……回过头看，这似乎是斯大林的一步妙棋……是什么样的大局观让他做到了这一点？

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: There are dictators all over the world who stay in power for a long time. Do not dismiss their ability to stay in power. They're surfing quite a wave wherever they live, of people who butcher each other with great regularity. I would suspect—suspect, because how would I have the evidence—that many of these long-term dictators have EQs that are off the charts. When you come in the room, they just gut-feeling know whether they're going to cap you or not.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 世界各地都有长期掌权的独裁者。不要低估他们保持权力的能力。无论身处何地，他们都在驾驭着一股经常互相屠杀的人群所掀起的巨浪。我怀疑——只是怀疑，因为我哪来的证据——这些长期独裁者中有许多人的情商（EQ）高得爆表。当你走进房间时，他们凭直觉就能知道这些人是不是要把你干掉（cap you）。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If they get a few extra people, so what? Just so they get rid of all the people who are going to cause them problems. Incredible abilities. Also what Stalin does—I think Saddam Hussein imitated him, but I could be wrong about that one—is have multiple security agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. No one quite knows who's running the show and who's in power, but they're all funneling information to Stalin.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果他们多杀了几个人，那又怎样？只要他们除掉了所有可能给他们制造麻烦的人就行。这种能力令人难以置信。此外，斯大林的做法——我想萨达姆·侯赛因模仿了他，但我可能搞错了——是设立多个职能重叠的安全机构。没人确切知道谁在主事，谁掌权，但他们都在向斯大林输送情报。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So he has better information than anybody else. You can use one one day, another another day, which explains how all the heads of the equivalent of the KGB come and go. Most of the early heads of that wind up getting shot by their successors. You'd think they'd notice a pattern. They're very good at staying in power. They're really good at managing that problem. It does not bring prosperity. That comes from the world of maritime trade, of following international law instead of capping your trade partner.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 所以他比任何人都掌握着更好的情报。你可以今天用这个机构，明天用那个，这就解释了为什么那些相当于克格勃头目的人换来换去。大多数早期的头目最终都被他们的继任者枪毙了。你会以为他们能看出这种规律。他们非常擅长保持权力。他们真的很擅长处理这个问题。但这并不能带来繁荣。繁荣来自海洋贸易的世界，来自遵守国际法，而不是把你的贸易伙伴干掉。

章节 14：问答（下）：战争与贸易的抉择及被低估的同盟力量

📝 本节摘要：

在访谈的最后部分，Sarah Paine 驳斥了“中俄终将一战”的观点。她认为，中国作为精明的商人，绝不会为了资源去攻击一个拥有核武器的邻国，而是会利用经济杠杆，以极低的价格购买俄罗斯的资源。这会导致俄罗斯的未来越来越像“朝鲜”——一个因被孤立而不得不完全依附于中国的附庸。

此外，Paine 借用斯大林在二战中对德、日不同策略的成败（对日本的绥靖成功了，但对希特勒的误判使自己成了“菜单上的一道菜”），警告当今西方领袖不要误判对手。最后，她引用伯里克利的名言，呼吁美国不要采取“单打独斗”的自杀式策略，而应重拾二战后“马歇尔计划”的智慧：通过繁荣盟友的经济，组建强大的联盟来对抗独裁者，因为“没人能独自对付一个恶霸”。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: I want to ask about your, I don’t know if you call it a prediction but, your hypothesis that at some point China and Russia will finish each other off or have some sort of conflict which will be bad for both of them.

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 我想问问你的——我不知道该不该称之为预测——你的假设，即在某个时刻中国和俄罗斯会互相毁灭，或者发生某种对双方都不利的冲突。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: They won't finish each other off. They're too big to be finished off. Unless we do a nuclear war, then we might finish all of ourselves off. But the idea that there will be some sort of conflict between these two countries… I agree with the idea that China has a lot of people and a lot of wealth. Russia has a lot of water, and it has a lot of resources. These are complementary resources. They both have things that the other party has.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 他们不会互相毁灭的。他们太大了，不可能被彻底消灭。除非我们要打核战争，那我们可能会把咱们所有人都消灭掉。但是关于这两个国家之间会发生某种冲突的想法……我同意中国拥有大量人口和财富的观点。俄罗斯拥有大量的水和资源。这些是互补的资源。双方都有对方想要的东西。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: The question is, will they attain these things through war or through trade? It seems very improbable to me that… China's got a lot of money. It can just pay for Russian oil, it can just pay for water. Why would it invade a nuclear-armed nation?

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 问题是，他们会通过战争还是贸易来获得这些东西？在我看来，（战争）是非常不可能的……中国有很多钱。它完全可以直接花钱买俄罗斯的石油，直接花钱买水。为什么要入侵一个拥有核武器的国家呢？

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: I never said it would do that. It's a question of if Putin feels that his back is up against the wall. What price? We don't really know the terms of their trade... I suspect that whatever the terms of trade are going to be, the Chinese are going to get a really good deal.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我从没说过它会那样做（入侵）。问题在于如果普京觉得他已经被逼到了墙角。代价是什么？我们并不真正知道他们的贸易条款……但我怀疑无论贸易条款是什么，中国人都将获得一笔非常划算的交易。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Does that look like the bromance ending? North Korea has for decades been in a very desperate position. That’s quite a bromance. But there's no risk of North Korea and China going to war. North Korea relies heavily on China. It's not draining China in any way. It's the other way around. That's what Russia's future may be.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 这看起来像是“兄弟情”的终结吗？朝鲜几十年来一直处于非常绝望的境地。那可真是一段“兄弟情”。但朝鲜和中国之间没有开战的风险。朝鲜严重依赖中国。它并没有在任何方面消耗中国。情况恰恰相反。这就是俄罗斯的未来可能的样子。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Apparently certain Russians, when Putin had invaded the big way in Ukraine, said, "Oh my God, that's our future. It's North Korea. That's where we're headed." That could well be their future. It'll just keep going as they pour out wealth and the Chinese will try to get very good terms of trade for resources and be niggardly, meaning giving very few things back.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 显然，当普京在乌克兰大举入侵时，某些俄国人说：“天哪，那就是我们的未来。就是朝鲜。那就是我们要去的地方。”这很可能就是他们的未来。这将继续下去，随着他们耗尽财富，中国人将试图获得非常优厚的资源贸易条款，并且表现得非常吝啬，意味着只回馈极少的东西。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: In 1931, when Japan attacks Manchuria... People in the Politburo are telling Stalin, "Look, we’ve got to be aggressive against this." Stalin says, "Look, I don't want to raise tensions against another great power. Let's just let this slide, let's keep tensions low."... In the case of Japan, it works because Japan decides to attack China and not Russia. In the case of Germany, it doesn't.

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 1931年，当日本进攻满洲时……政治局的人告诉斯大林：“看，我们必须对此采取强硬态度。”斯大林说：“听着，我不想加剧与另一个大国的紧张关系。让我们就随它去吧，保持低紧张度。”……在对日本的案例中，这招奏效了，因为日本决定攻击中国而不是俄罗斯。但在对德国的案例中，这招失败了。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: Yeah, in Germany, he's trying to run the same script. He thinks it's going to work for him. That's what the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is about. Not remotely. He needed to read Mein Kampf to understand, "No, you're a menu item for Hitler. He's eventually going to come around."

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 是的，在德国问题上，他试图照搬同一个剧本。他以为这会对他奏效。这就是《苏德互不侵犯条约》的由来。但根本没用。他真该读读《我的奋斗》来明白这一点：“不，你是希特勒菜单上的一道菜（menu item）。他迟早会找上门来的。”

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: In our own day we don't really want to absorb the bad news. I could be wrong, but I believe that Putin wants not only all of Ukraine... but also he wants the Baltic states and he wants to keep on going. This is profoundly bad news... Stalin tries to work the same magic and thinks it's going to work for him and he doesn't get it. He becomes the menu item for Hitler and it just about wrecks him. But it works beautifully against Japan.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 在我们这个时代，我们真的不想接受坏消息。我可能是错的，但我相信普京不仅想要整个乌克兰……他还想要波罗的海国家，他想继续扩张。这是极坏的消息……斯大林曾试图施展同样的魔法，以为这会奏效，但他没搞懂。他成了希特勒的“盘中餐”，这差点毁了他。但这招对日本却用得极其漂亮。

[原文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: There's another concept that's useful: cooperative adversary. I've introduced this before. It doesn't mean the adversary wants to cooperate with you, but they just don't play their cards particularly well. We're talking about China that has had all of those rebellions... It doesn't have these strong government institutions. It is much easier to script-write a place like that... Whereas with Hitler, Germany has all kinds of institutions... Hoodwinking Hitler is going to be much more difficult than whoever he's dealing with in China in this period.

[译文] [Dwarkesh Patel]: 还有一个有用的概念：合作性对手（cooperative adversary）。我以前介绍过这个。这并不意味着对手想和你合作，而是他们牌打得特别烂。我们谈论的是那个经历了所有那些叛乱的中国……它没有那些强大的政府机构。给那样的地方“写剧本”要容易得多……而面对希特勒，德国有各种各样的机构……忽悠希特勒要比忽悠这一时期他在中国打交道的任何人都要难得多。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: I don't know how long it takes them to do whatever they're going to do... But you need to figure out how to manage it, to have a blast shield so that whatever fallout comes from their toxic, whatever they're doing, it minimizes how it hits your friends and partners. This is why you should be focusing on maximizing the economic growth of your friends and partners, because that is the only effective way to deal with them.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 我不知道他们（中俄）做他们要做的事需要多长时间……但你需要搞清楚如何管理它，建立一个防爆盾（blast shield），以便无论他们那些有毒的行为带来什么后果，都能将对其对你的朋友和伙伴的冲击降到最低。这就是为什么你应该专注于最大化你的朋友和伙伴的经济增长，因为这是对付他们的唯一有效途径。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: If you go it alone, who deals with a bully alone? Always gang up on them. Why would you ever want to go alone against a bully? You'd want to go in with lots of friends. This is what the World War II generation did. The Marshall Plan... You'd have to spend real money so the European economies recover. How are they gonna do it? Buying our stuff. It's a tremendous win-win. In strategy, you wanna figure out win-win things instead of these zero-sum things where, "Oh, I invite you over, I humiliate you, I feel good," and then you're mad forever. It's pointless.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 如果你单打独斗——谁会独自对付一个恶霸？永远要联合起来对付他们（gang up on them）。你为什么要独自对抗恶霸？你会想要和很多朋友一起上。这就是二战那一代人所做的。马歇尔计划……你必须花真金白银让欧洲经济复苏。他们怎么复苏？买我们的东西。这是一个巨大的双赢。在战略上，你要想出双赢的办法，而不是那些零和博弈，比如“哦，我把你请来，我羞辱你一番，我感觉很爽”，然后你永远怀恨在心。那是毫无意义的。

[原文] [Sarah Paine]: So I'm going to quote Pericles, who was the leader of Athens at its height... This warning came on the eve of the succession of Athenian blunders and ancient Athens never recovered: "I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the enemy's devices." Our leaders truly need to ponder this before they wreck all of us, themselves included.

[译文] [Sarah Paine]: 最后我要引用伯里克利的话，他是雅典全盛时期的领袖……这句警告发自雅典一系列战略失误的前夜，而古雅典从此再未恢复元气：“相比敌人的计谋，我更通过恐惧我们自己的错误。”我们的领导人真的需要在他们毁掉我们所有人——包括他们自己——之前，好好思考这一点。